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US national security experts spend years studying, seeking to avoid and sometimes 
helping to mediate or prosecute conflicts. Over time, veteran policy hands in the exec-
utive and legislative branches, as well as academia, thinks tanks and the media, come 
to believe that they understand all the important dimensions of security. And yet, 
for most, one dimension – space – presents a significant gap in their understanding. 
Space’s importance is major, growing and underappreciated inside the Washington 
Beltway.
Over a half century ago, the US-Soviet space race captured the imagination of the 
American people, and the manned space program from the 1960s onward bred na-
tional competence in the design, manufacture and launch of rockets, satellites and 
payloads with ever-greater capabilities. Scientific study, helped by access to space, 
flourished. Civil and military use of space-based communications grew fast as the 
internet, personal computing and cellular telephony gained widespread adoption be-
ginning in the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the Pentagon recognized that the US 
military had developed a dependence on spaced-based communications, such that a 
sudden denial of space-enabled information in wartime could impair the effectiveness 
of combat units.
The military saw from wargaming simulations of future conflict that space assets were 
like a crystal goblet: exquisite but easily shattered. An adversary would naturally con-
template measures to disable US forces’ ability to command and control operations 
across an entire theater of operations, and to access real-time intelligence and target-
ing data supplied from distant sources. The enormous warfighting advantage afforded 
to US forces by space systems was, because of its vulnerability, perceived as an Achilles 
heel.  The conclusion was logical: space had to be defended. 
Space became a “domain,” talked about by defense analysts as one of several discrete 
arenas of potential confrontation, like air, land, sea or nuclear – or more recently, 
cyber. For security experts, these can be useful categories; yet here is where the un-
derappreciation of space becomes acute. It is not just that traditional “terrestrial” war-
fare, involving loss of life, destruction of property and territorial conquest imposes 
readily-visible costs that society has long recognized as vital interests, while the idea 
of attacking satellites in space seems a lesser level of aggression. The deeper problem 
is with the long-term consequences of destructive conflict in space, for these may be 
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poorly anticipated by policymakers during a time of hostilities, and yet, in retrospect, 
these may prove to be more regrettable than all but the most destructive acts of war in 
the other “domains.”
Presidents in the 21st century will expect to exercise close control over any major 
future crisis; many regard the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as the template for wise, 
clever, well-advised presidential decision-making in an escalating confrontation. And 
yet, as useful as experience from the nuclear playbook is, wargames have suggested 
important differences, one of which is that the space domain imposes a particularly 
forbidding time element on the management of a space crisis. Not only will time be 
lost in detecting that US space systems have been interfered with, but knowing with 
certainty that a space system anomaly was due to attack, and assigning unmistakable 
attribution, will consume precious time as well.
Because entire constellations of valuable satellite systems rotating the Earth could be 
destroyed quickly if indeed an adversary is targeting them, military commanders with 
expertise and responsibilities in the space domain will press for an immediate presi-
dential grant of authority to take action. Are security generalists comfortable that they 
could advise the president on decisions and actions that would best serve the US inter-
est in such a scenario?
What makes this domain, and the study of deterrence in space, at once different and 
underappreciated, is the aftermath. Conventional wars can produce fearsome destruc-
tion; lost lives cannot be replaced, but societies recover. Even the nuclear accidents at 
Chernobyl and Fukushima instruct us that relatively small nuclear exposure of civil-
ian populations can be extremely hazardous and hard to manage; yet societies can 
pursue measures to cope with their effects, and recover.  
Imagine, however, a future conflict in which space assets are targeted with destructive 
force. The US Air Force Space Command in recent years hosted wargaming exercises 
that simulated, in one instance, hostilities that required US and allied forces to operate 
for “a day without space.” While loss of space-based communications was mitigated by 
terrestrial systems, the consequences for operating in space were certainly not rem-
edied in a day. Indeed, participants were left to speculate if the United States might be 
contemplating a century or even much longer “without space.”
Consider what this could mean for the reputation of the United States, and for the tra-
jectory of human discovery. Unchecked, hostile action in space could produce debris, 
orbiting the earth at nine times the speed of a bullet, so prevalent as to put at risk all 
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sophisticated spacecraft including satellites. This could place manned and unmanned 
space flight at unacceptable risk of mission failure due to catastrophic collision with 
debris. Not only would investment in, and insurance for, advanced spacecraft and 
launch engineering be extinguished. Of much greater importance, mankind’s access 
to space for exploration and pursuit of knowledge would be closed off – for young 
and old alike, for schoolchildren, scientists and aspiring astronauts, in America and 
around the world, possibly for a very long time. A more toxic legacy for US security 
policy would be hard to conceive.  
That is why the study of space deterrence should matter to all policymakers, and why 
the Stimson Center’s Space Security project, led by Stimson co-founder Michael Kre-
pon, is pleased to present this collection of six essays studying deterrence of destruc-
tive acts in space, drawing from lessons from the nuclear era. I hope you find them of 
interest.  




Acronyms and Key Terms
A2/AD  – anti-access/area denial 
ASAT  – anti-satellite 
BMD  – ballistic missile defense
GEO  – geosynchronous orbit
GGE  – Group of Government Experts
GPS  – global positioning system
ICBM  – intercontinental ballistic missile
ICOC  – International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities
ISR  – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
ITAR  – International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
LEO  – low Earth orbit
LTBT  – limited test ban treaty
MEO  – middle Earth orbit
MIRV  – multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles 
NASA  – National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NRO  – National Reconnaissance Office
OST  – Outer Space Treaty
PNE  – peaceful nuclear explosions
PLNS  – pre- and post-launch notification system
PNT  – precision navigation and timing 
PPWT  – Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 
     and the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects
SALT  – Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SDI  – Strategic Defense Initiative 
SEIS  – space-enabled information services 
START  – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TCBMs  – Transparency and Confidence Building Measures
UNCOPUOS – United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
WMD  – weapons of mass destruction
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Space and Nuclear Deterrence 
By Michael Krepon
“Space deterrence” is defined here as deterring harmful actions by whatever means 
against national assets in space and assets that support space operations. Analogously, 
nuclear deterrence is defined as deterring harmful actions by means of nuclear weap-
ons. Concepts of nuclear deterrence have been well developed. In contrast, attention 
to space deterrence has been sporadic during and after the Cold War, sparked mostly 
when anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities have been tested. These concerns faded after 
the demise of the Soviet Union, and have now revived with the advent of China’s am-
bitious space program. 
DEMONSTRABLE VS. INFERRED DETERRENCE
Nuclear deterrence and space deterrence have common elements as well as distinct 
differences. No difference is more striking than with respect to the visibility of nuclear 
deterrence capabilities compared to the largely inferential nature of space deterrence. 
The advent of nuclear weapons was advertised with spectacular effect, with the mush-
room cloud immediately becoming the symbol of the “atomic age.” Ever since, nuclear 
deterrence widely was presumed to be strengthened by visible displays. Tests of war-
head designs were carried out in the atmosphere and were subsequently driven un-
derground, easily confirmed by seismographs. Missile flight tests repeatedly affirmed 
vigilance and readiness. Some states possessing nuclear weapons still parade nuclear-
capable missiles on national holidays. 
In contrast, capabilities to harm space assets have been tested only occasionally in 
dramatic ways and mostly have been pursued quietly or by indirect methods. Con-
sequently, space warfare capabilities rarely make headlines, unlike actions signaling 
nuclear deterrence, which are the subject of intense public and media attention. While 
nuclear deterrence rests on deployed or readily deployed capabilities, the weaponiza-
tion of space – defined here as the placement of dedicated war-fighting capabilities 
in this domain – has yet to occur. The nuclear superpowers deployed large numbers 
capabilities to harm space assets have been  
pursued quietly or by indirect methods
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of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles carrying thousands of warheads, many ready for 
launch on short notice. At the same time, military capabilities specifically designed to 
harm satellites were rarely deployed, had limited operational utility, and were subse-
quently mothballed during the Cold War.
The Eisenhower administration considered contesting a Soviet “right” to have its 
Sputniks orbiting over US soil, but thought better of it: American satellites would soon 
follow – including ones revealing military secrets in a closed society. It took no great 
gift of prophecy to foresee benefits accruing from the norm of free passage. The Ken-
nedy administration saw fit to position a crude ASAT capability in the Pacific after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis – a decision that extended into the Johnson and Nixon admin-
istrations. This capability was hardly worth the bother in military terms. Presidents 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson were far more interested in beginning 
to establish norms for the peaceful uses of outer space. The Soviet Union was soon 
eclipsed by the United States in the “space race,” and was amenable to downplaying 
the prospect of confrontation in this domain. In 1967, the nuclear superpowers agreed 
to the Outer Space Treaty, their second major codified constraint of their strategic 
competition, after an agreement four years earlier to stop testing nuclear weapons in 
the atmosphere. 
There were, to be sure, periods of heightened military friction and competition in 
space, particularly following Soviet ASAT tests in the 1970s and after President Ron-
ald Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. In retrospect, 
a striking aspect of these periods of heightened competition in space was how little 
residue they left on the strategic competition, and how careful both superpowers were 
not to cross each other’s red lines in space, as well as on the ground and at sea. Just as 
Washington and Moscow learned not to play with fire in particularly sensitive zones 
after crises over Berlin and Cuba, so, too, did they reach tacit and formal agreements 
not to create havoc with each other’s satellites – despite multiple capabilities that en-
abled them to do so. 
One reason why demonstrable deterrence was deemed crucial for the nuclear compe-
tition, while inferential deterrence would suffice for space, was that military capabili-
ties designed for one domain – including missiles deployed for the purpose of nuclear 
a striking aspect of these periods of heightened 
competition was how careful both superpowers were 
not to cross each other’s red lines in space
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deterrence and for missile defense intercepts – could be used in the other. Another 
reason was that after crises in Berlin and Cuba, the United States and the Soviet Union 
acted for the most part as status quo powers. Will this Cold War record of uncommon 
restraint in space continue between a status quo power and a rising power? 
Caution is warranted before reaching overly optimistic or pessimistic answers to these 
questions. Conditions have changed, and the competition between Washington and 
Beijing will be different in crucial respects than that between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Besides, there has never been a consensus in the United States over the 
definition of, and requirements for, successful deterrence. Moreover, Beijing’s strate-
gic objectives and the means that will be employed to achieve them remain opaque. 
What can be said with certainty is that the mix of US-Chinese cooperation and com-
petition in space is not predetermined. Instead, this mix will reflect, and be influenced 
by, a much larger canvas of bilateral relations. 
DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS
The requirements of nuclear deterrence have always been varied and in dispute. De-
cades of living with and arguing about the “Bomb” have not settled these arguments. 
The same is likely to be true with regard to the requirements of space deterrence. No 
one can assert with authority why nuclear deterrence “worked” to prevent battlefield 
use since 1945. Nor is there a convincing body of evidence whether more or fewer 
nuclear weapons, at greater or lesser states of operational readiness, whether deployed 
in different configurations, or whether accompanied by missile defenses, would have 
made thermonuclear warfare more or less likely. The United States and Soviet Union 
embraced excessive requirements for nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Both 
escaped Armageddon despite or because of these requirements, depending on how 
dovish or hawkish one’s inclinations are. 
In the nuclear realm, major debates accompanied the unveiling of the atomic bomb, 
the hydrogen bomb, the intercontinental ballistic missile, sea-based deterrents, mul-
tiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, ballistic missile defenses, and cruise 
missiles. The sheer intensity and duration of the US-Soviet strategic competition en-
Will this Cold War record of uncommon restraint  
in space continue between a status quo power  
and a rising power?
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sured extended debates over the requirements of nuclear deterrence. These debates 
were intensified further by the advent of negotiations to control and reduce nuclear 
capabilities, as the pace of strategic modernization programs typically accelerated 
alongside diplomatic efforts to control the arms race. With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, domestic debates in the United States now have focused on how low US num-
bers can safely go, and how nuclear deterrence can best be maintained in an era of 
deeper reductions. 
Compared with the nuclear arms competition, strikingly new military developments 
in space have been rare occurrences . Moreover, diplomatic initiatives for space were 
rare and mostly consensual occurrences, in stark contrast to nuclear arms control 
and test ban treaties. Consequently, debates over space deterrence and the best ways 
and means for its promotion have been less intense and less frequent than those over 
nuclear deterrence. One big exception was the launch of Sputnik, which generated an 
intense debate over military uses of space and the appropriate US strategic posture. 
When the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations concluded that US na-
tional security was best served by accepting – indeed, seeking to promote – the safe 
passage of satellites overhead, there was less to debate. A significant diplomatic initia-
tive – the 1967 Outer Space Treaty – set some norms of responsible behavior in space, 
placed this domain off-limits to weapons of mass destruction, and elicited broad pub-
lic acceptance. Building on this enduring diplomatic accomplishment, while forging 
a US consensus on the requirements to deter attacks on national assets and critical 
infrastructure relating to space, is likely to be more difficult in an era of hyper-parti-
sanship on Capitol Hill.   
In the absence of a consensus on the requirements of nuclear deterrence in the United 
States, decisions on force structure were shaped more by the legacy of prior nation-
al decisions, domestic politics and economic constraints than by fresh thinking and 
clean-sheet-of-paper strategic planning. Notably, steep reductions in US and Russian 
nuclear arsenals over the past quarter-century have not been accompanied by waves 
of public anxiety in the United States about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. While 
Washington and Moscow continue to have disagreements, it is hard to envision a deep 
crisis between them that could trigger a crossing of the nuclear threshold.  
Compared with the nuclear arms competition, 
strikingly new military developments in space  
have been rare occurrences.
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How much nuclear capability is enough for deterrence elsewhere? The most defen-
sible answer is, “it depends.”  Outlier states, such as North Korea, Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein, and Libya under Muammar Qaddafi, have sought a handful of weapons and 
the means to deliver them to deter attacks by major powers or to extend freedom of 
action within their environs. The issue is still joined as to whether Iran falls in this 
category, or whether Iran’s Supreme Leader would be content with a virtual capability, 
short of weaponization. 
Great Britain and France, major powers possessing legacy arsenals, have the luxury 
to determine the requirements of nuclear deterrence in fixed terms. These require-
ments have been shaped by the interplay of symbolism, budgetary pressures, and the 
presumed value nuclear weapons provide to be “taken seriously” by Washington and 
the international community.
In contrast, India and Pakistan, mid-sized newcomers to the ranks of states possess-
ing nuclear arsenals, have far more pressing security concerns, including territorial 
disputes, recurring crises and the not-too-distant memory of a limited war occurring 
shortly after testing nuclear devices in 1998. Matters have been complicated further 
because of China’s role in assisting the development of Pakistan’s deterrent along with 
Beijing’s parallel pursuit with New Delhi of more consequential roles in Asia. 
Under these circumstances, all three parties in this triangular competition appear to 
have defined nuclear requirements in relative terms. The annual growth of these ar-
senals is the most dynamic feature of contemporary nuclear equations. This triangu-
lar competition could be heightened by externalities, particularly relating to Wash-
ington’s missile defense programs, US defense cooperation agreements with India, 
and the occurrence of contentious issues with Beijing, including in space. At present, 
however, the primary drivers of nuclear deterrence requirements reside within the tri-
angle, marked by the diversification of delivery platforms for nuclear weapons to in-
clude short-range delivery vehicles, sea-based systems as well as cruise missiles. Much 
depends on whether Pakistan, the state that can least afford this competition, relaxes 
its perceived requirements for nuclear deterrence, and whether the two states that can 
most afford to compete, China and India, choose to buttress their national strength 
by downplaying the role of nuclear weapons and by focusing primarily on economic 
growth. If so, their stockpile growth might be far below production capacity. 
How much capability is enough for deterrence?   
The most defensible answer is, “it depends.” 
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DETERMINING SUCCESS
Definitions of “successful” nuclear deterrence require clarification and qualification. 
On two occasions – the Sino-Soviet clash in 1969 and the Kargil conflict in 1999 be-
tween India and Pakistan – the possession of nuclear weapons by neighboring states 
did not prevent border skirmishes and limited wars. Instead, the acquisition of overt 
nuclear capabilities may actually have emboldened the weaker state to engage in risk-
taking of this kind. Nor has the possession of nuclear weapons deterred wars or en-
sured successful outcomes in wars with non-nuclear-weapon states, including the 
1982 war between Great Britain and Argentina; the 1979 border war between China 
and Vietnam; the US war in Indochina from 1964 to 1973; and wars waged by the So-
viet Union from 1979 to 1989 and the United States from 2001 onward in Afghanistan. 
 The possession of nuclear weapons has not prevented harrowing crises between nu-
clear-armed states over Cuba in 1962, in the Middle East in 1973, between the US and 
the Soviet Union in 1983, and between Indian and Pakistan sparked by spectacular 
acts of terrorism in 2001 and 2008. While consensus is illusive on the role of nuclear 
weapons in these cases, the preponderance of evidence suggests that nuclear weap-
ons were not useful in compelling an adversary to alter unwanted or harmful behav-
ior during these crises. Nuclear threats by the Eisenhower administration directed 
against China during the Korean War might be an exception to the above cases. If so, 
the success was qualified, since US compellent threats appear to have hastened Bei-
jing’s acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent. 
Despite this historical record, the presumption that deterrence is strengthened by 
stockpile growth, diversification and dynamism remain strongly held within nuclear 
enclaves. A contrary view has been offered most persuasively by those who have been 
tested in the crucible of crises where breakdowns of nuclear deterrence were possible. 
During severe crises, crisis managers become their own action officers, so very few in-
dividuals have been in positions to provide first-hand assessments of how close “suc-
cessful” nuclear deterrence came to breaking down. From this chastened perspective, 
the size and war-fighting characteristics of opposing arsenals has mattered less than 
preventing even a single nuclear detonation in times of deep crisis. 
The Cuban missile crisis is, thus far, the most harrowing and carefully researched case 
study on the limited utility of nuclear weapons in deep crisis. McGeorge Bundy, Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy’s national security advisor, famously reflected on these matters 
seven years afterward:
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It is one thing for military men to maintain our deterrent force with vigilant 
skill, and it is quite another to assume that their necessary contingency plans 
have any serious interest for political leaders. The object of political men – 
quite rightly – is that these weapons should never be used. … Political leaders, 
whether here or in Russia, are cut from a very different mold than strategic 
planners. They see cities and people as part of what they are trying to help – 
not as targets.6
Nikita Khrushchev arrived at much the same conclusion in his memoirs. Khrushchev 
concluded that, “Any fool can start a war, and once he’s done so, even the wisest of 
men are helpless to stop it—especially if it’s a nuclear war.”7 His thinking mirrored 
Bundy’s: “I knew that the United States could knock out some of our installations [in 
Cuba], but not all of them. If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived—even 
if only one or two big ones were left—we could still hit New York, and there wouldn’t 
be much of New York left.”8 His bottom line was that ”both sides showed that if the 
desire to avoid war is strong enough, even the most pressing dispute can be solved by 
compromise … The episode ended in a triumph of common sense.”9 
There is no reason to believe that other US and Soviet leaders would have shared 
Bundy’s and Khrushchev’s views had they been handling the Cuban missile crisis. 
Nor can we assume that their instincts would apply to contemporary national lead-
ers in China, India and Pakistan if faced with the same crucible of decision. And yet, 
the “enormous gulf ” that Bundy witnessed first-hand during the Cuban missile cri-
sis – the “gulf between what political leaders really think about nuclear weapons and 
what is assumed in complex calculations of relative ‘advantage’ in simulated strategic 
warfare”10 – remains as true today as was the case then. Bundy characterized those 
seeking added targeting and use options for nuclear weapons – as is now evident in 
China, India and Pakistan – as living in an “unreal world”: 
In the real world of real political leaders … a decision that would bring even 
one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s own country would be recognized in 
advance as a catastrophic blunder; 10 bombs on 10 cities would be a disaster 
beyond history.11 
In Bundy’s view, successful nuclear deterrence is not about seeking relative advantage 
or disadvantage. It’s not about the quest for superiority, and it’s not about nuclear war-
fighting scenarios. Other notable US strategists, such as Paul Nitze, held diametrically 
opposite views. Regardless of their differences, men like Bundy and Nitze could agree 
that nuclear deterrence was necessary and conducive to restraint in deep crisis. Above 
all, successful nuclear deterrence was – and is – about not crossing the nuclear threshold. 
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The recollections of Khrushchev and Bundy constitute a very small but significant sample 
that force size was not determinative in the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis. The United 
States held an overwhelming edge in nuclear capability; indeed, this edge was one reason 
for Khrushchev’s gamble to place Soviet nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in 
Cuba. Nonetheless, those with powers of decision did their utmost to avoid crossing the 
nuclear threshold. To those responsible for decision making, the prevention of one nuclear 
detonation mattered more than the imbalance in nuclear forces. 
By logical extension, one can argue that a mutual desire to avoid nuclear exchanges makes 
an imbalance of conventional capabilities even more consequential in a deep crisis or in 
warfare. The two limited wars between nuclear-armed states after the Cuban missile crisis 
point to this hypothesis: the United States enjoyed overwhelming advantages in conven-
tional capabilities in the Caribbean, and the Soviet Union possessed far more conventional 
firepower and logistical capability than the People’s Republic of China, which was reeling 
from the Cultural Revolution in 1969. India was initially disadvantaged during the Kargil 
War, but was quickly able to mobilize advantageous conventional capability to the front. 
The 2001-2 “Twin Peaks” crisis between India and Pakistan, sparked by an attack on the 
Indian Parliament by militants trained in Pakistan, did not result in limited warfare, in 
large part because Indian decision makers did not have favorable military options after the 
Pakistan Army mobilized to block Indian Army offensives.   
This cautionary and fortunately limited historical record indicates that fearsome weapons 
that political leaders do not wish to use provide few advantages in crises and limited wars. 
Nuclear weapons do have inherent powers to dissuade leaders from taking military action, 
but the disposition of conventional forces near potential fighting corridors can produce the 
same result. Political leaders have not found the size of their nuclear arsenals or their war-
fighting potential comforting in deep crises. Neither has the possession of a nuclear deter-
rent been helpful for compellence, nor for avoiding defeats in conventional wars. Instead, 
the possession of offsetting nuclear weapons has made crises and limited wars especially 
nerve-wracking, despite the best efforts of national leaders to avoid crossing the nuclear 
threshold. Some crisis managers have been emboldened by having greater nuclear war-
fighting capabilities than an adversary, but their sense of martial conviction was notably 
absent among those responsible for determining whether to cross the nuclear threshold.
Academic debates over this conclusion have not been entirely settled. One recent analysis 
by Matthew Kroenig concludes that, “States that enjoy nuclear superiority over their oppo-
nents are more likely to prevail in nuclear crises. … Nuclear superiority aids states in games 
of nuclear brinkmanship by increasing their levels of effective resolve.” 12 The hazards of 
Kroenig’s assessment are evident in his conclusion that the outcome of the 1999 Kargil crisis 
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was due in part to India’s advantageous strategic force posture. In actuality, Pakistan had a 
greater capability to deliver nuclear weapons than India during the crisis but was diplomati-
cally isolated and conventionally disadvantaged. 
While the size and features of a nuclear deterrent matter less than the possession of “the 
bomb” and its assured means of delivery, this does not mean that size is completely irrel-
evant. Size may be one of many other reasons that induce national leaders to exercise cau-
tion in deep crises. A small, survivable nuclear arsenal might also be sufficiently persuasive 
as a deterrent – but this, too, is a supposition, not a certainty. In the case of severe crises 
between Pakistan and India after both countries demonstrated their nuclear deterrents in 
1998, Indian leaders acted with restraint. They did so, in part, because economic growth 
rates were more important than responding militarily to mass-casualty assaults and, in part, 
because of the absence of targets in Pakistan that were both meaningful and not likely to 
prompt unwanted escalation. Despite these qualifiers, national leaders usually opt for more 
and better nuclear capabilities after a severe crisis. The equation of more nuclear might with 
greater security has become a bedrock belief within nuclear enclaves — even though the 
more nuclear-armed adversaries compete, the less secure they feel. 
Despite – or because of – the uncertainties noted above, these cases point in the direction 
of a narrow conception and definition of successful nuclear deterrence. One measure of 
success can be defined as inducing cautionary behavior between nuclear-armed adversar-
ies. Caution is of great value in avoiding crises, and it is of greater value in the event that 
crises cannot be avoided. Caution is most valuable when nuclear-armed states engage in 
limited warfare. Nuclear deterrence succeeds most clearly when adversaries avoid crossing 
the nuclear threshold. The exercise of caution during severe crisis and limited hostilities as 
well as avoiding a crossing of the nuclear threshold have become the core definitions of suc-
cessful nuclear deterrence during and after the Cold War. These core definitions of success, 
while greatly circumscribed, remain immensely important.
Since the relationship between nuclear force size and the promotion of cautious behavior 
cannot be proved, proponents and opponents of nuclear weapons can continue to adhere 
firmly to contrary articles of faith. Those who view the value of nuclear deterrence expan-
sively share a common assumption that more capability equals more advantage – especially 
when an adversary is engaged in a nuclear build-up. In this view, the more foreboding the 
edifice of deterrence looks, the less inclined an adversary will be to cross red lines. Conse-
quently, nuclear-armed states concerned about surprise attack and rapid escalation reject 
constructs of minimum or finite deterrence in favor of additional targeting and use options. 
Those who ascribe limited value to nuclear deterrence argue that greater targeting and use 
options place greater stress on command, control, safety and security in times of crisis. 
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While these debates haven’t been resolved, skeptics appear to have the better argu-
ment by focusing on one of the many paradoxes associated with nuclear deterrence: 
immediately below the meta-level that defines success lie conditions for its potential 
failure. During crises, when nuclear capable forces are readied for use, the possibilities 
for inadvertent use, breakdowns in command and control, and accidental use grow. 
Because diversified use options distribute weak points within the edifice of deterrence 
as it grows, crisis and deterrence stability grow shakier as a result. These dynamics 
were present during the Cold War superpower competition, and they are present on a 
far smaller scale in the crisis-prone relations between India and Pakistan.
Severe crises and limited wars clarify the limits and the requirements of successful 
nuclear deterrence established during the Cold War. Deterrence that succeeds “only” 
in preventing a crossing of the nuclear threshold succeeds greatly, even if nuclear 
weapon holdings do not succeed in compelling desired behavior or in altering the 
course of limited conflict. Because the primary threats to successful nuclear deter-
rence relate to accidents and loss of control in deep crisis, three operational require-
ments for successful nuclear deterrence are of overriding importance: secure second-
strike capabilities, effective command and control mechanisms over the use of nuclear 
weapons, and effective safety and security mechanisms to prevent accidental as well 
as unauthorized use. 
The assurance of devastating retaliation, provision of effective command and control, 
and maintenance of safety and security measures can be costly and complex, but they 
do not require huge edifices of deterrence based on widely diversified targeting and 
use options. “Deterrence,” as Kenneth Waltz concluded, 
is easier to contrive than most strategists have believed. … If one thinks of 
strategies as being designed for defending national objectives or for gaining 
them by military force and as implying a choice about how major wars will be 
fought, nuclear weapons make strategy obsolete.” 13
three operational requirements are of overriding 
importance: secure second-strike capabilities, 
effective command and control mechanisms, and 
effective safety and security mechanisms to prevent 
accidental as well as unauthorized use.
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On this last point, Sir Lawrence Freedman arrived at a similar conclusion – that the 
term “nuclear strategy” was a contradiction in terms.14 
EXTRAPOLATING TO CHINA AND  
TO SPACE DETERRENCE 
The United States maintains a great many nuclear weapons and diverse means for 
their delivery to deter a similarly armed and similarly vulnerable adversary. This force 
posture was sized in comparison with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and sub-
sequently to the Russian Federation. Force sizing to deter the Kremlin appears suffi-
cient for all lesser cases, including the objective of dissuading the People’s Republic of 
China from seeking to compete with the United States in this realm. US nuclear forces 
continue to be maintained in a high state of readiness – albeit not as high as during the 
Cold War – to deter surprise attack and to provide the National Command Authority 
with prompt and varied options in the event of a breakdown in nuclear deterrence. 
In contrast, the requirements to deter attacks on US space assets, at present, do not 
appear to include kinetic-energy weapons dedicated to space deterrence that are de-
ployed in space, on land or at sea. Dedicated ASAT weapon systems were considered 
deployed for portions of the Cold War, but they were rudimentary and poorly suited 
for operational requirements. They were not replaced, systematically upgraded and 
repeatedly tested to demonstrate vigilance, resolve and to reinforce deterrence , as was 
the case for nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.15 
The Soviet Union possessed far more formidable military space and nuclear capabili-
ties than the People’s Republic of China does now. The United States engaged in mini-
mal commerce with the Soviet Union, compared to significant trade and financial in-
teractions currently with China. The Cold War contest between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was ideological, global and geopolitical. In contrast, the competition 
between the United States and China lacks an ideological dimension and is, at present, 
more regional than global. These contrasts suggest that the relatively relaxed US-So-
viet military competition in space might carry forward in a competitive relationship 
Dedicated ASAT weapon systems were rudimentary 
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between the United States and China. On the other hand, Beijing’s intentions and am-
bitions are unclear, and bilateral cooperation in space between the United States and 
China is minimal compared to the US-Soviet and US-Russian experience.  
There can be no doubt that space has become, as the Obama administration has noted 
repeatedly, more competitive, contested and congested than during the Cold War.16 
Features of space operations have changed markedly, including the advent of commer-
cial space operations and profit-taking related to satellites, the increase in the number 
of nations utilizing space for varied purposes, and the criticality of space systems for 
military operations. All major space-faring nations increasingly rely on satellites, but 
none more so than the United States. Multinational partnerships in space now figure 
prominently; the sharing of benefits and risks might alter deterrence calculations, as 
well. All of this, and more, is significantly different from the first three decades of the 
Space Age. Does this mean that Cold War-era calculations of the requirements for 
space deterrence have fundamentally changed?  
To answer this crucial question, we must first try to reach an informed judgment as 
to why the requirements for space deterrence were presumed to be so different from 
nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, and then to assess whether these conditions 
remain in place. One possible reason is that major powers have long considered war-
fare in space to be linked to nuclear warfare. If so, the requirements of the former 
might have been subsumed in the latter. The linkages between nuclear warfare and 
activities in space are numerous and well understood. Satellites are connected in many 
ways to the execution of nuclear war-fighting plans by helping with weather forecast-
ing; targeting, indications and warning of attacks; assessing damage and maintaining 
command, control and communications. During the Cold War, the contestants un-
derstood that to disable or attack these satellites by whatever means was unlikely to 
be viewed in a vacuum. Instead, attacks on critical assets and infrastructure in space 
commonly were viewed in the gravest terms, regardless of whether they were precur-
sors to attacks on nuclear forces . These conditions continue to remain in place. 
An appreciation of the linkages between space assets and nuclear assets does not, 
however, explain why nuclear tests were so prevalent and why ASAT tests were so 
limited during the Cold War. Despite the clear linkages between nuclear and space 
attacks on critical assets and infrastructure in 
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deterrence, requirements for the former were excessive and requirements for the latter 
were relatively relaxed. As noted earlier, this dichotomy can probably be explained, in 
some measure, by the abundance of other means to interfere with, damage or destroy 
critical assets in space, including non-kinetic kill mechanisms such as lasers and jam-
mers. Counter-space capabilities reside in conventional- and nuclear-armed weapon 
systems, including missiles of various kinds, along with missile defense interceptors. 
The perceived requirements for dedicated systems to engage in space warfare might 
well have been reduced significantly because of these residual or latent capabilities. 
These conditions remain in effect. Indeed, latent capabilities to engage in space war-
fare have grown, and have become more prominent because missile defense intercep-
tors have been tested dramatically in an ASAT mode by China in 2007 and by the 
United States in 2008. 
A third possible explanation for Cold War restraint – albeit one that has become far 
more appreciated of late – might relate to the indiscriminate, abhorrent and self-de-
feating nature of some means to engage in warfare in space. This first became apparent 
with respect to atmospheric nuclear testing. These tests generated public revulsion 
and political activism. By the early 1960s, concerns over public health dangers arising 
from atmospheric tests overrode the arguments of those who desired their continua-
tion to clarify military and operational requirements. Less well known were the poten-
tial hazards of atmospheric tests to the health of the first astronauts and cosmonauts, 
as well as to the first satellites placed in low Earth orbit. One particularly powerful US 
test on July 9, 1962, Starfish Prime, damaged at least six fledgling satellites.17 
Space debris poses a clear and present danger in space analogous to the danger atmo-
spheric testing posed to satellites and human exploration at the dawn of the space age. 
The hazards of ASAT tests involving “hit-to-kill” technologies first became apparent 
during the Cold War, when a 1985 US ASAT test created over 250 pieces of trackable 
space debris, one of which came within one mile of the newly launched international 
space station 14 years later. The abhorrent, indiscriminate and self-defeating conse-
quences of debris-causing ASAT tests were not widely appreciated during the Cold 
War because few of these tests were carried out.18
A kinetic-energy ASAT test conducted in 2007 by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
ended complacency over the hazards of space debris. This ASAT test produced more 
latent capabilities to engage in space warfare have 
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than 3,000 pieces of debris large enough to track, and tens of thousands of smaller 
pieces, endangering human spaceflight and hundreds of satellites, without regard for 
ownership and nationality.19 The Pentagon demonstrated an agile, sea-based ASAT 
capability in 2008 by shooting down a non-functioning intelligence satellite, in a man-
ner that minimized debris consequences. As a result of these tests, as well as other 
significant debris-causing events, recognition of the potential environmental conse-
quences of space warfare is unquestionably greater now than during the Cold War. 
Reaction to the PLA’s 2007 ASAT did not spark mass protests, unlike the case of atmo-
spheric testing. This ASAT test did, however, alarm space operators to such an extent 
that an international norm against further tests of this kind might take hold. 
While the fragility of the global commons might induce restraint with regard to ki-
netic-energy ASATs, there are other means to interfere with and damage satellites. 
As noted above, lasers and jammers could also be employed to disrupt space opera-
tions, and could do so without creating debris fields. In this event, one critical element 
of space deterrence, as with nuclear deterrence, is the ability to determine who has 
sought to damage space assets, or succeeded in doing so, by non-kinetic means. 
Attribution is a critical prior step to the choice of retribution. The attribution prob-
lem is likely to be harder with regard to space warfare, if for no other reason than the 
list of potential suspects is longer, including perpetrators that may not be under the 
control of governments.20 The attribution problem is, however, not unique to space 
warfare; it also applies to acts of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism. One means 
of deterrence across domains is the distribution of varied means of observation: some 
perpetrators might not carry out hostile acts if they have reason to expect discovery. 
Thus, redundant means of space situational awareness can serve deterrent purposes. 
Similarly, the development of forensic capabilities to attribute responsibility backs up 
deterrence across domains, but is likely to be more difficult in space, where physical 
evidence cannot be examined properly. In all domains, the context within which hos-
tile actions are taken is likely to be strongly suggestive of the perpetrator, but may not 
be definitive. 
Space debris poses a clear and present danger in 
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Another common aspect of nuclear and space deterrence is the requirement for re-
silience.21 The value of any attack on space assets diminishes in proportion to the 
victim’s ability to compensate, recoup losses and respond appropriately. Deterrence 
against limited attacks, including attacks by non-kinetic means, is thereby reinforced 
by the evident ability to adjust to disruptions and losses of capability. Limited attacks 
and disruptions might well be more likely in asymmetric warfare than in confronta-
tions between major powers because the weaker party can expect to have less to lose 
in space warfare. At the same time, the weaker party might have insufficient means to 
disrupt the space operations of the dominant power – except by using nuclear deto-
nations that would badly affect space assets of all major powers. Outlier states might 
have few friends, but they are unlikely to want to alienate them by disrupting their 
space operations.
Worst-case projections of a failure in space deterrence – as with the worst case pro-
jection of a failure of nuclear deterrence – involve catastrophic losses from a surprise 
attack. For some, the worst case of a “space Pearl Harbor” has displaced Cold War con-
cerns over a disarming “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack against US nuclear forces . Only 
major powers have the capacity for massive attacks against a wide range of space assets 
in low Earth and geosynchronous orbits, as well as in between. The most persuasive 
deterrent against the low probability, but high-consequence nature of worst cases is the 
evident ability to respond with devastating effect to grievous injury. In the worst case 
of a bolt-out-of-the-blue, massive nuclear attack, deterrence was reinforced by clarify-
ing the degree of difficulty for the attacker’s success and the horrific consequences of 
failure. 
The worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack postulates that a nuclear re-
sponse would cause insufficient retribution, or might be withheld to avoid even more 
fearsome punishment. Those who focus on the worst case of a breakdown in space 
deterrence argue that the aggressor has a greater likelihood of success than with a 
surprise nuclear attack, and that the victim will be reluctant to respond by crossing 
the nuclear threshold. While worst cases lie on the improbable end of the spectrum of 
possibilities, they cannot be ignored. US and Soviet leaders spent excessive amounts 
of money and deployed improbable numbers of nuclear weapons to guard against 
worst cases. The resulting nuclear force postures built to deter bolt-out-of-the-blue 
the worst case of a “space Pearl Harbor” has 
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attacks were not very reassuring. To the contrary, the buildup of nuclear war-fighting 
capabilities to deal with worst cases raised insecurity. In a far more constrained bud-
getary environment, US national leaders must decide now how much of a deterrence 
and insurance policy to buy against a low probability/high consequence scenario of a 
massive surprise attack in space. 
A severe crisis between major powers that plays out in space will reflect the magnitude 
of the stakes involved – a space age Cuban missile crisis . National leaders contem-
plating the first move of space warfare will face the same unalterable dilemmas of 
choice that Kennedy and Khrushchev faced. A leader can choose limited warfare for 
extremely uncertain gains and the possibility of uncontrolled escalation, or seek vic-
tory with the potential of all-out warfare and devastating consequences. 
In the first-ever severe crisis between major powers in space, both contestants will 
possess the capacity to deny each other’s pursuit of space dominance. In this way, 
the nature of the space domain, where offense easily trumps defense, is like the nu-
clear domain. Consequently, the contestants will be unable confidently to ensure de-
cisive victory by means of surprise attack. Just as protection from fallout in nuclear 
exchanges cannot be secured, so, too, will the first use of kinetic-energy ASATs be 
self-denying: mutating debris fields will make large swaths of space inoperable to one’s 
own satellites, either quickly or over time. The use of non-kinetic-energy ASATs on a 
modest scale invites retaliation in kind or retaliation across domains. The use of non-
kinetic-energy ASATs on a massive scale invites massive retaliation, if not in kind, 
then across domains. In the event of a severe crisis between Washington and Beijing, 
would a Chinese leader risk everything with this cosmic throw of the dice?
In the event of warfare in space between major powers, national leaders will face an 
abundance of risk, just as they would in the event of warfare on the ground or at sea. 
The presumption inherent in worst case projections of space warfare is that disabling 
violence in space will dissuade conventional military responses and will not spill over 
to nuclear warfare. This assumption of compartmentalization weakens deterrence in 
all domains. The “space Pearl Harbor” scenario also assumes that warfare in space, 
unlike warfare in other domains, can be executed without unwelcome surprises, mis-
calculations, accidents or breakdowns in command and control. 
A severe crisis between major powers that plays 
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US and Soviet leaders did not presume this to be the case during the Cold War, and US 
and Chinese leaders need not presume this to be the case in the future. The conclusion 
reached by Kurt Gottfried and Richard Ned Lebow during a dark Cold War chapter 
of heightened military competition in space seems equally relevant in a US-China 
context: “ASATs possess a considerably greater capacity for transforming a crisis into 
a war, and for enlarging wars, than they do for assisting in military missions or en-
hancing deterrence.”22 This conclusion seems equally applicable to space warfare by 
kinetic or non-kinetic means. With the benefit of hindsight, concerns over the worst 
case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack now seem quite overdrawn. While mili-
tary plans to execute this scenario existed, political leaders sought to avoid executing 
them. Worst case assessments of a space Pearl Harbor seem unlikely, as well. 
If a breakdown in space deterrence occurs, it could be as a result of seeking tactical 
advantage in conjunction with limited military operations. Alternatively, a breakdown 
of space deterrence could be a defensive act for signaling purposes, as has often been 
postulated with a breakdown of nuclear deterrence. In either case, deterrence break-
downs are most likely to happen on a limited scale alongside attempts to maintain, as 
much as possible, the military use of space. While worst-case scenarios appear im-
plausible, there may well be a greater potential ambit for limited warfare in space, 
since satellite interference and disruption can be reversible. The requirements to shore 
up deterrence or to compensate for a breakdown of deterrence in these scenarios are 
far more modest than the requirements to deal with worst cases.  
Breakdowns of space deterrence could also take the form of attacks on ground-based 
critical infrastructure, whether by non-state actors, special operation forces, air strikes 
or by other means. Attacks on the US homeland or on US installations abroad could 
reasonably be expected to prompt retaliation of a kind and intensity deemed justified 
by US leaders. Responses might be proportionate or disproportionate to the damage 
incurred. In these scenarios, a wide range of military options would be at the disposal 
of US leaders. In this sense, the notion of “cross-domain” deterrence, which is often 
discussed as having special relevance to space, is not inherently unique or distinct 
to this domain. No country enjoys a wider range of choice to reinforce deterrence 
than the United States. Retaliation in kind has always undergirded deterrence in the 
nuclear domain, but US decision makers have never been obliged to respond in kind 
and in the same domain with regard to hostile actions not involving nuclear weapons. 
the notion of “cross-domain” deterrence is not 
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The common thread running through this wide range of contingencies is the difficulty 
US decision makers will face in deciding on appropriate responses while maintain-
ing escalation control. In deep crises between major powers, deterrent capabilities 
will be tested not just against each other, but against the ability of national leaders to 
keep events in harness. The great edifices of nuclear deterrence constructed during 
the Cold War had built-in weaknesses – far less against surprise attack than against 
maintaining command and control over battlefield and accidental use. The same con-
ditions might well apply to space, where the edifices of deterrence have been infer-
ential and modest. Because severe crises in space, unlike deep crises associated with 
offsetting nuclear arsenals, have yet to occur, weaknesses in systems of space deter-
rence have not been tested fully and may be poorly understood. Deterrence capabili-
ties will always look better in the abstract than in the crucible of decision making after 
deterrence fails. Resilient and redundant capabilities in space are helpful, to the extent 
that they are affordable, to convey deterrence messages. The message of cross-domain 
deterrence may also be helpful, but does not make decision making any easier in the 
event of a breakdown in deterrence.   
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
This 2007 Chinese ASAT test, like the launch of Sputnik 50 years earlier, has sparked 
debates over the preferred mix of competition and cooperation in space between ma-
jor powers. The US debate over Sputnik was not answered definitively and was revis-
ited at particularly harsh junctures during the Cold War. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test 
clarified, if further clarification were needed, the choices under consideration. The 
fragility of operations in space offers the possibility of a shared understanding among 
major space-faring nations to cooperate in protecting and utilizing this domain. This 
hopeful hypothesis has always coexisted with justifiable reasons for pessimism. Ca-
pabilities to carry out warfare in space are growing and have never been greater. As 
was the case during the Cold War nuclear competition, the growth of war-fighting 
capabilities can be unnerving as well as deterring. 
In deep crises between major powers, deterrent 
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Major powers in the nuclear age have managed so far to cooperate as well as compete. 
They can do so in space, as well. Nuclear diplomacy is commonplace, while space di-
plomacy has been pursued rarely. Nuclear competition is usually ramped up alongside 
diplomatic efforts. To a lesser extent, this has been true for space diplomacy. This was 
evident prior to and during the brief period of ASAT talks during the administration 
of President Jimmy Carter. It is also evident at present, when Washington, Moscow 
and Beijing are championing quite different diplomatic initiatives. In the vacuum cre-
ated by the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
Russia and China have promoted a treaty to ban the use of force and weapons in outer 
space. The United States, the European Union and Japan favor an International Code 
of Conduct for space. The Russian and Chinese approach, calling for an unverifiable, 
Kellogg-Briand-like, hortatory treaty, is neither feasible nor advisable. By comparison, 
an International Code of Conduct has practical, near-term potential to establish and 
strengthen norms for responsible behavior in space. These diplomatic initiatives have 
been punctuated by rare displays of hit-to-kill ASAT capabilities.
While the concurrency of diplomatic initiatives and heightened military competition 
is not new, widespread recognition of the precariousness of space as a global com-
mons is a relatively recent phenomenon. The prevalence and dangers of space debris 
in low Earth orbit factors into space deterrence calculations in ways that have yet 
to be appreciated widely. Deterrence is reinforced when a particular means of war-
fare is commonly viewed as self-defeating – even when an adversary takes no ac-
tion in response. Deterrence is also reinforced when a particular means of warfare is 
commonly viewed as being likely to result in unwanted and uncontrolled escalation. 
Kinetic-energy ASATs qualify on both counts. Their use would be self-defeating in 
the sense that the resulting debris can place one’s own satellites and space operations 
at risk. Moreover, the pinball effects of mutating debris fields increase the likelihood 
of uncontrolled escalation in terms of additional damage accruing to satellites from 
follow-on debris hits. If these phenomena are well understood, deterrence against 
kinetic-energy warfare in space is greater now than ever before. 
Kinetic acts of warfare between major powers directed at space assets on the ground 
pose a significant likelihood of prompting unwanted or uncontrolled escalation of 
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a different kind. The United States and the Soviet Union experienced severe crises 
during the Cold War, playing with fire in Berlin and Cuba, as well as in the eastern 
Mediterranean, where naval forces operated in close proximity during the 1973 crisis 
in support of friendly governments in the Middle East. After these extremely tense 
encounters, both nuclear superpowers continued to jockey for geopolitical advantage, 
but did so by employing proxies and by taking advantage of each other’s missteps in 
locales peripheral to supreme national interests. In all of these cases, the United States 
and the Soviet Union avoided the direct use of force, knowing that kinetic engage-
ments could spiral out of control and that a crossing of the nuclear threshold might 
lead to uncontrollable events.
During the Cold War and immediately after, the scenario of a direct clash between the 
United States and China that seemed most worrisome involved Taiwan. This scenario 
remains possible, but is widely regarded as being less likely due to the extent of trade 
and investment between Taipei and the mainland. If this assessment proves to be cor-
rect, it has important relevance to the prospect of warfare in space or on the ground 
between the United States and China. Trade and financial interactions between the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are significant and growing. 
If nuclear deterrence constitutes a mutual hostage relationship, the same dynamic 
applies to nuclear-armed states that engage in activities that shore up each other’s 
national economy. The Soviet Union and the United States engaged in one mutual 
hostage relationship, but not the other. The PRC and the United States engage in not 
one, but two, mutual hostage relationships. The combination of nuclear deterrence 
and economic co-dependency suggests that acts of warfare in space can be deterred, 
and that the requirements to do so might not be more onerous than during the Cold 
War, when economic co-dependency did not accompany nuclear deterrence.   
Of all the Cold War cases, the 1973 crisis in the eastern Mediterranean might have the 
most relevance to contemporary concerns of a clash between the United States and 
China. To be sure, analogizing from the 1973 Middle East crisis requires many qualifi-
ers. China, unlike the Soviet Union and the United States in 1973, has no close friends 
to protect from offshore. Unlike the Soviet Union (and Russia at present), Beijing has 
not extended help to friendly countries that have found themselves in trouble of their 
own making. For example, China’s “all-weather” friend, Pakistan, has reached out to 
Beijing for help during severe crises with India, and Pakistani leaders have returned 
home empty handed in each case. 
Despite these and other differences, the 1973 crisis and a potential clash between the 
US and Soviet navies in the eastern Mediterranean still resonates with respect to US-
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China relations. There are territorial disputes between Beijing and US friends and al-
lies in the East China and South China seas. Beijing has upgraded its declared national 
interests in these territorial disputes, and is extending the reach of its naval capabili-
ties. As Michael Nacht has noted, both Washington and Beijing embrace anti-access, 
area denial military strategies, although US capabilities are not described as such.23 
This, together with asymmetrical capabilities and interests, could well lead to friction 
in space, on the ground and, especially, at sea. 
The explosive potential of a clash at sea between the US and Chinese navies has now 
eclipsed prior concerns regarding Taiwan. During the Cold War, the United States 
and the Soviet Union both pursued anti-access, area denial strategies and capabilities. 
Moreover, Washington and Moscow possessed asymmetric capabilities and interests, 
no less than is currently the case between the United States and the PRC. And yet, the 
very circumstances that have led some to conclude that warfare in space between the 
United States and China is inevitable did not result in warfare in space, on the ground, 
or at sea between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The primary distinction between these two cases is the absence of commerce with a 
Cold War adversary and the prevalence of economic competition and co-dependen-
cy with China. In the view of space deterrence pessimists, warfare typically follows 
commerce. As the 2001 Space Commission report chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, who 
was soon to become US secretary of defense, argued, “The political, economic and 
military value of space systems makes them attractive targets for state and non-state 
actors hostile to the United States and its interests.”24 Skeptics of space deterrence are 
arguing, in effect, that advantages in military space capabilities matter greatly, while 
significant US advantages in nuclear and conventional forces may have insufficient 
deterrent effect. 
These skeptics reinforce their case on the shaky ground of historical inevitability. As 
the 2001 space commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld concluded, “We know from 
history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates 
that space will be no different.”25 There is, however, no historical inevitability associ-
ated with matters of war and peace in the nuclear and space age. Those offering the 
words “history proves” are rarely historians. As Bernard Brodie – a naval historian by 
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training – has wryly noted, “When one hears the phrase ‘history proves’ one should 
get ready for bad history and worse logic.” 26 It is as hazardous to argue the future 
inevitability of warfare between the United States and China as it was to assert the 
inevitability of warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War. Military plans are not determinative. Clashes between major powers have 
become rare by historical standards, especially since the advent of nuclear weapons 
and satellites . Friction between the United States and China resulting from economic 
competition is far more likely to result in protective tariffs than in warfare. 
A space Pearl Harbor – to borrow once more from the 2001 Rumsfeld space com-
mission report27 – is possible, just as a massive surprise attack with nuclear weapons 
has always been possible. But neither is probable as long as the basic requirements of 
space deterrence, as with nuclear deterrence, are met. Cold War history was studded 
with crises and the occasional proxy war, but no instances of direct conflict between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. In large measure, most historians and strate-
gists attribute this surprising fact partly to offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities. To 
dismiss the argument of historical inevitability is not, therefore, to dismiss the value 
of deterrence. Deterrence helped to avoid nuclear exchanges and warfare in space 
between two superpowers inclined toward the status quo after their searing crises 
over Berlin and Cuba. This record of accomplishment can also extend to competition 
between a status quo power and a rising power – and with far less onerous deterrence 
requirements. 
CONCLUSION
The US dependency on space will grow as Chinese military space capabilities grow. As 
a consequence, the United States is obliged to reinforce space deterrence capabilities 
while engaging in diplomatic initiatives aimed at reassurance . This combination of 
initiatives proved successful during the Cold War, and can continue to be successful 
in the future. 
The key elements of space deterrence, as with nuclear deterrence, are secure retalia-
tory capabilities sufficient to deny advantages to an attacker, effective command and 
control mechanisms, and redundant safety and security mechanisms to prevent ac-
cidental as well as unauthorized use of military capabilities. In addition, successful 
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deterrence requires situational awareness, attribution capabilities, as well as resilient 
space assets so that the United States is able to identify the perpetrator of harmful ac-
tions and continue to utilize space for national and economic security despite these 
acts. 
These requirements are not controversial, although they may not be affordable in suf-
ficient measure – as was the case with the perceived requirements of nuclear deter-
rence. The crux of debate over space deterrence is whether to continue to rely very 
heavily on latent or residual capabilities to engage in warfare, if necessary, or to shift 
toward more evident, dedicated, kinetic and deployed means of dissuasion. There are 
several powerful arguments for the United States to continue to rely on inferred rather 
than heavily demonstrable deterrence in space. To begin with, a non-dedicated, non-
deployed, non-kinetic space deterrence posture has been successful in the past. An 
inferred posture is also more conducive to stabilizing deterrence than the deployment 
and testing of dedicated, kinetic counter-space capabilities. These hallmarks of an in-
tensified arms competition did not produce a great sense of security in the nuclear 
domain, and are unlikely to offer a greater sense of security in space. Instead, more 
demonstrable space deterrence efforts are likely to increase requirements and costs 
while decreasing assurance. 
An accelerated competition in the development, testing and deployment of US and 
Chinese counter-space capabilities is likely to spill over into the nuclear domain. The 
practical effect of this linkage would be to increase nuclear requirements in China, 
while retarding reductions in deployed US nuclear capabilities that are in excess of 
the Pentagon’s needs. In a constrained budget environment, the United States could 
apply defense dollars more wisely and enjoy added security if this dynamic could be 
avoided. Another reason to avoid an intensified competition in dedicated and de-
ployed counter-space capabilities is that residual and latent US counter-space capa-
bilities are growing significantly, particularly with respect to new missile defense in-
terceptors. The growth in inferred capability provides the basis to avoid a competition 
in dedicated, deployed counter-space capabilities – if China is amenable to inferential 
deterrence.
This is an essential qualifier. A continued US preference to avoid a heightened compe-
tition marked by repeated displays of dedicated capability to disrupt, damage or de-
stroy space assets depends on Beijing’s acceptance of inferred deterrence. The United 
States and China have both demonstrated counter-space capabilities. If Beijing de-
cides to ramp up its space warfare capabilities, the Pentagon will not be found want-
ing in this competition. A far more preferable posture would be one of “contingent 
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restraint,” whereby the Pentagon does not exercise options well within its capabilities, 
as long as the PLA is similarly constrained. Parallel policies of contingent restraint 
worked during most, but not all, intervals of the Cold War.28 This dynamic can also 
succeed under far less demanding contemporary circumstances.
Deterrence is based on threats. Deterrence, by itself, is not reassuring. The Cold War 
did not become hot because deterrence was complemented by reassurance in the form 
of diplomatic accords to reduce nuclear dangers. Contingent restraint can be inferen-
tial, or it can be reinforced by diplomatic accords. Stable deterrence requires reassur-
ance when competitors possess devastating military options.29 
Washington and Beijing have yet to demonstrate successful diplomatic engagement 
to moderate a military competition in space. Neither have they agreed on coopera-
tive joint ventures in space, like those that helped diminish pressures to ramp up US 
and Soviet space warfare requirements during the Cold War. Reassurance during the 
Cold War took the form of treaties. Senate consent to, and the entry into force of trea-
ties regarding military space capabilities seem unlikely. Executive agreements remain 
possible, however. One means of reassurance – an International Code of Conduct 
for responsible space-faring nations – is readily available. Another, in the form of 
collaborative ventures in space science and exploration, awaits the commitment of 
far-sighted leaders.30
Worst-case projections related to nuclear warfare between the superpowers – projec-
tions that led to massive nuclear stockpiles – did not carry over to Cold War prepara-
tions for warfare in space. Most analysts, whether optimistic or pessimistic by nature, 
were pleasantly surprised by this result. Under quite different and less challenging 
circumstances, a dangerous military competition in space between the United States 
and China might also be avoided by combining deterrence with reassurance. 
If Beijing decides to ramp up its space warfare 
capabilities, the Pentagon will not be found wanting 
in this competition. A far more preferable posture 
would be one of “contingent restraint”
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The Absolute Weapon and the  
Ultimate High Ground: Why Nuclear 
Deterrence and Space Deterrence  Are 
Strikingly Similar - Yet Profoundly Different 
By Karl P. Mueller
In his introductory essay to this volume, Michael Krepon surveys and compares nu-
clear deterrence to the related and still rather nascent policy arena of space deterrence. 
This chapter takes another look at space deterrence, approaching the comparison 
from a slightly different direction by focusing on theory and strategic principles while 
giving short shrift to the history of the policy-making in question that his chapter 
presents in detail.1 
The connections between space power and deterrence have been a matter of increas-
ing interest in recent years as the United States has become more and more dependent 
on space systems to perform essential military functions, and as the rise of China has 
demonstrated that deterrence is central to national security policy in all ages, rather 
than being something that mostly mattered during the Cold War. As we think about 
these connections, it is natural to turn to nuclear deterrence in a search for useful 
analogies. The study of nuclear deterrence, embracing both theoretical and practical 
dimensions, has achieved the often elusive objective for a highly theoretical discipline 
of actually having been useful to policymakers. 
Nuclear power is different from conventional power in important respects, and space 
power is different from terrestrial power. Does understanding nuclear deterrence, in 
particular, give us useful insights into deterrence in space? Or do nuclear and space 
deterrence have more in common with each other than they do with other varieties 
of deterrence? It would be nice if the answer were “yes” because decades of thinking 
very hard about nuclear deterrence has resulted in a well-developed body of theory 
about it,2 although much of it has not been tested due to the absence of nuclear wars 
and the infrequency of deep nuclear crises. Even though we have seen no nuclear 
weapons fired in anger since 1945, deterrence is not mere guesswork: The absence 
of explosions does not indicate the absence of deterrence; it indicates the absence of 
deterrence failures.
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This brief essay will argue, or at least assert, that it is important for anyone seeking to 
understand space deterrence to have a basic mastery of nuclear deterrence – indeed, 
anyone seriously interested in national security affairs at the level of relationships 
between major states ought to have a grasp of this now relatively neglected subject. 
There are noteworthy analogical nuggets to be found in such a comparison – some 
metaphorical, others more concrete. But in the end, nuclear deterrence and space de-
terrence differ in so many ways that the contrasts between them are far more pro-
nounced, and more illuminating, than the characteristics that they have in common.
DETERRENCE
It is not only natural but essential to begin by establishing what deterrence is and 
how it works in general. The term is often bandied about with limited regard for con-
ceptual precision, and, even among those who do concern themselves with clearly 
defining deterrence, there is less consensus about what it does and does not comprise 
than one might expect. Search the political science literature for explicit and implicit 
definitions of deterrence – if one has nothing better to do – and one will find disagree-
ments about whether it is proper to apply the deterrence label to threats of denial as 
well as punishment, to promises as well as threats, to wars being averted by external 
conditions or self-restraint as well as deliberate signaling by an opponent, to the non-
occurrence of wars that no one was very interested in starting in the first place, to 
preventing wars before a crisis occurs, and even (though mostly in works of several 
decades past) whether there can be such a thing as non-nuclear deterrence.
Usually a broad definition of deterrence is most useful for scholarship, and even more 
so for policymakers who are interested in results more than debates about taxonomy. 
For the present discussion, it will suffice to say that deterrence refers to trying to cause 
someone not to do something (such as starting a war) by changing their expectations 
about the consequences of their potential actions (and also to the outcome of such ef-
forts if they are successful). Deterrence is a subset of coercion,3  and can (and should) 
be differentiated from actions that reduce or eliminate the adversary’s ability or op-
portunity to misbehave instead of deterring it from doing so; the latter is the domain 
of “brute” or “pure force,” destruction or unconditional appeasement.4
This is not the place for an extensive primer on deterrence, so I will settle for making 
four important points about the subject. First, and most fundamentally, deterrence 
is something that occurs in the mind of the enemy. It is a function of the opponent’s 
expectations, which in turn depend on their perceptions and beliefs; objective reality 
usually affects these, but when what is real diverges from what is perceived, it is the 
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latter that matters. (In contrast, defense is what happens if deterrence fails, at which 
point objective reality takes over.) Thus, bluffs may deter but will not provide protec-
tion if they are called, while the opposite is true of defenses that the enemy does not 
know about. Similarly, escalation thresholds are what the actor responding to them 
thinks they are which may not align with the expectations of an adversary.5
Second, deterrence is about the relative attractiveness or unattractiveness of alterna-
tive courses of action. States do not go to war because they expect to win, they do so 
because they expect to be better off if they attack than if they do not. If the expected 
value of the status quo is very low (if the enemy “has nothing to lose”), even a very 
risky action may be preferable  (picture Japan in 1941), while an actor who is well 
contented with his current situation may find even the prospect of cheap and easy 
victories to hold little appeal. For the deterrence practitioner this means it is always 
important to consider how the alternatives will stack up against each other in the op-
ponent’s eyes, and to keep in mind that making the status quo look better can be just 
as useful for deterrence as making war look worse.6 
This leads into the third point, which is that there are many ways to deter, since there 
are multiple approaches to making an opponent think that starting a war or escalating 
a conflict would be worse than not doing so. Prudent deterrers will look for oppor-
tunities to exploit across this range, and will be attentive to the risk that a threat or 
promise in one avenue will undermine deterrence efforts in another:7
• Punitive deterrence involves increasing the expected costs of one or 
more potential outcomes of the action to be deterred. Examples range 
from retaliatory nuclear attacks to inflicting a lot of casualties on the 
battlefield to threats of economic or diplomatic punishment – including 
by third parties. The most potent punitive threat will be ones that apply 
whether or not the opponents’ action succeeds.
• Deterrence by denial works by making the desired outcome of an action, 
such as victory in a war, appear less likely and some less appealing 
outcome look more likely. Decreasing your apparent vulnerability to an 
attack is a good way to discourage it, but some threats are harder to 
foil than others, and relatively weak deterrers may have little ability to 
threaten defeat or even frustration against a more powerful opponent. 
if the enemy “has nothing to lose,”  
even a very risky action may be preferable
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• Rewards and reassurance (positive deterrence if you prefer) seek to 
make aggression or escalation less attractive by making the status quo 
look more beneficial or less dangerous to the potential adversary. If the 
opponent expects that the result of restraint will simply be a war on less 
favorable terms later, there will be little incentive for restraint.
• Unconditional measures of various sorts can also contribute to the 
prospects for deterrence, though strictly speaking they are not coercion. 
Destroying a key enemy military capability before it is used can make 
a threat less dire; at the other end of the spectrum, settling an existing 
dispute may eliminate the principal motive that might otherwise lead to 
war.
Finally, when moving from the theoretical plane to making strategy for the real world, 
talking about deterrence in general is rarely very useful, instead it is essential to spec-
ify whom you want to deter from doing what (and under what conditions). Even for 
the same opponent, the best approach for deterring it from taking action A may not 
be ideal, or even effective, for deterring it from closely related action B. Conversely, a 
strategy that is well suited to deterring one target from a particular form of misbehav-
ior may be a very poor choice for deterring someone else from doing the same thing.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
With this last point firmly in mind, it is worth taking a moment to be clear about 
what the term “nuclear deterrence” means, which is not quite as simple an issue as 
one might assume. In everyday conversation, nuclear deterrence usually refers to us-
ing nuclear threats or nuclear weapons (which is more or less the same thing most of 
the time) as a deterrent tool. Thus, we might argue about whether nuclear deterrence 
can be relied upon in a particular case not only to deter an opponent from employ-
ing nuclear weapons but also to deter any number of non-nuclear actions such as 
invading a neighbor using conventional military forces. However, for the purposes of 
comparing nuclear and space deterrence, it will be more useful if we instead scope our 
consideration of nuclear deterrence based on what is being deterred rather than what 
is being used to do it: that is, to think about how the use of nuclear weapons has been 
and can be deterred, whether by threats of nuclear response or other means entirely, 
including but not limited to conventional military action.
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SPACE DETERRENCE
The reason for framing nuclear deterrence as deterrence of nuclear use rather than 
deterrence by nuclear threat is that when we talk about space deterrence we almost 
always have in mind deterring attacks against satellites and related space systems, not 
the use of space capabilities for deterrent purposes, which is a vast and multifaceted 
subject given the variety of functions that space systems perform.8  However, this is 
still quite vague by the standards of the “deterring whom from doing what?” criterion.
There are many ways to attack or interfere with satellite operations, ranging from the 
literally  inoffensive (such as deception measures against imaging) through various 
flavors of jamming, dazzling and other non-kinetic attacks with either temporary or 
lasting effects, up to outright attacks by projectiles, directed energy weapons or other 
means to damage or destroy satellites. (Alternatively, targeting the ground segments 
of space systems may be an easier and more attractive option, but this largely falls 
outside of what we usually have in mind when discussing space deterrence, since de-
terring such actions is essentially the same as dealing with threats to other terrestrial 
targets.) For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the high end of the scale, 
leaving aside low-grade interference with satellites or the services they provide; also 
omitted will be any serious consideration of cyberattacks directed against space-relat-
ed systems, since deterring such actions involves a broad topic of deterrence analy-
sis unto itself.9  Thus, references to “space weapons” in the pages that follow can be 
read as synonymous with “anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons,” always keeping in mind 
that among the ranks of potential ASATs are a variety of weapons and tools that are 
primarily intended for other purposes, from mid-course ballistic missile defenses to 
manned spacecraft.10
The issue of who might need deterring and under what circumstances often receives 
less attention than it merits. It is easy to list a wide variety of potential adversaries who 
might be interested in launching ASAT attacks against the United States or its allies if 
they had the capability to do so, but in practice there is a relatively limited set of op-
ponents and scenarios that appear to be plausible foci for space deterrence concern 
rather than merely being imaginable.
It is worth noting that in virtually every conflict the United States is vulnerable to at-
tack in many forms and many places that are not actually carried out, either because 
enemies lack the inclination to do so (before or after taking the likely consequences 
into account), because they lack the imagination to recognize the possibility, or be-
cause they have more attractive things to do with their capabilities. Although satellites 
46
are intrinsically vulnerable to attack in absolute terms, thanks to orbital mechanics 
and the limited potential for concealment in space, on the whole they tend to be rela-
tively challenging targets for physical attack when compared with the relevant alter-
natives. The most economically valuable satellites, and many of the most militarily 
important ones, operate in high orbits that make them much more difficult to attack 
than their counterparts in low Earth orbit (LEO).  Moreover, enemies interested in 
inflicting economic damage or psychological trauma on the United States will find 
many easier ways to do at least as much harm by striking terrestrial targets.  This is 
likely to be less true for attacks seeking to cause military damage or disruption, but 
even there, striking at the ground segments of space systems, or interfering with their 
effective operation through terrestrial jamming or other means, will often be easier 
than attacking the satellites themselves in orbit.
Yet there are conditions under which attacking US satellites might indeed appear to 
be sound policy for an adversary, even though these are likely to be more limited than 
is often supposed.  Three sets of circumstances loom especially large. The first is situ-
ations in which an ASAT attack, or a series of them, would offer a substantial military 
payoff in a situation of ongoing or imminent crisis or conflict. This would be most 
likely if attacking satellites were a way to exploit key vulnerabilities of US military 
power; how substantial the potential for that to be the case in the future will depend 
greatly on the ways in which the United States carries out the various elements of its 
military transformation plans over the coming generation, in addition to how well 
it deals with the challenges of satellite protection per se. Achieving such effects on a 
large scale would require considerable ASAT capabilities, and thus would likely be the 
purview of relatively major powers.11
Second, ASAT attacks promising more limited benefits might be attractive in cases 
where ASAT capabilities had already been built – perhaps only as a deterrent to US 
ASAT attacks – and a conflict or crisis subsequently broke out in which it appeared 
likely that the systems eventually would be destroyed or rendered ineffective: a “use it 
or lose it” situation. In a conflict in which the adversary faced the prospect of conquest 
or regime change being imposed by the United States, of course, every weapon would 
fall into the “use it or lose it” category, and high stakes (and possibly psychological 
desperation) could be expected to make deterrence particularly difficult.
Third, ASAT attacks could be appealing by offering a way to attack the United States 
or its allies (or to send a powerful coercive signal about one’s willingness to use force) 
while limiting escalation risks, making retaliation problematic or allowing the state 
launching them to maintain the moral high ground. Damaging or destroying satellites 
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could cause considerable economic or perhaps military damage without killing many 
people – depending on the nature of the attack it is conceivable there would be no 
immediate loss of life – and without attacking the adversary’s homeland. Among the 
possibilities, a high-altitude nuclear detonation could offer a way to employ nuclear 
weapons without causing mass destruction, in response to which the likelihood of US 
nuclear retaliation might appear to be quite low.  
SIMILARITIES: THE POWER OF ROCKET SCIENCE
Why should we expect nuclear and space deterrence, and nuclear and space power 
more generally, to have a lot in common a quarter century after the end of the Cold 
War? 12  That the association seems intuitively natural, at least at first, would seem to 
have much to do with the technologies that underpin these policy realms.
Perhaps the most obvious nuclear-space parallel is that power and deterrence in both 
cases are conspicuously and intimately connected to space age (and information age) 
physics. This matters on at least two levels. One is that to participate usefully in dis-
cussions of either nuclear or space deterrence it is necessary to have a basic grasp of 
the science involved in the field, as well as an understanding of deterrence and of the 
larger strategic context. This does not mean that one has to be able to design an atomic 
bomb, a missile or a satellite to discuss them intelligently, or that having deep exper-
tise in the science or engineering of either field  necessarily will make one more astute 
about related policy issues than someone with more rudimentary knowledge of the 
subject – Albert Einstein was far from prescient about the realities of a nuclear-armed 
world. But just as knowing the difference between a bomber and a ballistic missile or 
why multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) mattered was indis-
pensable for thinking about nuclear deterrence in the Cold War, and understanding 
the differences between nuclear and chemical weapons is essential to discussing weap-
ons of mass destruction intelligently today, wrestling with issues of space deterrence 
requires knowing something about orbits and gravity wells and the functions that 
satellites perform.
This isn’t really a problem – or rather it shouldn’t be. A bright undergraduate can learn 
enough about nuclear weapons and strategy in a few hours to opine intelligently about 
Why should we expect nuclear and space  
deterrence to have a lot in common a quarter 
century after the end of the Cold War?
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nuclear deterrence. Space is somewhat more complicated, but the intellectual entry 
costs are also far from prohibitive. 13  Yet military space power has become – indeed it 
has always been – primarily the preserve of a relatively small group of specialists, both 
within the US Air Force and other armed services and in the broader policy-making 
and policy-assessing  world. A variety of factors contribute to this, some relate to the 
domain knowledge being fairly arcane, some are sociological and all are reinforced 
by the secrecy that surrounds many national security space activities and programs, 
particularly the most advanced and expensive ones. Something analogous is true of 
nuclear strategy and policy, particularly since the end of the Cold War when the use 
of nuclear weapons seemed to become a far more remote possibility and interest in 
nuclear arms control diminished accordingly – as did the attention devoted to the 
subject in staff and war colleges, civilian universities and most other places where is-
sues of nuclear policy were once matters of mainstream concern and debate.14  
In practice, the peripheralization and sometimes isolation of the communities of 
nuclear experts and space experts can have potentially serious consequences. It can 
narrow or stifle debate and innovation (although this is not inevitable – isolation can 
also create space for innovation by excluding people who would interfere with it) and 
may facilitate or perpetuate dysfunctional processes or policies. More dangerously, if 
nuclear or space strategy becomes a domain disconnected from the broader national 
security community, either inside or outside of government, it can leave the United 
States ill-prepared to deal with crises and other events involving these capabilities by 
making them less familiar to non-specialist military and civilian leaders. Coming to 
grips with the realities of space power and space deterrence, as with the corresponding 
nuclear issues, is not something to undertake once a crisis in which they loom large 
is already underway.
PROLIFERATION
Nuclear and military space capabilities both began as the exclusive domain of the su-
perpowers, and subsequently have spread gradually to other countries. Originally the 
entry costs of nuclear weapons and space programs were astronomical. Beyond the 
United States and the Soviet Union, many of the largest and wealthiest major powers 
decided not to take on the expense and inconveniences associated with making the 
effort to join the nuclear club – and powers that did generally contented themselves 
with relatively small arsenals. 
Over the past 50 years, the economic barriers to becoming a nuclear power have erod-
ed to some degree. It is still no small matter to achieve entry into the nuclear club, but 
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much of this difficulty is due to deliberate action to raise political and other obstacles 
to nuclear proliferation. As South Africa demonstrated in the 1980s, developing a 
basic atomic weapons capability has become something that virtually any sizable, suf-
ficiently motivated state can achieve eventually. North Korea more recently drove this 
point home. That relatively little nuclear proliferation actually occurs reflects a dearth 
of countries that want the bomb more than a lack of countries’ abilities to acquire it. 
The story is not terribly different in space. Here we are not thinking so much about the 
growing roster of states that have become spacefaring by owning their own satellites 
as about the slower but significant spread of space launch, ballistic missile and other 
capabilities that could be used as the basis for operational antisatellite capabilities. 15 
As with nuclear weapons, the entry costs are considerable, requiring the resources of 
a state rather than an eBay account and a credit card, but it is now a game in which 
states other than superpowers certainly can play.
There is also a clear parallel between the proliferation of nuclear and space capabili-
ties on the political side: No state has ever developed nuclear weapons or substantial 
military space assets just for their cachet, but considerations of prestige can figure into 
such decisions to an important degree, as illustrated by the Cold War space and arms 
races between the United States and the USSR.16 This can matter to deterrence by, 
for example, leading governments to acquire or maintain destabilizing weapons for 
reasons other than their strategic utility, or contributing to provocative arms racing 
behavior. 
These things being said, it is worth noting that there are important differences be-
tween joining the nuclear and the military spacefaring clubs. One is that civil and na-
tional security space tends to be very intertwined on multiple levels, so states can find 
the need to contemplate issues of  space power and space deterrence thrust upon them 
as a result of going into space for reasons that have little to do with military power. In 
contrast, while civil nuclear programs and nuclear weapons programs can certainly be 
That relatively little nuclear proliferation  
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becoming nuclear powers.
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related to each other, states do not, as a rule, stumble into becoming nuclear powers,17 
though they may well achieve that status without having fully thought through all of 
its implications.
Another contrast is that, so far, nuclear weapons have always remained in the clear 
possession of a single state, or at most a few states under a dual-key arrangement 
where the weapon belongs to one country but is based in, and perhaps delivered by, 
a system belonging to a close ally. For many space systems against which the United 
States might want to deter attack, things are not so simple. Satellite constellation may 
be owned by international consortia or multinational corporations, for example, and 
there might be many users of a single system, changing frequently as transponder 
leases change or new contracts are let for space-based services. This makes deterrence 
more complicated, though greater complexity doesn’t necessarily imply greater dif-
ficulty. For example, one argument in favor of US military use of non-US satellites for 
functions like communications is that an enemy might be reluctant to attack third-
party satellites with a broad customer base in a situation where it would be willing to 
attack ones whose loss would hurt only the United States. 
CRISIS STABILITY
Of central importance to deterrence, more or less by definition, are issues of crisis sta-
bility. 17  When prospective combatants have strong incentives to strike first in a con-
frontation, because they would be much better off by doing so than if the opponent 
landed the first blow, deterrence becomes much more difficult than if there is little 
incentive for preemption. The same is true for decisions about whether to take escala-
tory action in a conflict already underway. Here, again, there are noteworthy parallels 
between nuclear and space deterrence. (There are important differences as well, and 
we will return to the subject of crisis stability in the next section.)
The two most important of these similarities both derive from the tendency for nucle-
ar and ASAT attacks to be difficult to defend against. Defending against ASAT attacks 
tends to be hard because of physics and the geography of orbital space: Satellites are 
difficult, even often impossible, to conceal and difficult or costly to maneuver out of 
harm’s way. Defending against nuclear strikes can also be very hard, particularly when 
the weapons are delivered by ballistic missiles, but the fundamental problem with try-
ing to intercept incoming nuclear warheads is that even defenses with a high success 
rate may be of little strategic value because a very small number of “leakers” can be 
sufficient to cause vast destruction. If an attacker has high confidence that an attack of 
either type will be at least operationally successful because defenses are not effective, 
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deterrence efforts will need to focus on punishment and reward strategies because 
deterrence by denial will have little to offer. This is a problem that extends beyond the 
confines of crisis stability, but it can be especially acute in a crisis by creating powerful 
incentives for a first strike if war appears inevitable, or even merely likely. Moreover, 
when the stakes are high, making punitive threats (or reward offers) that are powerful 
enough to deter, absent being able to threaten an attacker with actual defeat, can be a 
very difficult strategic mountain to climb.
The second issue is closely related. Under conditions of real or perceived first-strike 
advantage, and with weapons for which tactical warning from detection to attack may 
be measured in minutes (or even less for some directed energy attacks or for attacks 
by prepositioned “space mines”), decision-making timelines are likely to be very com-
pressed. 18  This can cause or contribute to a witch’s brew of pathological effects, limit-
ing opportunities for communication and signaling between adversaries or mediation 
by third parties, constraining the collection and analysis of information and consider-
ation of alternative options, even causing panic and other psychological problems for 
decision makers under intense pressure.19 
It is important to qualify this discussion, however. While defense against nuclear and 
ASAT attacks tends to be difficult, the verb is intentionally tentative; the extent to 
which the tendency manifests itself in practice will depend on the weapons and de-
fenses that the nations involved choose to deploy. Weapons that are vulnerable to at-
tack will threaten crisis stability much more than ones that have a reasonable prospect 
of surviving an enemy first strike; weapons that are particularly or only vulnerable to 
surprise attack are likely to be especially destabilizing. Thus systems such as unhard-
ened, MIRVed, land-based ballistic missiles or space-based ASAT laser weapons are 
crisis stability nightmares, combining offensive usefulness with great potential vul-
nerability that creates “use-it-or-lose-it” incentives for decision makers not to risk al-
lowing a powerful adversary to strike first.
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
As a coda to close out this enumeration of parallels between the arenas of nuclear and 
space deterrence, it is also worth noting briefly the similarities among some of the 
Decision-making timelines are likely to be very 
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witch’s brew of pathological effects
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potential environmental consequences of nuclear and space warfare. The physics of 
nuclear fallout and of orbital debris due to kinetic-energy ASAT attacks are entirely 
different, but from a policy perspective they have much in common. Both are poten-
tially serious and, on a large enough scale, catastrophic contamination threats that 
originate as collateral effects of particular attack methodologies – or that can be gener-
ated deliberately as a means of inflicting additional harm on an enemy. Because their 
effects are essentially indiscriminate, affecting geographically vulnerable bystanders 
without regard for national borders, they magnify the extent to which deterring nucle-
ar or space combat is a matter of concern to non-belligerents, and cast a long shadow 
over issues of weapon investment and testing.
At the extreme end of the scale, it is not unreasonable also to suggest that there is 
more than a passing resemblance between “nuclear winter” fears during the Cold War 
and the threat of nuclear ASAT use making large swaths of low-earth-orbital space 
uninhabitable  for unhardened satellites due to the excitation of the Van Allen radia-
tion belts that could persist for months or years. The latter effect would be far less 
cataclysmic, and more easily generated, than the former, but both would have global 
and relatively long-term consequences that bear heavily on the deterrence calculus for 
prospective attacks that might trigger such results.
DIFFERENCES: AN ABUNDANCE OF UNIQUENESS
These and other parallels between nuclear and space deterrence, and between nuclear 
and space power more generally, are significant and can be illuminating; failing to be 
aware of them would certainly be unfortunate. On the other hand, not recognizing the 
differences between the two subjects can be actively perilous, leading to misconcep-
tions that invite strategic surprise and major policy missteps. 
There is more than a passing resemblance between 
“nuclear winter” fears and the threat of nuclear 




In spite of the similarities identified above, nuclear deterrence and space deterrence 
aren’t really parallel concepts. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that space deterrence is 
a very useful construct – we do not speak of air or naval deterrence as distinct cat-
egories, after all, because of the degree to which conventional warfare in different do-
mains is usually intermingled. Military space activities, too, are intimately connected 
to operations and capabilities in the other domains. This is not to say that deterring 
attacks against satellites and other space-related targets is not a matter of importance, 
only that it is a policy problem that may be less separate from other deterrence chal-
lenges than is often assumed. 
Yet space really is different – the unique operating environment and, above all, the 
physics of orbital mechanics, create an operational and strategic world in which con-
ventional wisdom often does not apply.  The same can be said of nuclear strategy and 
deterrence, but it does not follow that because space and nuclear power each work 
differently from conventional military power they must then resemble each other.  For 
example, during the Cold War it was often noted that nuclear weapons could turn fa-
miliar notions of offense and defense upside down: Strategically, threatening to attack 
an enemy’s nuclear arsenal was offensive, but threatening to annihilate enemy cities 
was fundamentally defensive, albeit unsavory. Similarly strategic defenses threatened 
to undermine deterrence if they protected a superpower’s cities, but not if they only 
defended its retaliatory nuclear capabilities. In space warfare, too, the meanings of of-
fense and defense familiar from settings such as air warfare become inverted, though 
in a different way. In this realm, attacking enemy satellites even over one’s own ter-
ritory is reckoned to be offensive counter-space activity, while protecting one’s own 
satellites as they overfly the enemy is defensive.
More central to space deterrence, it is worth considering a very basic question: Is at-
tacking another state’s satellites a step up the escalation ladder from attacking terres-
trial forces, or a step down?20 Discussions about how to deter antisatellite attacks often 
take for granted the idea that, if possible, we should try to contain the use of force 
within the atmosphere, frequently proposing that the US government declare redlines 
to emphasize that ASAT attacks will be treated as extremely grave offenses, inviting 
severe responses. One could look alternatively at warfare in space and conclude that 
It does not follow that because space and nuclear 
power each work differently from conventional 
military power they must then resemble each other.
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with a low expected body count, it should be considered milder than terrestrial con-
flict. Chinese writings that touch on this subject generally adopt a perspective that 
sees attacks on enemy space systems as unexceptional. The point here is not that one 
attitude is the correct one, but that the answer is sufficiently ambiguous that there is 
considerable potential for deterrence to be complicated by a lack of common thinking 
between the parties concerned. Such misunderstandings are by no means impossible 
when it comes to nuclear deterrence, but they are more likely to be limited in scope 
given the power of nuclear threats to concentrate the mind.
DESTRUCTIVENESS
The most fundamental difference between nuclear and space weapons and, in turn, 
between nuclear and space deterrence, is one of the simplest: Nuclear weapons are 
extremely destructive. This can seem like a truism, certainly everyone knows that it 
is true, yet it is surprisingly easy to discount – perhaps the clearest illustration is the 
frequency with which we refer to “weapons of mass destruction” or even “CBRNE” 
weapons – lumping nuclear weapons together with vastly less destructive ones.21
The reason we speak of “the absolute weapon” and “the nuclear revolution” is that the 
difference in destructive power between conventional and nuclear explosives makes 
the latter qualitatively different from the former, with relatively modest arsenals being 
capable of inflicting truly catastrophic harm on an enemy in relatively short order. 22 
Crucially, in many cases, even a state that is losing a war would be able to threaten 
to inflict such harm against a successful adversary. It is this result of the coupling of 
nuclear weapons with airpower and missiles that makes nuclear strategy and nuclear 
deterrence distinctive. Among states with reasonably robust nuclear arsenals, all that 
is really required is a reasonable expectation that one’s retaliatory capabilities will not 
be eliminated or disabled by an enemy’s first strike. There are very powerful incentives 
to avoid war, or to avoid very much escalation if a limited conflict does break out. 
This does not mean that deterrence will never fail or that escalation will always be 
controlled, but the deck should be relatively well stacked in favor of strategic stability 
and successful deterrence.
For space weapons and space deterrence the situation is very different. There may still 
be strong reasons for mutual restraint, but the prospect of catastrophic human costs if 
a war breaks out in space or if a terrestrial conflict spreads there is not likely to be one 
of them. Instead, one of the reasons that attacks on space systems might be attractive is 
their potential to cause the enemy great military or economic harm without generat-
ing a large body count. Indeed, some early advocates of space weapons development 
55
argued for the merits of shifting military competition and conflict into space at least 
partly on such humanitarian grounds. (Even nuclear weapons might be employed in 
space without killing many people, possibly none at all.)23 
Consequently, there is little reason for leaders to quail at the prospect of using weap-
ons in space during a conflict as they do with respect to employing nuclear weapons. 
To be sure, attacking an enemy in space would likely appear to be a dramatic action 
of much import, particularly because it would be largely unprecedented. However, 
once the decision to go to war, or even to risk war, against a powerful enemy has been 
taken, the significance of also employing space weapons is likely to be figuratively, as 
well as literally, marginal. The problem of convincing an enemy that is willing to fight 
the United States within the confines of the atmosphere that it should not also be will-
ing to extend that conflict to space, if doing so appears militarily advantageous, is a 
daunting deterrent challenge. 
Another consequence of the destructive power of nuclear weapons is that once a state 
possesses even a fairly small number of deliverable nuclear weapons, the size and 
sophistication of its arsenal is likely to matter less for deterrence than the apparent 
willingness to use it . Under most circumstances, credibility is less of an issue for anti-
satellite weapons – threats to employ them are more likely to be believed because the 
intrinsic costs of doing so will be lower – but their actual capabilities will tend to be 
in doubt until they are demonstrated. Therefore, the incentives to offer such demon-
strations prior to a conflict may be great, either for deterrent or compellent leverage.
STRATEGIC STABILITY
We have already mentioned the issue of stability and first-strike advantage in nuclear 
and space strategy when discussing nuclear-space parallels, noting that both nuclear 
and space weapons tend to be hard to defend against. However, this similarity at the 
tactical and operational level breaks down on a broader scale. Viewed strategically, 
nuclear weapons tend strongly to favor the defense because it is so difficult to disarm 
a competent nuclear-armed opponent decisively through aggressive action, given that 
even a small number of surviving weapons can matter so much. In space, on the other 
hand, offense dominance scales up: a power that strikes aggressively should be, in 
The size and sophistication of a nuclear arsenal 
matters less for deterrence than the apparent 
willingness to use it.
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theory, able to get the upper hand, or at least get the greatest possible use out of what-
ever offensive counter-space capabilities it has invested in.
One of the reasons for this difference is that space weapons, and military space ca-
pabilities more generally, derive their significance from the roles that they play and 
the impact that they have in terrestrial warfare.24  One might still wage a space war in 
isolation, with no accompanying hostilities occurring on the planet below, but even 
in such a case losses of space capabilities, even the control of space itself, would mat-
ter because of how advantages gained in space subsequently might be translated into 
military, coercive or other benefits in the terrestrial arena. Nuclear weapons also can 
be closely coupled to terrestrial warfare but, at the end of the day, they tend to trump 
conventional uses of force.
Once again we need to recognize that offense or defense dominance is ultimately 
shaped by the weapons that states build and the doctrines they embrace. It is pos-
sible, by accident or design, to develop force postures that enhance or weaken stability 
even when the basic attributes of key military technologies lean in another direction 
– this is not a simple matter of technological determinism. That being said, however, 
the tendency for nuclear weapons to make conquest and aggression more difficult 
rather than easier is extremely powerful, although one reason that nuclear deterrence 
tends to be robust is that nuclear deterrence failures have such potential to be hor-
rific, which is the fundamental mechanism underpinning mutual assured destruction. 
Space warfare has no analogue for such secure second strike capability that could be 
similarly stabilizing, in spite of potential options to threaten a spacefaring state with 
very great harm by attacking its highly valued space assets.
CONCLUSION 
As this essay has sought to sketch out, the parallels between nuclear and space deter-
rence are thought provoking and potentially illuminating. However, each of these do-
mains involves key characteristics that are unique to it, so understanding one does not 
imply or constitute mastery of the other.  The sense that there ought to be a close cou-
pling between the two subjects may be due in part to the fact that each is exceptional. 
Bernard Brodie bestowed the label “the absolute weapon” on nuclear arms, establish-
ing a tradition that was carried on by generations of nuclear scholars.25  These are pro-
foundly unconventional weapons because of their immense and unrivaled destructive 
power, which fundamentally shapes deterrence involving them in many ways even 
though the basic principles of deterrence still apply.
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Space has its own superlative: It is “the ultimate high ground.”26  But this is a metaphor 
that must be handled with care. Space is not merely a higher-altitude version of air, 
it is a different operational environment, governed by a different set of physical laws. 
Orbital mechanics instead of aerodynamics make LEO space territorially indivisible; 
lack of traditional terrain or terrestrial weather create a unique landscape where it is 
difficult to hide; and time and distance operate on different scales than on the ground 
or in the air. This makes space ideal for performing some military functions, almost 
all of them involving the collection or transmission of information, and very ill-suited 
for others that can usually be far better performed by terrestrial or aerial systems that 
are not hundreds or thousands of miles away from their targets. 27  All of these con-
siderations contribute to making space deterrence something different from nuclear 
or some other form of deterrence transplanted to a domain that is colder, darker and 
less familiar.
Because of the increasing centrality of nuclear, space and cyber issues to national secu-
rity concerns in the 21st century, each of these deterrence domains (which we might 
respectively tag as “stronger, higher, faster” to borrow and reshuffle a familiar slogan) 
stands to be more and more important to deterrence problems in coming years. Each 
involves distinctive dynamics and accordingly needs to be addressed on its own terms. 
But in doing so, it is essential not to treat any of them in isolation from the others or 
from the broader field of deterrence, lest their interconnections, both in theory and in 
practice, be overlooked. 
Understanding one domain does not imply or 
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Reconsidering Deterrence for  
Space and Cyberspace 
By James A. Lewis
 
The ability to deter attacks against networks or satellites is so limited that we can rea-
sonably ask whether deterrence still makes sense as an organizing principle for strat-
egy. Concepts of deterrence do not transpose well in a changed international environ-
ment against new classes of opponents with significantly different degrees of tolerance 
for risk, and that employ different weapons technologies that are less destructive and 
less attributable than was the case for Cold War deterrence built around nuclear weap-
ons. 
 
Deterrence, in its classic form, is the possession of sufficient military power to credibly 
threaten to use force if vital interests are endangered, thus dissuading an opponent 
from taking action. The paradox for deterrence today is that while the United States 
has the most advanced cyber and space forces in the world, they neither deter our 
opponents generally nor deter hostile acts specifically directed against US cyber and 
space assets. Threats by the United States to use cyber or anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks 
will not deter because these attacks cause only limited damage and do not put oppo-
nents sufficiently at risk. Threats by the United States to use military force to defend 
cyber or space assets will also fail to deter because in peacetime, these threats are not 
credible and in wartime, opponents are likely to judge that the benefits of an attack on 
cyber or space assets will outweigh the costs. 
 
Deterrence still works as it was designed to work in the 1950s, stopping opponents 
from undertaking massive conventional wars or nuclear strikes, but it is largely irrel-
evant to the amorphous and indirect conflicts the United States faces today. While nu-
clear deterrence achieved success at a strategic level, it did not deter Soviet espionage, 
the use of proxies, or adventures at the strategic periphery when the Soviets perceived 
that the United States was weakened by failure in Southeast Asia. 
 
A pattern is emerging that nondestructive 
or reversible “attacks” cannot be deterred in 
peacetime.
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Efforts to transpose deterrence to the space and cyber domains will be similarly un-
successful. Deterrence has not prevented cyber espionage efforts by many countries, 
foremost among them China. Nor is cybercrime deterred. Deterrence has not pre-
vented the jamming of communications by Iran and others. China, in at least one 
instance, has illuminated a US military satellite with a laser.1 Russia has used coercive 
cyber techniques in two instances, against Estonia and Georgia. Moscow likely was 
deterred from direct military action in the first instance by Estonia’s membership in 
NATO and because of the potential for damaging consequences in other areas such 
as trade or finance, but the Kremlin was not deterred from encouraging “patriotic 
hackers” to launch denial of service attacks against Estonian government websites and 
financial institutions.2 While these denial-of-service attacks were only minimally dis-
ruptive, they created anxiety in Estonia over Russian intentions. A pattern is emerging 
that nondestructive or reversible “attacks” – incidents that do not involve death or 
destruction – cannot be deterred in peacetime. 
 
Any reconsideration of the utility of deterrence must reassess Bernard Brodie’s famous 
statement that, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to 
win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no 
other useful purpose.”3 The mere existence of a strategic nuclear force was enough to 
deter major conventional conflict between the United States and Soviet Union. This is 
no longer the case. Today, in peacetime, opponents will test the thresholds for provo-
cation. In war, opponents will assume that attacking US cyber assets is worth the cost. 
And unlike global nuclear war, limited, localized conflicts are winnable by one side 
or the other without incurring catastrophe. The chief purpose of US military strategy 
now must be to rely on war-fighting capabilities rather than deterrence. US military 
forces must be able to win battles and to fight through unavoidable attacks, rather than 
expecting to prevent them. 
 
A CHANGED SECURITY  
ENVIRONMENT FOR DETERRENCE
Deterrence rests on a series of assumptions about how potential opponents recognize, 
interpret and react to threats of retaliation. Successful deterrence assumes that oppo-
nents will assess the threat of damaging consequences correctly if they undertake cer-
tain courses of action and that this will lead them to reject those actions as too risky or 
The chief purpose of US military strategy  
now must be to rely on war-fighting capabilities 
rather than deterrence.
63
too expensive. Nuclear deterrence rested on a framework of political understandings 
between the two “peer” superpowers regarding strategic intent, military capabilities, 
diplomatic engagement at the most senior levels on military and security issues, and 
thresholds or redlines to constrain and manage conflict. 
 
Common understandings allow for credible threats to be made with lower risk of mis-
interpretation. Signaling – tacit communications between adversaries – can manage 
and reduce the chance of misinterpretation, but signals require tacit understandings 
on “redlines” and thresholds, implicit or explicit understandings among potential op-
ponents, and public statements about intentions. The political conditions for effective 
deterrence – an ability to influence an opponent’s planning by making clear that cer-
tain actions carry unacceptable risk – required a process of direct and indirect engage-
ment where opposing leaders explicitly discussed how risk should be calculated and 
how the balance of deterrent forces should be assessed. None of these political condi-
tions exist for space or cybersecurity. 
 
Deterrence, in its High Church nuclear application, actually may not have worked as 
we think it did.4 The United States had nuclear weapons and threatened to use them 
if there was, in President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s, words, “trustworthy evidence of a 
general attack against the West.”5 Eisenhower hoped that nuclear deterrence would 
obviate the need for more expensive conventional forces. Later administrations moved 
away from this position to experiment with various response options and different 
mixes of conventional and strategic forces. Creating a political and deterrent role for 
nuclear weapons required a long and tense set of interchanges between Moscow and 
Washington before they produced more stability than risk. A complex and arcane 
hierarchy of weapons, signals and strategies was assembled on the American side, but 
despite a high degree of openness, the intent of this deterrent hierarchy was not always 
fully understood by the Kremlin.
 
The political framework for Cold War deterrence took years to develop. It no longer 
exists, and has not been duplicated in Washington’s relations with potential oppo-
nents. The United States no longer faces a single opponent, or even a single class of 
opponents. There has been a diffusion of potential opponents, from a single adver-
sary with whom Washington had both processes and understandings, and who would 
at times mirror US actions, to a near-peer opponent in China, two confrontational 
states, Iran and North Korea, in tense regions, as well as non-state actors, with dif-
ferent vulnerabilities, strategies and attitudes towards risk.6 Some of these new oppo-
nents lack the experience, institutions and skill to calculate the risk of certain actions; 
a few may misinterpret deterrent threats while others may not feel threatened at all. 
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To the extent that these understandings exist for cyberattack and ASAT warfare, they 
are drawn from existing international practice and agreement on the use of force and 
the right of self-defense.
 
These new opponents are rational in the sense that they calculate risk and benefits 
of actions against the United States, but their calculations are based on different as-
sumptions and preferences. All but Russia lack the experience of the Cold War to 
guide their interpretation of American actions. Some overestimate their own strength. 
Others hold religious beliefs that may devalue deterrent threats. Some may be willing 
to accept higher levels of damage. Given preconceived ideas about the intent of US 
policy, the lack of a shared political framework to interpret actions and lack of experi-
ence, deterrent threats could easily be misinterpreted as aggression or ignored. 
 
Similar factors shape the ability to deter non-state actors. Additionally, non-state ac-
tors have no cities or population to threaten or hold hostage, and their tolerance for 
risk is likely to be much greater than most nation-states. These individuals have al-
ready accepted a high degree of risk in pursuit of their aims and they believe their 
followers are already under attack. They may accept death as a necessary sacrifice. A 
threat intended to deter will at best only shape the planning of jihadis and other in-
surgents. Some non-state opponents may even welcome retaliation, expecting that the 
resultant collateral damage would justify and expand support for their cause.
 
From an opponent perspective, an overt, kinetic attack on an American satellite dur-
ing peacetime would be considered very risky in that the opponent could reasonably 
fear the American response. Similarly, a destructive cyberattack against the United 
States carries a high degree of risk. A covert, non-destructive attack does not carry the 
same degree of risk. Key factors in opponent decision making will involve a calcula-
tion of how likely the attack is to be attributed to them and how beneficial the result of 
the attack will be in serving their purposes, bearing in mind that these purposes may 
be as diverse as testing avenues for asymmetric attack to prepare for conflict with the 
United States, making a statement of defiance or gaining espionage advantage. 
 
DETERRENCE AND CHINA
In order to deter China from using ASAT weapons, China’s leaders would have to 
calculate that an ASAT attack would lead to an escalation of conflict or to damaging 
retaliation. In peacetime, Beijing would probably calculate that an ASAT attack might 
risk being seen as a casus belli. If so, it is unlikely that China’s kinetic or directed ener-
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gy weapons would be used outside of conflict. If, however, Washington and Beijing are 
already engaged in an armed clash, the threat of the use of force in space is somewhat 
moot. Washington could, for example, threaten to escalate the conflict by warning 
that an attack on a satellite will result in the destruction of China’s space launch com-
plex. Beijing may nonetheless calculate that at this stage of its military modernization, 
interfering with US satellites is worth any retaliatory interference with their own satel-
lites, and that the risk of escalation in other domains is either low or acceptable. 
 
There is some evidence that Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and 
overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. China has little experience with the 
arms control negotiations that underpinned nuclear deterrence, has a different con-
ceptual framework for conflict and international relations, and lacks the experience 
of the Cold War for interpreting American actions and signals. Chinese military con-
cepts on “deterrence” differ significantly from US concepts, meshing Schelling’s ideas 
of deterrence and compellence in ways that encourage use and increase the risk of 
miscalculation.7 Deterring Chinese ASAT attacks during armed conflict would re-
quire threatening something other than China’s own satellites, since the People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) is not yet so dependent on space assets that the satellites’ loss 
would constrain their operations as much as the loss of American satellites would hurt 
US forces. In this situation, Chinese leaders may see an exchange of satellite attacks as 
working to their benefit. Only a credible threat to retaliate against a terrestrial target 
would change China’s calculus, but such threats bring the risk of escalation of conflict 
that would need to be weighed carefully.
 
Responding to an attack on a military target in space or a military cyber network with 
an attack on the Chinese homeland would likely be seen by China as escalatory. Ad-
ditionally, nationalist sentiment among the citizens of potential opponents like China 
or Iran suggests the most likely effect of US escalation unless it was sustained and 
broadly destructive, would be to reinforce support for the regime and for a continua-
tion of the conflict.
 
Belief shapes perception. The Kremlin believed that the United States was inherently 
aggressive and sought the destruction of the Soviet Union. Soviet political and mili-
tary leaders debated whether the US investment in weapons was to retain a credible 
deterrent or to attain first strike capabilities. Paranoia also colors how authoritarian 
Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk 
and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks.
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regimes that lack domestic legitimacy view the United States. Cultural and linguistic 
differences also contribute to misinterpretation of deterrent messages.
CREDIBLE THREATS
The ability to make a credible threat is the core of deterrence. An opponent calculates 
the benefits of an action and compares these to the potential cost and the likelihood 
that such costs will actually be inflicted. The credibility of a deterrent threat is shaped 
by opponent perceptions and by their tolerance for risk. A threat that poses unaccept-
able risk will deter. A number of factors shape this calculation of unacceptable risk. 
For state opponents, a deterrent threat must entail existential risk or a compelling 
and unavoidable threat to the state’s core interests, such as its territorial integrity or 
political independence. A central flaw in deterrence theory today is that, in the wake 
of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, few opponents find it credible that the United States 
will use expeditionary forces in retaliation to provocations. 
 
Unlike other military technologies, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat. If 
used, damage and casualties would be massive. In contrast, neither cyberattacks nor 
ASAT attacks pose the same level of destructiveness; they certainly are not existential 
threats. If there was some way credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons after 
a cyberattack, deterrence might be possible. However, a nuclear threat in response to 
these attacks would not be proportional and the threat to use nuclear weapons is likely 
to be discounted by opponents. There are powerful norms that constrain the use of 
these weapons, and therefore, a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to cyberat-
tacks would be dramatic but not credible. Calls for a nuclear response to cyberattacks 
would be dismissed as frivolous. Threats to use military force to retaliate against an 
act that would not be considered as justifying the use of force in self-defense under 
international law or practice will likely be dismissed by opponents as bluster. 
 
To be credible, a deterrent threat also would have to impose an “unacceptable loss” 
on the opponent. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara calculated that the 
“unacceptable loss” required for the nuclear deterrence included half of Soviet indus-
trial capacity, at least two-thirds of their military forces and perhaps a quarter of their 
civilian population.8 These damage estimates would be ridiculously disproportional 
to the loss of a satellite or the disruption of a computer network. It would require bi-
zarre calculations (by both the United States and opponents) to determine the thresh-
olds for losses of satellites or computer networks that would trigger massive retaliation 
like that envisioned by McNamara during the throes of the Cold War. 
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An extensive discussion that began in the 1950s sought to gauge the utility of differ-
ent deterrent scenarios and exchange ratios ranging from massive relation to flexible 
response, or between counter-value and counter-force strikes. These calculations were 
complex and their results easily misinterpreted. Contemporary strategic calculations 
could only increase in the event of “cross-domain” deterrence. If, for example, Wash-
ington responds to an attack on a satellite by attacking a space launch facility, this 
would be seen as disproportional and as escalatory.
 
Overly broad definitions of “vital interests” are both unhelpful and inaccurate. A pre-
cise definition would identify vital interests as the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the nation. Determining what causes serious harm to the nation-
al interest is a political decision, but there are identifiable upper and lower bounds. 
Drawing on the UN Charter, actions that threaten the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a nation would certainly count as a threat to vital national interests.9 
Disruption of economic relations or of communications (subject to Pictet’s tests of 
scope, duration and intensity)10 could qualify as serious harm to the national interest. 
A simple test for vital interests would be to determine if a nation’s political leadership 
(the president, and the secretaries of state and defense) regularly and routinely raised 
the issue in discussions with foreign counterparts. 
 
Washington has engaged in a series of definitional debates on whether to extend its 
vital interests to matters that would indirectly affect territorial integrity and political 
independence. These efforts have had mixed success. Defining the political indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of Europe and Japan as a vital interest was compelling, 
particularly after the tangible demonstration of commitment produced by a massive 
US effort to liberate Europe and defeat aggression in Asia, which included the use of 
nuclear weapons, followed by the creation of a formal defensive alliance, the station-
ing of significant forces and clear, sustained high-level interest. The Carter Doctrine 
proclaimed that the United States would use its military forces to defend oil resources 
in the Persian Gulf.11 This did not deter Saddam Hussein from invading an oil-rich 
neighbor, nor did it deter Iran from creating a proxy-state ally in Lebanon, from seek-
ing to expand its influence in Iraq, or from engaging in terrorism and in nondestruc-
tive actions against networks and satellites. 
The ability to deter attacks against networks or 
satellites is so limited that we can reasonably 
ask whether deterrence still makes sense as an 
organizing principle for strategy.
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 Nuclear deterrence created a degree of restraint and stability, as major powers were 
afraid of the potentially existential consequences of direct military action against the 
other. But an attack against a network or a satellite would not justify a nuclear re-
sponse, certainly not against another nuclear power, and most likely not against a 
non-nuclear power given the stigma attached to nuclear weapons’ use. Ruling out a 
nuclear response limits deterrence. Anything less than an existential threat or a threat 
against truly vital interests will not have a deterrent effect. Deterrence lies at the in-
tersection of credible threat and vital interests and neither is present for space or cy-
berspace. 
 
If opponents had a similar interpretation of vital interests, if they believed there was 
a credible threat of serious retaliation for attacks against vital US interests, and if they 
believed an attack would be attributed to them, it might be possible to deter them. To 
date, however, no cyberattack has threatened vital interests. Instead, cyber incidents 
have generated little more than complaints. Opponents similarly may suspect that 
the United States will not start World War III if there is a nondestructive attack on a 
satellite.
 
Washington could shape opponent calculations by making specific statements on 
when and how it would respond to attacks on satellites or on networks. A Soviet inva-
sion of Europe would trigger the use of nuclear weapons, either massively or flexibly, 
on Soviet forces, installations and leadership. This was a clear threat, publicly enunci-
ated, linking explicit actions against vital interests to explicit (and immensely damag-
ing) consequences. 
 
Developing the same clear linkage will be more difficult for satellite and cyberattacks. 
What is the appropriate and proportional response for an attack against something 
less than a vital interest? Does retaliation create the risk of escalating conflict into 
other domains? If one assumes a degree of caution by major powers that have less 
tolerance for risk than other classes of opponents, one could expect to see the use of 
temporary and nondestructive attacks against satellites, and disruption of military 
computer networks rather than cyberattacks on civilian critical infrastructure in the 
American homeland. Opponents can manage the risk of escalation by observing im-
plicit limitations on attacks while still gaining military advantage. If the opponent is 
Anything less than an existential threat or  
a threat against truly vital interests will not  
have a deterrent effect.  
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in extremis, even these limitations may be discarded. Cyber and space capabilities 
are attractive targets that offer asymmetric advantage. The United States cannot make 
credible threats to deter nondestructive attacks, and in conflict, the value of ASAT 
attacks to an opponent may outweigh perceived risk unless Washington threatens a 
truly disproportional response. 
 
The construction of a credible deterrent will be difficult in these circumstances. An 
explicit or implied deterrent threat to stop citizens from committing cybercrimes or 
military force would ensue will provoke either outrage or ridicule. The same is true 
for the threat of retaliation for nondestructive ASAT attacks, as jammers located in 
the attacker’s national territory are immune in peacetime from military response. Tit-
for-tat exchanges, especially if they involve nondestructive and temporary effects, are 
more likely to irritate than deter, and could easily escalate any confrontation or con-
flict. 
 
International convention and law place constraints on how armed force can be used 
and thus limit the ability to make credible threats. Nations have the right to use force 
(consistent with the laws of armed conflict) in self-defense against destructive or co-
ercive acts that threaten their territorial or political integrity. In international practice, 
espionage is not considered to be the use of force and a threat to use force in response 
to espionage is not credible. It would also, as noted above, be an unusual and unprec-
edented step to use military force in response to espionage – a precedent the United 
States, itself, might not wish to see created. In light of these constraints, opponents are 
unlikely to find the threats intended to deter as being credible.
 
For threats against space and cyber assets, there is a gap between credible threat and 
proportional response. Proportionality, which limits the use of excessive force in re-
sponse to incidents and provocations, limits the kinds of threats that can be made. 
How much force is excessive is, of course, a judgment to be made by political leaders, 
taking into consideration their concern for international opinion, their own values 
and their assessment, with their military advisors, of the political and security conse-
quences of the use of excessive force. 
 
For threats against space and cyber assets,  
there is a gap between credible threat  
and proportional response.
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If one accepts the premise that only the threat of truly damaging retaliation has a 
deterrent effect, and if a truly damaging retaliatory threat can only be credibly made 
in response to an attack that involves the use of force and poses an existential threat 
or threatens serious harm to national interests, one has identified the threshold below 
which deterrence will not work. ASAT and cyberattackscyberattacks that do not pose 
existential threats or immense harm to vital interests, and thus neither deter or are 
deterrable. We routinely overestimate the effect of cyberattacks, which cause only lim-
ited physical damage, can be uneven in their effect, and are offer more opportunities 
for remedial action than kinetic attacks. Risk and benefit are asymmetric and favor 
the attacker. 
 
The use of nuclear weapons in the Cold War rapidly became binary; the choice for 
Washington and Moscow was use or non-use. Many analysts viewed escalation con-
trol as a fiction. Others maintained that once the nuclear threshold was crossed, lead-
ers could engage in graduated nuclear attacks or limited nuclear war without this es-
calating uncontrollably into exchanges that posed an existential threat.12 ASAT and 
cyberattacks, with their more limited effects, do not face the same taboo on use, nor 
do they generate the same fear regarding first use.  
 
The Cold War clarified there were classes of actions that were not deterred by nuclear 
threats. Opponents with different cultural backgrounds, less experience in interna-
tional relations and with a higher tolerance for risk might miscalculate the threshold 
of action that would trigger a forceful response. The likelihood of miscalculation is 
greater with the broad range of opponents the United States now faces.
 
Declaratory policy is the best tool for shaping opponent perception of risk and cred-
ible threats. The declaratory statements of nuclear deterrence were robust, delivered 
by the president or the secretaries of defense or state. At their core they linked spe-
cific and immensely damaging responses to specific opponent actions. They explicitly 
laid out US capabilities to inflict unacceptable destruction. Observable programs and 
expenditures underpinned US statements. These explicit statements did not prevent 
ASAT and cyberattacks, with their more limited 
effects, do not face the same taboo on use, nor do 
they generate the same fear regarding first use.  
Risk and benefit are asymmetric and  
favor the attacker. 
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opponent testing of the limits of deterrence, particularly at the periphery of vital in-
terests, nor did they deter actions that fell below the threshold of the use of force, but 
they provided a degree of clarity that made it easier for opponents to calculate risk 
and redlines. 
 
General statements delivered in national strategies without presidential or cabinet 
secretary-level reinforcement do not have the same effect. National strategies tend 
to be vague purposely and are not associated clearly with consequences. Ambiguity 
in deterrent threats, often held up as strategically artful, actually may encourage op-
ponent miscalculation and lead to greater risk taking. Take, for example, the Obama 
administration’s declaratory policy for space, issued in 2010: 
 
The United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of 
space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-
defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems 
and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, 
defeat efforts to attack them.13
It is unlikely that the threat to “employ a variety of measures” strikes fear into the 
hearts of opponents. Imprecision is defended as necessary since giving opponents ex-
plicit redlines would tell them what they could do with impunity. This ignores the 
likely conclusion that opponents, judging from their actions, had already deduced an 
implicit redline: that in peacetime, Washington will do nothing against actions that 
fall below the threshold of the use of force. While Washington believes that impre-
cision reinforces freedom of action, opponents may judge that the generality of US 
declaratory policy reflects a deeper indecision as to how Washington will respond to 
malicious actions against satellites.
 
Declaratory policies for cyberspace are similarly imprecise. The first general declara-
tion had weight as it was delivered in a groundbreaking speech by President Barack 
Obama in May 2009.14 In this speech, the President said that cyberspace would be 
treated as a ‘strategic national asset” where the United States would “deter, prevent, 
detect and defend against attacks.” Although general, this was an important first step. 
It was followed, however, by an international strategy for cyberspace in May 2011 that 
stated:
 
When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace 
as we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent 
right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted 
through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have 
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with our military treaty partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary 
means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate 
and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our 
Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will 
exhaust all options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh 
the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act in a 
way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad 
international support whenever possible.15 
The mass of caveats that open and close the declaratory statement – “when warranted,” 
“appropriate and consistent with international law,” “exhaust all other options before 
military force,” “carefully weigh the costs of action” – undercut its deterrent value. 
Most of these caveats are self-evident, they detract from the clarity of the statement 
and opponents could easily misinterpret or undervalue the implied threat.
 
Then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made the clearest declaratory statement on 
cyberattacks in an October 2012 speech.16 Panetta said that if the United States detect-
ed an imminent threat of cyberattack that would cause significant physical destruc-
tion or kill American citizens, it would take preemptive action. In nuclear parlance, 
this is the equivalent of “launch on warning.” His statement was directed against Iran, 
which was then engaged in a series of massive denial of service attacks – the most ba-
sic form of attack – against major US banks and a telecommunication company.17 It is 
telling that, while the Iranian activities subsided for a brief period, they soon resumed 
and were expanded to include probing of US critical infrastructure companies for ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities. Tehran did not cross the threshold set by Panetta and, judg-
ing from continued Iranian actions, the threat did not deter nondestructive attacks or 
intrusive preparations for attacks that could disrupt or destroy. 
This partial record suggests that in peacetime, opponents will likely estimate that an 
action that does not rise to the level of the use of force and some physical destruction 
will not provoke or justify a military response by the United States. Cyber espionage 
or cybercrime, for example, falls below the threshold set by international law that 
would justify a military response. A military response to espionage would be unprec-
edented in international affairs, as nations do not regard espionage as an act of war 
or as the use of force. The risk, of course, is that an opponent with a different cultural 
background, less experience in international relations and with a higher tolerance for 
risk might miscalculate the threshold of actions triggering responses. The likelihood 
of miscalculation is greater given the diversity of potential opponents Washington 
now faces, and miscalculation also limits the scope of deterrence by affecting the cred-
ibility of any deterrent threat.
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The risk of US retaliation using its general military capabilities is sufficient to deter de-
structive attacks in peacetime. It is unlikely, however, that opponents can be deterred 
from attacking US space or cyber systems once conflict is initiated. In conflict, an op-
ponent may calculate that the losses to the United States from attacks on satellites or 
networks outweigh the risk of retaliation or of escalation. Washington can effectively 
deter major military operations against itself and its allies, but we can deter little else 
because the cost-benefit ratio has changed in ways unfavorable to deterrence. 
A CHANGED TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
The technological environment has changed in ways that erode the ability to deter. In 
contrast to nuclear deterrence, cyber and ASAT weapons are less destructive and in 
most cases, much more readily available. The cost of acquisition and use is lower. Un-
like nuclear attacks, where attribution is hard to avoid, attribution in both space and 
cyberspace is difficult, especially if the attacks are well planned. Attackers who believe 
they are anonymous will have a sense of impunity. Anonymity makes deterrent threats 
meaningless, since an attacker is likely to assume that the risk of detection and repri-
sal is low or nonexistent. What constitutes a “weapon” in both domains encourages 
doctrine and tactics that emphasize striking first, without warning. These factors work 
against stability and they undercut deterrence by reshaping perceptions of risk. 
The perception of the risk of retaliation depends to a degree on the destructiveness of 
the weapon used. Nuclear weapons, with their immense destructive capability, pose a 
threat that is difficult for a nation to ignore. A single nuclear weapon could destroy a 
city. No other weapon has the same destructive capacity. Nuclear weapons are sui ge-
neris, and the rules that apply to their use do not apply to other weapons technologies. 
Cyber “weapons” are less damaging than conventional weapons and ASAT weapons 
are so specialized and limited that they hold no extraordinary risk. Both ASAT and 
cyberattacks offer real military advantage, but neither is likely to threaten the survival 
of the state, nor do they pose unacceptable damage. 
Truly destructive attacks still require a high degree of skill and investment, but less 
destructive attack capabilities are easily acquired, and because they do not involve the 
What constitutes a “weapon” in both domains 
encourages doctrine and tactics that emphasize 
striking first, without warning.
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use of force, carry less risk in their use. Sophisticated cyberattacks (like the Stuxnet vi-
rus that was directed against computers involved in the Iranian nuclear program) re-
quire research and advanced coding capabilities, but basic cyberattack tools are widely 
available. Similarly, kinetic or directed energy attacks against satellites require a level 
of resources that restrict their use to a few nations, but some nondestructive ASAT 
weapons, such as jamming, hacking and other techniques, are more easily obtained. 
In both cases, non-state actors as well as states have access to the low-end weaponry.
There are similarities between space and cyberspace that affect the applicability of 
deterrence. In both domains, the United States faces multiple opponents, and both 
are marked by extensive use of covert activities and by low-level friction, e.g., friction 
that stays below the level of the use of force. This potential for nondestructive “attack,” 
lowers the risk of action and makes deterrence more difficult. For both domains, there 
is only a limited framework of norms or expectations for behavior, perhaps better 
developed for space activities, but still insufficient for providing a shared framework 
for countries to calculate the risk of an attack. The Soviet Union acknowledged having 
nuclear capabilities – it was in its national security interest to do so. Acknowledge-
ment made serious discussion possible. In contrast, China denies possessing cyberat-
tack and ASAT capabilities, making serious discussion impossible. 
While there are similarities in the space and cyber domains, there are also divergences. 
Space is a mature technology; cyberspace continues to evolve. In particular, techno-
logical change will reduce the burden of attribution for cyberattack. A reduced ability 
to attack covertly will in some but not all circumstances change opponent calculation 
on the utility of cyberattack in peacetime. Cyber infrastructures do not face the same 
physical constraints that make it difficult to harden satellites against attack. Over time, 
opponents will face reduced covertness and harder targets in cyberspace. In contrast, 
technical measures are unlikely to reduce significantly satellite vulnerabilities. Vulner-
ability in cyberspace is also becoming more symmetrical, as many nations become 
dependent upon computer networks, while the United States remains asymmetrically 
vulnerable in space because it depends upon space more than its opponents. In cyber-
space, for all but the most isolated economies, global digital networks have become 
the central economic tool for nations. While it is possible to insulate national net-
works to a degree, both China and Iran are as vulnerable to disruption as the United 
States. Autarkic, backward, economies, like that of North Korea, are the exception. 
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ASYMMETRIC VULNERABILITY AND ASYMMETRIC RISK
Deterrence is less effective in an environment where the United States has more to lose 
than an attacker. Nuclear deterrence depended in part upon symmetric perceptions of 
vulnerability. Each side essentially held the other’s civilian population, military forces 
and economic infrastructure hostage. This risk symmetry is now lacking, particularly 
for space assets. If an opponent interferes with an American satellite and Washington 
responds in kind, the United States will run out of targets before the opponent does. 
While all nations have vulnerabilities that can be exploited, particularly with peer or 
near-peer opponents, the US military is much more dependent upon information, net-
works and space assets than likely opponents, making attacks on these US systems 
irresistible. In an ASAT exchange, US military capabilities could be severely damaged, 
while the effect on China, which operates very few satellites, would be marginal. China, 
Russia and Iran (if it further develops its capabilities) could derive considerable benefit 
from attacking US space capabilities while Washington would derive only marginal 
benefit from attacking theirs. This suggests that deterrence in space or cyberspace can-
not be domain limited and will require threats in other domains, i.e., an attack on US 
satellites could lead to an attack by US forces on terrestrial targets, raising risks of mis-
interpretation and escalation in conflict. 
  
There is a natural US tendency to approach vulnerability from an apolitical and tech-
nological point of view. This involves assessing the chances that a weapon can reach 
its target and the damage expectancy once it arrives. This may not be how opponents 
assess vulnerability. Mao Tse-tung’s famous statement (to Indian Prime Minister Jawa-
harlal Nehru in 1954) on how “the deaths of 10 or 20 million people [from an atomic 
bomb] is nothing to be afraid of ”18 was, in good measure, bluster, but it also may have 
reflected the views of a leader who was demonstrably willing to sacrifice millions of 
lives to achieve a goal. Overconfidence and underestimation of risk by new opponents 
cannot be ruled out. 
During conflict, opponent calculations will be based on different assumptions about 
opportunities and risks, assumptions that have been shaped in part by US statements 
before conflict. Opponents will seek to gain military advantage and defeat US forces. 
The benefits of attacking and disrupting the foundations of the US informational ad-
vantage – computer networks and satellites – will be readily apparent to them. Oppo-
nents may be tempted to use such attacks in the initial phases of conflict, particularly 
given the benefits of surprise. Unlike nuclear weapons, first use against cyber and space 
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assets does not bring with it the risk of rapid escalation to an existential conflict, as was 
the case with nuclear weapons, nor are there powerful taboos against use.
Opponent goals and expectations for conflict will shape the decision to use cyber 
and ASAT attacks. A desire for a quick victory over deployed US forces will encour-
age more extensive use of cyber and ASAT attacks. If the conflict is not going well, 
opponents may seek to ratchet up the level of attacks or to threaten attacks against 
the US homeland in an effort to manage and constrain US options. If they believe 
the United States poses an existential response to their regime, inhibitions against 
use, particularly against civilian targets in the US homeland may be discarded. If the 
United States has engaged in cyberattacks that the opponent sees as disproportional, 
it will also reduce inhibitions. The common themes are that information assets are a 
legitimate target and an area where an opponent will be tempted by the belief that an 
attack will provide asymmetric advantage. In conflict, opponents will not be deterred 
from calculating that attacks on networks or satellites are attractive and worth the risk. 
AN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENT
Strategic stability was a characteristic of deterrence based on mutual and symmetric 
vulnerability. Nuclear deterrence assumed a relationship between stability and vulner-
ability, where balancing mutual vulnerabilities created a stable strategic environment. 
The overwhelming nature of the nuclear threat meant these weapons did not have to 
be used to demonstrate that hostile actions could be costly. Washington could “man-
age” the conditions for stability by ensuring a rough equivalence of forces that pro-
duced and maintained symmetric vulnerability, so that the Kremlin never perceived a 
moment when the benefits of direct attack outweighed the cost. 
Deterrence is inherently less stable in a multipolar environment than in a bipolar 
one. In some circumstances, efforts to pursue deterrence in a multipolar environment 
might actually be destabilizing, as inexperienced opponents misinterpret threats in-
tended to deter. Threats in deterrence are conditional – if X happens, the response 
will be Y – but opponents may not understand this conditionality or may discount 
it, given their perception of US intentions and the continuing resonance with foreign 
audiences of earlier US statements as to how it would dominate and deny space and 
In conflict, opponents will not be deterred from 
calculating that attacks on networks or satellites  
are attractive and worth the risk. 
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cyberspace to opponents. Selective or deficient listening is very difficult to overcome 
absent regular dialogue. Given differing sensitivities and levels of cognition among 
multiple opponents, a deterrent message could easily be misinterpreted. 
This is not a stable situation. Opponents are disinclined to accept US dominance 
(what some would call “hegemony”) or regional military presence. Opponents will 
engage in asymmetric challenges to gauge their effect and determine how far they 
can go without triggering a US military response. Opponents will seek to avoid di-
rect military confrontation with the United States and use asymmetric modes of 
conflict. These asymmetric efforts gnaw at the fringes of vital interests and present a 
more complicated target for a deterrent response, as they involve an increased risk 
of collateral damage, the difficulty of calculating proportionality, and a more com-
plicated decision-making process for determining responses. The United States can 
expect a continued period of challenge and testing as nations (and politically moti-
vated groups) recalculate their relationships with other states and explore ways to 
constrain American power. Just as the nuclear deterrent did not deter adventures at 
the periphery, US space and cyber capabilities cannot be expected to deter indirect 
challenges.
CONCLUSION
Deterrence is no longer a sufficient goal for strategy. To paraphrase Sir Michael How-
ard, there is widespread doubt that a posture of deterrence, however structured, will 
be enough to prevent an opponent that accepts war as an instrument of policy and 
has built up a formidable arsenal from not only initiating but fighting through a 
conflict in the expectation of victory, whether the United States wishes it or not.19 
If the question is whether the United States can apply concepts of deterrence devel-
oped for nuclear weapons to deter attacks on networks or space assets, the answer is 
no. In peacetime, opponents will avoid destructive attacks that would justify the use 
of force by the United States in retaliation. During armed conflict, the United States 
will not be able to deter or prevent attacks given different perceptions of risk by at-
tackers that derive from the perception of asymmetric vulnerability. Opponents will 
stand to gain more than they expect to lose in any exchange. 
Deterrence is no longer a sufficient  
goal for strategy.
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Future conflict will certainly include cyberattacks and possibly attacks on satellites. 
The goal of American strategy should be to deny these attacks success in achieving 
their larger objective of gaining military advantage over US forces by disruption of 
cyber and space assets. The best way to accomplish this objective is to create the ability 
to fight and win even if attacked in the space and cyber domains. Planning and acqui-
sitions must be based on the assumption that opponents will attack space and cyber 
assets and that the United States must retain the ability to deliver the services these 
assets provide and limit any degradation in overall performance. 
A second objective for strategy is to shape and constrain the use of cyberattack to 
influence opponent calculations during conflict. The development of agreed interna-
tional norms could define constraints and escalatory thresholds and shape wartime 
use of cyberattacks by making it easier for opponents to calculate risk. Broad interna-
tional acceptance of norms could lead opponents to choose targets or modes of attack 
that hold less political risk. Multilateral understandings on acceptable behavior would 
increase the political risk of an attack and might justify retaliation. 
Just as the use – and even the threat of use – of nuclear weapons has been stigma-
tized,20 stigmatizing certain space and cyberattacks, or attacks against certain classes 
of targets, could reduce the risk of these attacks being launched. Stigmatization might 
be harder to create, as cyberattacks do not produce the moral repugnance that the 
planned use of nuclear weapons created, and the United States might, in the case of 
cyberattack, wish to preserve freedom of action to use these techniques. 
The absence of a visible cyber or space “arms race,” where nations publicize the devel-
opment of new capabilities in order to change opponent calculations of the benefits of 
military action, suggests that in practical terms, deterrence now plays a subsidiary and 
supporting role, confined to a few specialized and unlikely kinds of conflict. Nuclear 
weapons are no longer the focus of warfare. They exist, serve some symbolic func-
tion and perhaps cancel out their use by adversaries. Perhaps as a result, new forms 
of conflict have gained prominence in which classic concepts of deterrence have little 
value. Taking Brodie’s point on the utility of military force, the intent of building stra-
tegic arms was to deter. Now, adversaries build weapons designed to foil deterrence. 
The arms race was a kind of implicit bargaining between opponents, where one side’s 
deployments or programs led to a countering effort to preserve stability. Maintaining 
The goal of American strategy should be  
to create the ability to fight and win even if  
attacked in the space and cyber domains.
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a rough parity drove investment and planning. Now, countries build cyber and space 
weapons for warfighting advantage.
Improving defensive capabilities, constructing a normative framework that creates 
political disincentives for satellite and cyberattacks, and building in operational ro-
bustness that limits the benefit an attacker could gain, would all change opponent 
calculations in ways favorable to the United States. None of these steps entail repeat-
ing the Cold War experience of building offensive capabilities whose threatened use 
would deter attack. 
This essay questions whether the strategies and concepts developed for nuclear deter-
rence can be usefully applied to other kinds of conflict. Nuclear weapons are uniquely 
destructive, and the bipolar global conflict was a unique political moment in interna-
tional affairs. In this context, deterrence made sense, but these conditions do not exist 
for space or cyberspace. Deterrence, like Alfred Thayer Mahan’s decisive battle be-
tween fleets of battleships, may be an artifact of strategy from an earlier era that politi-
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Deterrence and Crisis Stability in  
Space and Cyberspace 
By Bruce W. MacDonald
Deterrence and crisis stability require continuing US access to the military and com-
mercial information streams both generated in and transmitted through space. Sta-
bility is reinforced when the incentives for an adversary to initiate offensive actions 
against one’s space assets, or to escalate the scale of offensive actions if some level of 
offense is already underway, are outweighed by the disincentives to do so. Stability is 
strengthened by the ability to absorb at least modest perturbations to the status quo 
without those perturbations amplifying over the course of an ongoing crisis or con-
flict. “Parochial stability” might be defined as circumstances in which one state enjoys 
stability with regard to space operations, but the state’s adversary does not. Parochial 
stability might then enhance escalation dominance for the parochially stable state, 
but not lend itself to deterrence and crisis stability because major space powers are 
unlikely to allow parochial stability for a potential foe. The very essential contribu-
tions of space assets as both an economic and military force multiplier ensure that any 
major power would not allow a competitor to attain, much less sustain, dominance in 
this domain. 
How might the United States and China achieve deterrence and crisis stability in space 
under current and foreseeable circumstances? Deterrence and crisis stability rest on 
the balance of actual and potential offensive and related defensive capabilities between 
the two major space powers. Deterrence stability in space is affected by the dynam-
ics of offensive and defensive force acquisition programs. Crisis stability, a subset of 
deterrence stability, is affected by perceived incentives and disincentives to undertake 
provocative or palliative behaviors and actions during a crisis. Deterrence and crisis 
stability in space operations are similar in some respects, but are also different from 
the nuclear domain. Deterrence stability overall, and crisis stability in particular, are 
highly desirable features for US security interests in the space domain, and generally 
desirable for cyberspace as well, given the considerable and growing economic and 
military benefits the United States derives from what can be termed space-enabled 
information services (SEIS) and the larger information services of cyberspace. Ac-
cordingly, strengthening our understanding of the dynamics of space deterrence and 
space stability in crisis situations is an essential national security task.
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In a crisis, the decisions made by the United States and others on whether and how 
to use space control and cyber assets will play a major role in determining whether 
or how a crisis escalates. Understanding deterrence and crisis stability in space and 
cyberspace, accordingly, should be a high priority national security objective, yet we 
know very little about crisis behavior in space and cyberspace.  To begin with, there 
fortunately have been no crises of note in space to extrapolate from, and while space 
war games offer insights, they too often rush through the crisis phase of the game to 
get to the conflict. In almost all such games, the important crisis period gets short 
shrift and is often viewed as little more than a necessary but minor prelude to the 
main event. Yet this is precisely the part of the exercise that should be a key focus of 
attention. Understanding the dynamics of the space domain in a crisis is essential to 
understanding how to maintain deterrence and crisis stability in space and how to 
avoid a potentially costly and lethal space conflict, or even larger full-scale war. This 
is not to downplay the importance of space war games, but rather to emphasize that 
more – perhaps separate – attention needs to be paid to the crisis phase. There is a rich 
vein of information to be mined from “crisis games,” where the emphasis would be 
on understanding what behaviors, decisions and actions prove to be escalatory or de-
escalatory. But much more needs to be done, including helping to frame the features 
that would lead to more informed and informative crisis games for space, in addition 
to war games.
This essay seeks to illuminate some dimensions of the strategic landscape of space, 
provides an overview of the dynamics of crisis stability in space, and identifies fac-
tors that would influence behavior in the space domain in a crisis or actual conflict. 
Of particular interest are behaviors that enhance or detract from deterrence stability 
in space, and some elements of cyberspace, too. Understanding how space deterrence 
functions or fails in a crisis, and factors that strengthen or weaken it, might enhance 
understanding of how best to shore up deterrence in a crisis, and how to prevent un-
wanted, uncontrolled escalation should conflict break out. It also could build upon 
current US space policy and strategy to inform peacetime decision-making on space 
behavior, space acquisition and strategic war-gaming. At this early stage in the devel-
opment of stability concepts for space (and cyberspace), drawing in part from stability 
concepts from the nuclear domain, this essay necessarily raises far more questions 
than it resolves.
we know very little about crisis behavior  
in space and cyberspace.
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STABILITY IN THE SPACE DOMAIN
From an analytical perspective, space is strongly linked to cyberspace, given that 
the military and economic benefits of space are overwhelmingly about information, 
either directly generated in space or transmitted through it. Space war games and 
studies have repeatedly demonstrated this space-cyber connection, making it impor-
tant that the cyber dimensions of space behavior be considered as well. The task of 
understanding the dynamics of the space and cyber domains is greatly complicated 
by the onrush of ever-advancing technology that re-sculpts the strategic landscape of 
both space and cyberspace. Technological change was and is a feature of the strategic 
nuclear environment, but the pace of change is arguably much faster in the space and 
cyberspace domains. From an analytical perspective, it is useful to begin looking at 
crisis stability purely within the space domain, but it would be a serious mistake to 
stop there. Cross-domain interactions seem almost unavoidable, other than possibly 
in a highly localized tactical situation.
Space assets, and the communications and cyber links that enable them to function, 
are the means by which essential national security information is either generated, 
transmitted or both.  This information is the lifeblood of US conventional military 
superiority and plays a key role in US strategic nuclear posture as well. As such, these 
space-related assets represent extraordinarily appealing targets to adversaries in any 
future conflict, and their relative vulnerability could provide dangerously attractive 
incentives in a crisis to pre-empt, escalating to war. Similar incentives exist in cyber-
space. It is not surprising that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would want 
the capability to interrupt the rivers of information and services that US space assets 
provide. This information allows American military decision-making, weapons and 
warfighters to be far more effective than in the past, vital advantages across the spec-
trum of potential conflict with major benefits to US security interests.
As China and others increase their space capabilities, their vulnerabilities in space will 
also grow as the margin of US operational advantage in space diminishes. It is pos-
sible that the United States will never become embroiled in a crisis with China, Russia 
or another major space power in years to come, but it would be risky to assume so. 
Greater understanding of the landscape and dynamics of deterrence and crisis stabil-
ity in the space domain, and their interdependence with the cyber domain, need to 
be explored.
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The importance of stability in the space domain has been recognized for some time, 
as in the Strategic Posture Review Commission, led by former Secretaries of Defense 
William Perry and James Schlesinger, that urges in its 2009 final report that the US 
“develop and pursue options for advancing US interests in stability in outer space.”1 
The 2010 US Space Policy issued by the Obama administration also “recognizes the 
need for stability in the space environment.”3  But what are the primary threats to de-
terrence and crisis stability in space?
SEIS lie at the heart of US military superiority and are an essential force multiplier. 
These space assets are quite vulnerable and hard to defend. Consequently, that which 
greatly enhances military power in space will also remain quite vulnerable, at least 
to near-peer[s] competitors in space. The strategic implications of this situation are 
troubling, and made more so by the advancing technology of the space and cyber 
domains. 
The immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons, coupled with the likelihood of un-
controlled escalation if the nuclear threshold were crossed, has been a stabilizing fac-
tor. Offensive military “counter-space” capabilities are less destructive and less terrify-
ing. Consequently, there is a greater likelihood of the potential use of space weapons, 
coupled with the potential advantages that could accrue to whichever party uses them 
first in the early stages of a transition from a severe crisis to open conventional con-
flict between major space powers. Unlike in the nuclear domain, there is no assured 
second-strike capability at present for warfare in space comparable to the presence 
of ballistic missile-carrying submarines at sea. Indeed, there are no weapon systems 
of any kind deployed in space, which would make offsetting efforts to deploy them 
extremely destabilizing. Deterrence and crisis stability in space could be reinforced if 
vital space-enabled information services could be made so resilient to attack (through 
disaggregation or, less likely, active defense) that they could continue to function suf-
ficiently after absorbing a major first strike. These conditions are hardly likely in the 
near- to mid-term, constituting a major difference for deterrence and crisis stability 
between the space and nuclear domains.
There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest increments 
in offensive counter-space capabilities raise great discomfort to potential adversar-
ies. There is also a serious risk of crisis instability in space when “going first” pays off 
– destroying an adversary’s satellites while raising great difficulties for retaliating in 
kind. Indeed, a high strategic payoff from pre-emption virtually defines the meaning 
of crisis instability. No one can claim certainty about what would happen in a crisis, 
but the potential for deterrence and crisis instability seems high and is likely to grow. 
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Both the Bush and Obama administrations have declared in their space policies that 
American space assets are a “vital national interest,” in recognition of the extraordi-
nary and growing US military and economic dependence on them.2,3 This is a new 
feature of US national security policy and reflects the rapidly evolving strategic envi-
ronment of the early 21st century. The vulnerability of vital national interests in space 
presents an enduring challenge for deterrence and crisis stability. The US dependence 
on space seems to require offensive and defensive counter-space capabilities to re-
spond in kind to attacks on vital national interests and to reinforce deterrence, but the 
nature and extent of these assets are veiled. In particular, US doctrine and strategy are 
unclear about when, how and under what circumstances to employ offensive counter-
space capabilities. 
STABILIZING AND DESTABILIZING ACTIONS
With conventional US military power so dependent upon SEIS, there would be sub-
stantial incentives in a deep crisis for a near-peer or a peer competitor to attack US 
military space infrastructure. The United States would likewise have certain incen-
tives to execute offensive counter-space operations in such circumstances. Resisting 
the temptation to strike first may be virtuous but could be strategically unwise, since 
going first could offer many advantages, while absorbing preemptive strikes, with the 
attendant degradation of military capabilities, is likely to be militarily and strategically 
unsound. The PLA appears to be well aware of this dynamic, based on doctrinal writ-
ings.4 Consequently, in a developing crisis, there are built-in incentives for escalation. 
A major unknown is how survivable a country’s offensive space capabilities would 
be after absorbing the full force of an adversary’s first strike. A key consideration is 
the extent resiliency can be built into SEIS assets that could retard the degradation of 
space-enabled capabilities. Strikes by adversaries with limited space capabilities could 
be addressed in traditional ways. 
As technology advances, options for interfering with, disrupting or destroying infor-
mation streams in space or supporting space systems likely will increase. Providing 
protective or defensive options for US space assets should be pursued where appropri-
ate, but most analysts presume that offense will retain a decided advantage in space 
over defense, unless very highly resilient, highly decentralized and affordable space 
systems can be developed in the future. In the nuclear domain, the inability of defense 
credibly to blunt offense generally was seen as stabilizing – but not until both super-
powers achieved assured second strike capability in the 1960s. Even then, arms race 
and crisis stability proved elusive. In the space domain, the pursuit of assured second 
strike capabilities will be more elusive and more destabilizing.  
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The United States has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival and 
proper functioning of its space assets offering profound military, civilian and com-
mercial benefits. Even a space conflict in which the United States is a bystander could 
result in severely adverse collateral effects. A peaceful, stable space environment would 
allow the United States to remain the primary beneficiary of what space can offer. The 
United States also seeks deterrence and crisis stability. These goals are not obtainable 
easily, because China has its own interests to pursue and has the means to prevent the 
attainment of US parochial stability. 
A properly crafted system of space management must be viewed as valuable by both 
the United States, China and all major spacefaring nations. This system will be hard 
to create, and harder to maintain during crises than in peacetime.  Indeed, maintain-
ing crisis stability will be the crucial test of whatever architecture can be constructed. 
Maintaining crisis stability in space seems more likely if “shock absorbers,” such as 
operating norms, are codified and become respected parts of the fabric of peacetime 
space operations. Crisis stability is less likely if operating norms are not in place when 
a crisis occurs.
The United States might enjoy potential benefits from some offensive operations in 
space, but these benefits must be weighed against the value of weakening a norm of 
non-use of force against space assets in a domain in which the United States enjoys 
great benefits. Another factor affecting national decisions about initiating offensive 
actions against an adversary’s space assets is that no country has any significant expe-
rience in this realm of conflict. The possibility of unintended consequences and major 
disruptions from infrastructure interdependencies may pose disincentives, but not an 
absolute barrier to initiating offensive actions in space. 
In any crisis it is possible that, despite the preferences of the parties involved, conflict 
appears inevitable. One central challenge for major space powers is to build firebreaks 
of sufficient resilience and effectiveness so that adversaries can avoid conflict due to 
miscalculation or misunderstanding. Escalatory steps, if required, ought to be taken 
based on an accurate understanding of unfolding events, not on the basis of misun-
derstandings and misperceptions. This is important both for addressing planned as 
well as unplanned or inadvertent conflict – if such firebreaks are possible.
In the space domain, the pursuit of assured  
second strike capabilities will be more elusive  
and more destabilizing. 
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While it is clear that the rules of nuclear deterrence and crisis stability do not translate 
directly into the space, much less cyber, domains, this does not mean that deterrence 
and crisis stability are therefore irrelevant – only that they exist in different forms and 
with different, sometimes starkly different, behaviors. Take, for example, the projected 
use of tactical vs. strategic nuclear weapons. War games have repeatedly indicated that 
any use of nuclear weapons, whether short or intercontinental range, would likely 
result in uncontrolled escalation and general nuclear war. In contrast, it seems entire-
ly possible that the United States and China, for example, might engage in offensive 
counter-space operations in limited, localized or tactical ways. Barriers to limited, of-
fensive counter-space activities could well be more porous for states that do not have 
the wherewithal to inflict catastrophic damage to space assets, or in scenarios in which 
major spacefaring nations oppose states with limited counter-space capabilities. 
Figure 1 is a rough sketch comparing and contrasting the space, cyber, nuclear and 
conventional conflict domains according to several strategic planning considerations. 
While hardly authoritative, the chart suggests that the variation across domains is 
pronounced, and that lessons learned from one domain should not be applied to other 
domains without careful review and analysis.
Feature Nuclear Space Cyber Conventional
Limited Use Is Escalatory? Yes No, but No, but No
Major Benefit to First Use? Modest Yes Yes Modest
Knowledge of Adversary Arsenal? Yes Yes, but No Yes
Understand Effects? Yes ? No Yes
Are There Cascading Effects? Yes Likely Yes Modest
Rate of Environment Change Modest High Very High Modest
Arsenal Vulnerability Modest ? ? Modest
Secure Reserve Force? Yes ? ? Modest
Role of Uncertainty Modest High Very High Modest
Figure 1
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At what point does the limited or tactical use of offensive counter-space capabilities or 
cyber weapons take us to a crisis tipping point, where miscalculation, misunderstand-
ing, Murphy’s Law and/or Mother Nature – the modern-day Four Horsemen of Stra-
tegic Apocalypse – trigger a crisis, small-scale conflict or show of force that escalates 
into all-out strategic conflict?  This is one of the great unknowns of deterrence and 
crisis stability in space, worthy of greater analysis and simulations. 
The dynamics of nuclear deterrence are well understood from Cold War experience. 
This is not the case for strategic warfare in the space and cyber domains. Offensive 
counter-space capabilities are difficult to count or compare in detail, their indirect 
effects are substantial yet difficult to quantify and capabilities are almost never dis-
cussed in public. Space weapons are less visible, and cyberweapons nearly invisible. 
Over time, the two nuclear superpowers developed venues to discuss strategic arms 
control and related issues. There is an obvious need for discussions of deterrence and 
crisis stability in the space and cyber domains, if only to develop a common language 
and understanding of the issues involved, as well as to provide insight into how ma-
jor powers understand these concepts and view the opportunities and pitfalls these 
weapons pose. 
In a crisis, the single most important non-military action that can be taken is to have 
open and reliable channels of communication with an adversary.  Communication 
channels in a crisis have a better chance of success if there is a prior record of con-
structive interaction, and when leaders are familiar with each other and conversant 
with the issues involved. This is one of the arguments in support of high-level pursuit 
of an international code of conduct and the development of rules of the road among 
major space powers. In the nuclear domain, communication was advanced through 
information exchanges and dialogues relating to strategic arms control negotiations 
and scientific exchanges. These avenues are absent in the US-China bilateral relation-
ship, and some are even enjoined by congressional intervention. In many ways, the 
space domain reflects the nuclear domain in the 1950s, when sporadic dialogue grad-
ually led in subsequent decades to more frequent contact, understanding and, even-
tually, collaborative ventures. The United States and the Soviet Union had no better 
alternative than to engage in this journey. The same is true for the United States and 
China at present.  
In a crisis, the single most important non- 
military action that can be taken is to have open 
and reliable channels of communication with  
an adversary.
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Signaling in a crisis is important, and is more useful if accompanied by a “diplomatic 
libretto” to ensure that what is communicated, whether by an action taken or not 
taken, is understood by the adversary. Signaling is subject to the same kinds of in-
terpretation and misinterpretation in the space arena as it has been in the nuclear 
domain. Just as elevated nuclear alert levels accompanied the Cuban missile crisis 
and the 1973 Middle East war, so, too, may signaling in space accompany a significant 
crisis between the United States and China. Nuclear signaling during the Cold War 
conveyed in unmistakable terms the seriousness of the stakes involved. In space the 
differential between signaling and messaging may be much smaller, even though the 
escalatory potential could be high. 
This, too, suggests the value of a space code of conduct and rules of the road among 
major space powers. Absent clear understandings grounded in routine practices and 
clarified through channels of communication, signaling in space can be misread by 
leaders who are mistrustful of one another and inclined to engage in worst-case analy-
sis. Likewise, unintentional or false signals, as in benign equipment failures, also can 
be destabilizing in a crisis, as participants scrutinize the entrails of every significant 
event for their meaning and intent. One urgent task for spacefaring countries would 
be to establish a libretto for space signaling, as well as  choreography for the transmis-
sion of such signals. The value of these measures ironically was demonstrated by a 
North Korean space launch in 2013. The launch was in clear violation of UN Security 
Council resolutions, but North Korea announced the launch in advance, giving the 
flight path and its purported intent as a space launch. When this test was conducted, 
and the missile flight path matched the announced flight path, worst cases were dis-
counted, even though this “space launch” contributed to the North Korea’s develop-
ment of an intercontinental-range missile. 
Upgrading the readiness of kinetic-energy ASAT capabilities in a crisis is unlikely to 
be kept secret, even if national leaders wished to do so.  Such preparations are likely 
to intensify a crisis, even if they were viewed as militarily prudent measures. During a 
deep crisis, the testing of an ASAT weapon or a weapon system that could readily be 
employed as an ASAT would be a seriously destabilizing act, even if explicitly meant 
as a signal. This is in some ways analogous to the portentous signaling option of a 
demonstration nuclear shot to show resolve, often discussed although never exercised. 
Upgrading the readiness of kinetic-energy ASAT 
capabilities in a crisis is unlikely to be kept secret, 
even if national leaders wished to do so.
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Rendezvous and proximity operations increasingly will become a feature of space op-
erations. Certain kinds of on-orbit operations could enhance space deterrence and 
crisis stability, such as replenishment of consumable and on-orbit repairs, by making 
the satellites at least somewhat more resilient. Other kinds of on-orbit operations, 
such as activity in the vicinity of adversary space assets, could be destabilizing. Prior 
notifications, rules of the road and a code of conduct might help clarify peaceful or 
malicious intent. Keep-out zones adjacent to foreign spacecraft might also be advis-
able. There is no obvious analogue to such operations in the nuclear domain. 
Offensive space counterforce targeting of key space infrastructure supporting nuclear 
forces would be extremely destabilizing, suggesting preparations for nuclear conflict, 
whether true or not. In the same way, cyber warfare targeting supporting nuclear 
infrastructure would be highly destabilizing. Asymmetries of space-based capabili-
ties could pose additional complications and dangers. For example, the United States 
places high value on its missile warning satellites, while China as yet has no compa-
rable capabilities. Breaking contact with, or attacking, communication links between 
national command authorities could have the most severe escalatory potential in a 
crisis or limited warfare.
THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OF SPACE
The military and commercial value of space resides in the information generated or 
transmitted in this domain. Viewed from this perspective, conflict seems unlikely to 
remain purely in the space domain except at the very lowest level of hostile activity, 
e.g., jamming of an individual satellite. Given the dependence of US conventional 
military power on space systems, the latter is likely to be a priority target for Chinese 
military action in the event of a conflict. Rapid escalation could ensue. Here we enter 
the realm of speculation, as there are no prior cases of space being the lynchpin of 
deterrence and crisis stability.   
The single most stabilizing aspect of the strategic nuclear balance was and is the exis-
tence of secure second strike capabilities. Sea-based strategic capabilities or capabili-
ties residing in Triads introduced an important stabilizing element into the strategic 
nuclear balance, assuring that no matter how powerful a nuclear first strike was, the 
attacker would still suffer a devastating retaliation. There does not appear to be an an-
alogue to the space or cyberspace domains, constituting major obstacles to deterrence 
and crisis stability in space. Indeed, in space there appear to be tangible advantages 
to striking first. Creating stabilizing equivalents to assured retaliatory capabilities – or 
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partial equivalents – appears to be a priority task for deterrence and crisis stability in 
space to be attained and strengthened.
For most of the nuclear era, the United States and the Soviet Union had a good idea 
of the strategic offensive and defensive forces arrayed against each other. This is much 
less true for offensive and defensive counter-space capabilities. Major powers will have 
difficulties gathering solid information on the types and status of deployed counter-
space and cyber capabilities. This means that uncertainty, bluffs and risk aversion 
might all be highly prominent features of crises in space and cyberspace, perhaps even 
more so than in the nuclear domain. Electronic warfare has a relatively long history in 
the annals of modern conflict, where radar jamming and other steps often have been 
used for tactical advantage. This may well continue to be the case in space at a purely 
tactical level. Small-scale use of jamming capabilities has already occurred, including 
Iranian jamming of Eutelsat, as well as other instances of interference.5,6 These actions 
need not be destabilizing or cause for escalatory action, depending on target type and 
scale of use. However, since uncertainties will remain concerning the boundary be-
tween non-escalatory and escalatory use, even small-scale acts of interference could 
lead to crisis instability, especially between major powers.
Resilient and redundant space assets will be key factors in deterrence and crisis sta-
bility in space.  Modest efforts in this regard might be sufficient to address relatively 
unsophisticated space and cyber threats, but not against major spacefaring nations, 
where system resiliency, alternative back-up systems and other means to preserve core 
SEIS capabilities in the event of a conflict will be required. The extent to which resil-
iency and redundancy can be better embedded in space systems will play an impor-
tant role in reducing incentives to deter and enhance crisis stability. As China seeks 
greater military reach farther away from its territory and concomitant global situ-
ational awareness, the PLA necessarily will need to rely more on space to meet its 
informational requirements. This growing space dependence will be a complicating 
factor in PLA contingency planning, as greater reliance on space almost certainly will 
be accompanied by greater vulnerability in this domain. The PLA, as well as the Pen-
tagon, will be obliged to seek more resilient and redundant space capabilities.
In any crisis that threatens to escalate into major conflict, political and military lead-
ers will be plagued by uncertainty about the effectiveness of their plans and decisions. 
Resilient and redundant space assets will be key 
factors in deterrence and crisis stability in space.
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Uncertainty will be compounded as conflict involves new domains such as space and 
cyber warfare, where weapon effectiveness is relatively untested and uncertain, infra-
structure interdependencies are unclear, and damaging effects against one’s adversary 
could result in damaging effects against oneself or one’s allies. Unless the stakes are 
very high, neither side is likely to want to take a huge gamble with their countries’ well-
being in a “single cosmic throw of the dice,” in Harold Brown’s memorable phrase.7  
The very newness of warfare in the space and cyber domains, coupled with risk averse, 
worst case assessments, could lead space adversaries into a situation of hysteresis, 
where each is self-deterred by their own uncertainty of success. This is shown con-
ceptually in Figures 2 and 3 for offensive counter-space capabilities, though it applies 
more generally. Where uncertainty and risk aversion are absent, there would be no 
difference between likely offensive counter-space performance and confidence in per-
Figure 2
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formance – a straight-line 1:1 correlation, as in Figure 2. In contrast, uncertainty and 
risk aversion create a gap in this relationship – or an island of stability – as shown in 
Figure 3. How resilient or robust this phenomenon may be is uncertain, but it may 
provide at least some stabilizing influence in a crisis. 
In the nuclear domain, the immediate, direct consequences of military use, includ-
ing blast, fire and direct radiation effects, were appreciated at the outset. Nonethe-
less, there were large uncertainties about and under-appreciation of the collateral, 
indirect and climatological effects of large-scale use of such weapons. In contrast, the 
immediate, direct effects of major space conflict are not well understood, and poten-
tial indirect and interdependent effects are even less understood. Indirect effects for 
large-scale space and cyber warfare are virtually incalculable, making conflict in these 
domains between major powers somewhat akin to the use of highly virulent biological 
Figure 3
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weapons, where the use of such weapons could end up causing as much damage to the 
user as to the adversary, imposing a certain level of self-deterrence. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR US SPACE SECURITY INTERESTS
The United States would be wise to exercise great caution in considering the first stra-
tegic use of offensive space capabilities, because it obtains more benefit from space 
than any other country. If offense predominates, why initiate offensive counter-space 
operations in a domain where one has the most to lose in warfare against a major 
power?  The use of offensive counter-space operations for tactical gain against a much 
weaker adversary would probably provide relatively little incremental benefit. Using 
offensive space capability in this scenario would therefore probably not be necessary, 
because military action by other means would likely be sufficient to defeat the oppo-
nent. Moreover, it is in the US national security interest to reinforce a norm of non-
use of offensive counter-space capabilities. Undercutting this norm requires careful 
evaluation, and only if the likely benefits substantially outweigh likely drawbacks.
If localized conflict with a near-peer competitor is already underway, then tactical, 
non-strategic and preferably reversible offensive space capabilities are likely to be con-
sidered for employment, but only in a selective battlefield manner where there are 
clear benefits substantially greater than those obtainable by alternative force options, 
and where indirect collateral effects are understood and deemed insignificant. Pre-
sumably, an adversary would apply the same calculus in decision- making. Given the 
uncertainties involved, a 55-45 cost-benefit ratio would probably not be good enough, 
while 90-10 might well be, depending on confidence in the measurement and assum-
ing cost-benefit ratios can be evaluated. Unlike nuclear crises and nuclear weapons’ 
use, where any use is likely to result in uncontrolled escalation, the situation will be 
more muddied in a space and cyber conflict. Escalation control could be problematic, 
substantial levels of casualties and economic damage could result from the indirect 
effects of all-out space and cyber war, and the military consequences of being cut off 
from SEIS would likely be very substantial. Furthermore, it would be questionable to 
assume that all-out space and/or cyber conflict would not spread to more traditional 
domains as well, raising the specter of nuclear as well as conventional conflict. 
Worst cases of space and cyber warfare may be 
avoidable, just as nuclear warfare was avoided 
during the Cold War.
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Each class of space assets has different value to both attacker and defender, with result-
ing “differential deterrence” and war-fighting implications. For example, it is impor-
tant to differentiate among orbits, as there are more options to attack more quickly in 
low Earth orbit than in geosynchronous orbit. An attack against space assets directly 
related to strategic nuclear forces would clearly have different implications than an 
attack against a civilian communications or GPS satellite. In the same way, a revers-
ible attack against a space asset does not have the same implications as an irreversible 
attack against the same asset. High fidelity space situational awareness capabilities 
are required to enable and confirm the nature of such attacks. Differential deterrence 
appears to be intrinsic to the space domain, based on target value; this appears to be 
true in the cyber domain as well. The employment of tactical attacks of a temporary or 
reversible nature would have the effect of lowering the deterrence threshold, thereby 
making the transition from crisis to conflict at least marginally more likely. 
Worst cases of space and cyber warfare may be avoidable, just as nuclear warfare was 
avoided during the Cold War.  The United States, China, Russia and other developed 
countries should have a common interest in avoiding strategic conflict in the space and 
cyber domains, which would threaten crippling direct and indirect economic conse-
quences in a way that the world has never experienced. Beijing, which has struggled 
to achieve levels of economic security previously unknown in Chinese history, should 
be reluctant to risk the economic advances of two generations of progress, as well as 
the promise of more progress to come. The demographic and other challenges facing 
China, where a high rate of economic growth has been deemed necessary to tamp 
down political unrest, would seem to offer cautionary notes against space and cyber 
warfare. Chinese leaders might, however, throw caution to the wind if they feared dire 
consequences for a failure to act in a severe crisis, or if they were unable to maintain 
tight control over a PLA that may not share their calculus of decision. China’s lack of 
a National Security Council-type decision-making body leaves open the possibility of 
a civil-military divide in a deep crisis.  
As was the case during the Cold War nuclear standoff, massive “bolt-out-of-blue” 
space or cyberattacks are unlikely. Generally speaking, it would be prudent to assume 
that any seeming offensive action of more than nuisance impact is a one-off, possibly 
accidental or even rogue event, or at most a way to demonstrate capabilities and send 
a signal. Some modest increase in defensive alert level also would be prudent, accom-
panied by a priority inquiry at an appropriate level to the suspected country of origin 
for explanation. This would be easier to accomplish if there would be some modality 
comparable to the US-Russian Risk Reduction Center or Hotline in existence, par-
ticularly between Washington and Beijing. Improved communication channels might 
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usefully accompany an international code of conduct for responsible spacefaring na-
tions, if one can be agreed to, and is worthy of consideration even if it not. 
The US alliance structure can promote deterrence and crisis stability in space, as 
with nuclear deterrence. China has no such alliance system. If China were to engage 
in large-scale offensive counter-space operations, it would face not only the United 
States, but also NATO, Japan, South Korea and other highly aggrieved parties. Given 
Beijing’s major export dependence on these markets, and its dependence upon them 
for key raw material and high technology imports, China would be as devastated eco-
nomically if it initiated strategic attacks in space. In contrast to America’s nuclear um-
brella and extended deterrence, US allies make a tangible and concrete contribution to 
extended space deterrence through their multilateral participation in and dependence 
upon space assets. Attacks on these space assets would directly damage allied interests 
as well as those of the United States, further strengthening deterrent effects.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to address the question of deterrence and crisis stability in 
space. The author’s intention has been to stimulate further thought rather than to 
preach verities. These pages strongly suggest the need for greater understanding and 
analysis of the challenges of preventing and responding to deterrence challenges in 
the relatively new strategic domain of space. Offensive counter-space capabilities and 
cyberweapons have many characteristics that are fundamentally different from nucle-
ar weapons, but they all share at least one characteristic in common: They are most 
definitely not just “one more weapon in the arsenal.”  Because assets in space consti-
tute and reflect vital national interests, offensive counter-space capabilities have stra-
tegically significant characteristics. Better understanding of the strategic landscape of 
space and cyberspace, is an essential 21st century priority.
This preliminary review barely scratches the surface of the critical issues of crisis in-
stability of space. Among the many further questions that should be addressed are:
• Could limited offensive counter-space attacks remain limited, or 
would they inevitably escalate into all-out space conflict?  Can 
firebreaks between actions that are likely to remain limited and 
those that run serious risks of escalation be determined and clarified? 
Will the United States, much less its potential adversaries, have the 
necessary space situational awareness to address such questions? 
97
• How much offensive counter-space capabilities does the United States 
require to have a credible space deterrent capability? Will other forms of 
military power, including cyber warfare capabilities, be sufficient?
• What kinds of offensive counter-space capabilities are most stabilizing 
and effective in meeting US military objectives?
• How much secrecy is advisable for US offensive space and cyber warfare 
capabilities? What are the advantages and disadvantages of secrecy, and 
how do they affect stability and deterrence? 
• What are the primary interconnections between space and cyber warfare, 
and how do they affect deterrence and crisis stability in space?
• How do China, Russia and other major spacefaring nations view deterrence 
and crisis stability in space?  Looking ahead, how will this shape China’s 
space doctrine, acquisition, strategies and diplomacy?
• Do “temporary and reversible effects” make space conflict less damaging 
while guarding against unwanted escalation?  Do temporary and reversible 
means of space warfare lower the threshold for space conflict?
• Are asymmetrical US responses to space attacks that create casualties 
credible? How does this affect their deterrent value?
• Will space deterrence hold if one side is close to what it perceives as a 
defeat?
• What is the impact of third (and Nth) countries on space deterrence?
• How will rapidly evolving cyber warfare capabilities affect deterrence and 
crisis stability in space?  How will they affect space-based capabilities?
• Does space declaratory policy affect behavior in a crisis?  If so, how? 
What are the tradeoffs between clarity and ambiguity, especially with 
regard to firebreaks and “red lines?” 
• How might the “fog of crisis” affect space crisis decision-making?
• What are the positive and negative effects of combining military and 
civilian functions on spacecraft?
• What are the relative merits and drawbacks of space-based vs. surface-
based offensive counter-space capabilities?  What are their advantages 
and disadvantages for deterrence and crisis stability in space?
• How will the growing capabilities of the United States, China and others 
to conduct on-orbit proximity operations on satellites affect deterrence 
and crisis stability in space?
• What new technologies are most likely to have significant impacts on 
deterrence and crisis stability in space?
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As this incomplete list of questions demonstrates, there are large uncertainties regard-
ing deterrence and crisis stability in space, both at the strategic level – about likely 
behaviors of adversaries in a crisis or in actual conflict – and at a tactical level. Deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of likely space power behavior in a crisis and in con-
flict can be gained through analysis, simulations and other research tools. These steps 
are required to enable wiser decision-making, provide more clarity of US require-
ments in the space and cyber domains, and illuminate US decision-making on space, 
in peacetime and especially in crisis and conflict. 
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The United States and China in Space: 
Cooperation, Competition, or Both? 
by Michael Nacht
 “Relations between China and the United States need not – and should 
not – become a zero-sum game. For the pre-World War I European leader, 
the challenge was that a gain for one side spelled a loss for the other, and 
compromise ran counter to an aroused public opinion. This is not the 
situation in the Sino-American relationship. Key issues on the international 
front are global in nature. Consensus may prove difficult, but confrontation 
on these issues is self-defeating.”1
- Henry Kissinger 
Any assessment of US-China relations in space should begin with a broader consider-
ation of the overall bilateral relationship in the context of contemporary international 
relations. The Cold War ended more than two decades ago, roughly the same amount 
of time as the “inter-war” period between the end of World War I and the start of 
World War II. Strategies used in the first war were deadly ineffective in the second.
The current period is marked by three key characteristics that were barely evident 
during the Cold War: asymmetric capabilities and strategies among the key players; 
growing economic, political and technological interdependence; and a complex pat-
tern of multi-polarity in which some states are more influential in certain spheres and 
less so in others.
Despite calls in some quarters for US retrenchment, Washington maintains deep 
involvement in virtually all the key security issues of the day, even after withdrawing 
from Iraq and the pending withdrawal from Afghanistan. More than a decade since 
9/11, the US employs a wide array of military, diplomatic and economic tools to battle 
Islamic extremism. The United States cooperates with other major powers to imple-
ment this strategy, albeit selectively. 
The United States has long-standing policies to thwart the spread of nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction, particularly the challenges posed by North Korea and 
Iran. In the former case, China plays an important role; in the latter, Russian influence 
and support is more pertinent. Because of their United Nations Security Council per-
manent member veto power, intense bargaining with Russia and China, however frus-
trating and limited in results, is a necessary feature of American diplomacy.
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Wherever one turns – seeking stability in Pakistan, resolving the bitter civil war in 
Syria, opening new opportunities for trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America, resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea – a complex 
pattern of cooperation and competition is evident in US-China relations. The bilat-
eral economic relationship, of course, dominates global attention. According to the 
US-China Business Council, the United States had an $83 billion trade deficit with 
China in 2001 that grew to $266 billion in 2008, dropped in 2009 during the finan-
cial crisis, and stood at $295 billion in 2011. As of 2013, China owned more than $1.2 
trillion in US treasury bills, notes and bonds. It owns 8 percent of all publicly held US 
debt, third largest behind the Social Security Trust Fund and the Federal Reserve.
These macroeconomic statistics have important domestic economic consequences as 
China’s economy has grown and matured. Both nations now face serious economic 
challenges. A key issue that bridges the gap between economic and security concerns 
is, of course, cyber security. This topic was discussed in depth by the national leaders 
for the first time in June 2013, and a working group has been established to generate a 
regular dialogue that could lead to common understandings and rules of the road in 
the cyber domain. The magnitude and quality of Chinese penetration of US computer 
networks, both public and private, is a huge bone of contention between Washington 
and Beijing. Chinese efforts have led to unprecedented theft of US intellectual prop-
erty, including design of advanced military systems. Chinese officials have claimed 
that, in the absence of codified rules, its behavior does not violate any laws.
In sum, the bilateral relationship is complex, marked by centripetal and centrifu-
gal forces that are likely to result in cooperation, competition and even confronta-
tion—what Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling characterized more than 50 years ago as 
“mixed-motive bargaining.” As both are nuclear weapon states, the shadow of mutual 
nuclear deterrence is always present, and, one hopes, serves as a cautionary element 
for the Chinese leadership.
WASHINGTON’S ASSESSMENT OF CHINA IN SPACE
Unlike cyber security issues, China’s space activities have not prompted a broad 
level of public discussion and debate. US assessments have remained the province 
of a small community of specialists. China was the third country to launch a man 
in space in 2003 and has been accelerating its activities in space for the past decade. 
The Department of Defense May 2013 assessment of China’s military capabilities 
noted that in 2012 China conducted 18 space launches and “expanded its space-based 
intense bargaining with Russia and China is a 
necessary feature of American diplomacy.
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intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological and communi-
cations satellite constellations.”2 
The report stated that China seeks to “limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by 
adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.”3 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for East Asia David Helvey noted that “China continues to invest in a multidimen-
sional program to deny others access to and use of space.”4 
The extent of China’s commitment to space is clearly evident and is reflected in the 
following data:
• China launched six satellites for its Beidou navigation constellation in 2012 
that completed a regional network as well as the in-orbit validation phase 
for a global network expected to be completed by 2020.
• In 2012 China launched 11 new remote sensing satellites that can perform 
civil and military applications. Its constellation of imaging and remote 
sensing satellites support military objectives by providing situational 
awareness of foreign military force deployments, critical infrastructure 
and significant political targets.
• China launched three communication satellites, five small experimental 
satellites, plus a meteorological and a relay satellite. China plans to launch 
100 more satellites by 2015 including imaging, remote sensing, navigation, 
communication and scientific satellites, as well as manned spacecraft.
• China continues to develop the Long March 5 (LM-5) rocket intended to 
lift heavy payloads into space. LM-5 will more than double the size of the 
low Earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) payloads China 
is capable of placing into orbit. The Wenchang Satellite Launch Center 
located on Hainan Island is expected to be completed in 2013 with the 
initial LM-5 launch scheduled for 2014.
What is the strategy behind China’s space activities? China has historically taken a long 
view of most strategic issues, and these steps are likely part of a marathon approach 
rather than a sprint. China’s declared space expenditures – $3 billion from 1992 to 2005, 
$3 billion from 2006 to 2013 – may well be understated and are a fraction of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) annual budget of approximately $17 
billion. But one must be very careful about Chinese pronouncements and about com-
parative budget estimates. It depends what can be purchased with what one spends.
China continues to invest in a multidimensional 
program to deny others access to and use of space.
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It is plausible that China has a mix of domestic prestige, strategic, economic and polit-
ical motivations. For domestic audiences, a sophisticated space program culminating 
in a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade would be a huge political boost for 
the regime and ratification that its focus on economic modernization without political 
reform is the right course.
Economically, China seeks to be a reliable and safe provider of launch services for 
humans and satellites. It has already launched communication satellites for Pakistan 
and Nigeria and a remote sensing satellite for Venezuela. If commerce in space is a 
wave of the future, as it surely seems to be, China seeks to be a major – if not the dom-
inant – player.
The increase in Chinese space launches might be explained partly by the relatively 
short life spans of Chinese satellites. Experts note that they tend to last three to five 
years, compared to 15 for the United States. Moreover, China, with all its current activ-
ity, still launches fewer satellites per year than the United States. China’s reconnais-
sance satellite resolution is thought to be about one meter. The commercially available 
GeoEye satellite resolution is better, at slightly less than half a meter.
Within Asia, China is competing with India and Japan, two neighbors with active pro-
grams and growing ambitions in space. Beijing has periodically experienced conten-
tious relations with both states, and would benefit politically, economically, militarily 
and psychologically by out-competing New Delhi and Tokyo in space. Strategically 
and in the longer term, China is well aware that the United States relies on satellites 
for perhaps 80 percent of its communications and more than 80 percent of its intelli-
gence gathering. By being able credibly to threaten US space assets, Beijing might seek 
to dissuade US intervention in a Taiwan or other East Asian crises. Destroying the US 
capabilities in space if deterrence fails could be determinative in conflict.
US officials explain Beijing’s pursuit of a variety of air, sea, undersea, space, counter-
space and information warfare systems as contributing to an anti-access/area denial 
[A2/AD] strategy. These pursuits are embedded in operational concepts, moving 
toward an array of overlapping, multi-layered offensive capabilities extending from 
China’s coast into the western Pacific. The Pentagon seeks to counter China’s A2/AD 
strategy by adopting measures that, if successful, would in fact, if not in name, reflect 
its own A2/AD strategy. 
China’s space activities are likely part of a 
marathon approach rather than a sprint.
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY
How relevant is the Soviet-American space rivalry during the Cold War to the emerg-
ing Chinese-American space competition? The Soviet Union launched the first Earth-
orbiting satellite into a low Earth orbit in March 1957 and Yuri Gagarin was the first 
human to complete an orbit of the Earth in April 1961. These were traumatic Cold 
War events for Washington decision-makers and the US public. They led to a mas-
sive investment in science and engineering education, major attention to the mili-
tary applications of space and the conversion of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (formed in 1915) into NASA in 1958. NASA gained worldwide renown 
in successfully implementing President John F. Kennedy’s initiative that culminated in 
the first human landing on the moon in July 1969.
Although there was clearly intense Soviet-American competition in building mili-
tary assets for space, and there were periods of intense strategic competition in space 
during the Cold War – exemplified by President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative launched in 1983 to transition to a defense-dominated nuclear relationship, 
and Soviet efforts to counter it – space paled in comparison to the strategic nuclear 
arms competition. The Kremlin realized that it could not compete with the United 
States in terms of advanced space technology, and steered the rivalry where it could 
– toward strategic nuclear delivery vehicles – where it could maintain rough strategic 
parity with the United States.
The techniques employed by Washington and Moscow to reduce the dangers of their 
strategic competition and to keep it within bounds may have some relevancy for the 
US-China competition in space. The US-Soviet nuclear rivalry produced an extended 
diplomatic dialogue in which both sides began to converge on a common vocabu-
lary. The completion of a series of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements 
did not always have a restraining effect – particularly at the outset of this process 
– but, over time, did place effective constraints on the pursuit of strategic advan-
tage in this domain. A three-decade-long process of nuclear negotiations produced a 
large number of individuals on both sides who became very familiar with each other 
and with their thought processes and negotiating gambits. The Russian Federation’s 
ambassador to Washington, Sergey Kislyak, has more than 25 years of arms control 
experience. 
The Soviets and then the Russians, while maintaining an opaque strategy and secre-
tive deployments, nonetheless came to accept intrusive on-site inspection and other 
cooperative monitoring measures because they perceived it to be in their political and 
security interests to do so. Indeed, as the Soviet and then the Russian economy dete-
riorated from the late 1970s through the end of the past century, nuclear diplomacy 
became Moscow’s chief means of retaining its superpower status.
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This experience bears little resemblance, at least so far, to the evolution of Sino-
American strategic relations. Although there has been continuous diplomatic contact 
between Washington and Beijing since the historic Shanghai communiqué in 1972, 
China has consistently refused to engage in formal arms control discussions, citing 
its position of deep military inferiority.  Although there have been numerous “Track 
II” dialogues on strategic issues between Chinese and American experts, the United 
States is a long way from establishing the sort of personal, linguistic and conceptual 
familiarity that developed between Moscow and Washington. Indeed, the joint Sino-
American working group on cyber security established in 2013 is the first of its kind, 
and it is too early to assess its value. The absence of personal, linguistic and concep-
tual convergence is a centrifugal force in bilateral relations that increases the probabil-
ity of misunderstanding, worst-case planning and miscalculation in crisis situations. 
Whereas the Soviet-American rivalry was global in character, the Chinese- American 
military competition is, as of now, regionally focused. Moreover, the Sino-American 
relationship is dominated by bilateral economic issues and complex interdepen-
dencies. These features were completely absent in Soviet-American relations. Thus, 
aspects of the emerging military competition, including in space, simply do not yet 
claim the priority that was consistently the case with Moscow. It is by no means clear 
whether the cyber and space issues will begin to produce more frequent and substan-
tive interactive exchange.
OUTLINING ELEMENTS OF THE SPACE RIVALRY 
The United States has long focused on three main objectives in space: defense of satel-
lites, control of space, and facilitating the projection of force. As Bruce M. Deblois and 
his co-authors have noted, 
Techniques available to protect US satellites include advanced technical 
means to overcome denial and deception, radiation hardening and shielding, 
command and data encryption, anti-jamming measures, and limiting 
orbital maneuvering … Techniques for denying an adversary the use of space 
[i.e., “space control”] … [include] denial and deception, electronic warfare, 
attacks on ground stations, micro satellites or space mines and ground-based 
projectile antisatellite weapons.”5  
The Cold War experience bears little  
resemblance, at least so far, to the evolution of  
Sino-American strategic relations.
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Force projection capabilities deployed in space, including space-based lasers, anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons, space mines, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and “bril-
liant pebbles,” periodically have gained public attention, but have yet to be realized. In 
contrast, the potential for ground-based military systems to be used as ASAT weap-
ons has been a fact of life for major spacefaring nations for many decades.  A newer 
question is whether “rules of the road,” codes of conduct or even formal treaties with 
China and other states will be a route to set norms relating to the use and deployment 
of some of these systems.
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S SPACE  
POLICY AND STRATEGY
The Obama administration, recognizing the rise of other major space powers, the 
primacy of the offense over defensive measures in space, the growth of private sector 
activity and unprecedented budgetary constraints, has issued several documents to 
articulate its position with respect to space activities. 
 
The first of these is the National Space Policy issued in June 2010, a joint product 
of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community.6 This document 
acknowledged that space has now become congested, competitive and contested.  It 
is congested with more than 21,000 objects in orbit ranging from the most impor-
tant satellites to the most trivial, but still lethal debris. It is competitive because of the 
growing number of states and private entities seeking to provide commercial services. 
And it is contested primarily because the United States, China and Russia use the 
domain to further their respective strategic and military purposes.
The Obama administration’s space policy calls for energizing domestic industries; 
expanding international cooperation; strengthening stability in space through infor-
mation sharing and other cooperative measures; increasing assurance and resilience 
of mission-essential functions by supporting infrastructure against disruption, deg-
radation, and destruction; pursuing human and robotic initiatives; and improving 
space-based Earth and solar observation.
Among many other points, the Obama administration’s space policy emphasizes the 
intent to maintain US leadership in space-based positioning, navigation and timing. 
Far more than his predecessors, President Barack Obama has emphasized the need for 
great cooperation and confidence-building while remaining committed to the central 
elements needed for the United States to use space for its national security objectives.
Space has become congested,  
competitive and contested.
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A follow-up National Security Space Strategy was issued in January 2011.7 This docu-
ment articulated a Department of Defense strategy for deterrence in space with four 
key elements:
1. Support the development of international norms of responsible behavior 
that enhance safety, security and stability in space.
2. Build coalitions to enhance collective security capabilities.
3. Deny the benefit of aggression by enhancing the resilience of space 
architectures and ensuring that US forces can operate effectively when 
space capabilities are degraded.
4. Be prepared to respond to an attack on US or allied space systems 
proportionally, but not necessarily symmetrically and not necessarily in 
space, using any or all elements of national power.
These elements constitute a mixed strategy that includes cooperative as well as unilat-
eral measures.
In January 2012, the Obama administration moved further on the cooperative side. 
Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States would 
work with other nations to develop an international code of conduct for outer space.8 
Clinton added that “a code of conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, 
safety, stability and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use 
of space.”9 But she emphasized that the US “will not enter into a code of conduct that 
in any way constrains our national security-related activities in space or our ability to 
protect the United States and our allies.”10
The European Union has led efforts for more than five years to establish a code of con-
duct in space, so far with limited results. On a different track, Russia and China have 
promoted at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere to secure 
adoption of a treaty called the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 
and the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).11 After several 
years of discussion on this proposal, Moscow and Beijing have little progress to report.
The extent of Beijing’s ambitions will determine 
whether deterrence succeeds in space.
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DETERRENCE AND AMBITION
The United States is a status quo power. China is a rising power. The extent of Beijing’s 
ambitions will largely determine whether deterrence succeeds or breaks down in 
space. The economic interdependence that characterizes Sino-American relations can 
have stabilizing effects. If, however, the Chinese leadership’s fundamental objective is 
to replace the United States as the leading military Asian power, and perhaps the lead-
ing global power, while achieving status as the world’s dominant economy, then con-
siderable friction could result.
Space assets are likely to feature prominently in a Chinese A2/AD strategy, as well as 
a US strategy to deny Beijing an A2/AD strategy. In the event of crisis, both US and 
Chinese leaders must presume capabilities to disrupt and damage satellites. It will be 
up to political leaders to exercise or decline to use these options.
The United States is pursuing multiple paths to maintain space capabilities in the 
event of disruptive or damaging actions by a potential adversary, including greater 
resiliency of space systems. The four features of resiliency include developing interna-
tional norms as a partial barrier to aggressive actions; building international partner-
ships so “an attack on one would be an attack on all;” revamping training and doctrine 
so the US forces can fight on once attacked; and maintaining a robust retaliatory capa-
bility against the attacker. Collectively the elements would serve to deter the initial 
attack or, if deterrence fails, respond with great military effectiveness. Potential US 
responses could occur across military domains, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Martin E. Dempsey remarked in the context of Chinese cyber espionage against 
US economic targets:
I think what the president … would insist upon, actually, is that he had the 
options and the freedom of movement to decide what kind of response we 
would employ … That’s why I say I don’t want to have necessarily a narrow 
conversation about what constitutes war and cyber, because the response 
could actually be in one of the other traditional domains.12 
The US-China strategic competition, including rivalry in space, fully illustrates the 
characteristics of contemporary international politics. It is a struggle between asym-
metric powers—a super power of long standing with powerful naval and air capabili-
ties and great dependency on high technology assets in the space and cyber domains 
seeking to reinforce the status quo vs. a (becoming) near-peer rival with vast ground 
forces that seeks to alter the status quo by thwarting US capabilities and thus deny-
ing American military intervention in East Asian (and perhaps other) conflicts. This 
rivalry is situated amidst complex interdependencies and limitations, including limits 
of influence on neighbors.
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In this context, cross-domain deterrence – the use or threat of use of action in one 
domain (i.e., land, sea, under the sea, air, space, cyber as well as economic tools and 
diplomatic measures) to thwart action in a different domain – will be given greater 
consideration. To be sure, cross-domain deterrence is not a new phenomenon. A 
recent obvious example is the use of economic sanctions and alleged cyberattacks 
against Iranian facilities aimed at dissuading Tehran and increasing the costs of con-
tinuing its nuclear weapon-related development program. 
There are, however, inherent difficulties in pursuing cross-domain deterrence. US 
declaratory policy tends to be purposefully vague with respect to many national secu-
rity threats in order to provide the president with a wide range of options. One cost 
of such flexibility might be confusion concerning the response to challenges to US 
national interests. An adversary might not know what to expect, be surprised by the 
response and might misinterpret the intent of the US reaction. Ignorance of the deci-
sion-making dynamics in Beijing by Washington and vice versa could lead to steps 
by either government intended to be de-escalatory that are viewed as escalatory. 
China’s centuries-old strategic culture that values opaqueness to shield both strengths 
and weaknesses will make the process of anticipating adversarial response especially 
challenging.
An additional conceptual confusion, at least in Washington, is between “deterrence” 
– providing credible threats to dissuade an adversary from taking a particular course 
– and “compellence” – providing credible threats to persuade an adversary from pur-
suing a course already adopted. In the much-studied Cuban missile crisis, for instance, 
US policy was both to deter a missile attack in the Western Hemisphere while com-
pelling the Soviets to withdraw missiles from Cuba. A US “side payment” of secretly 
agreeing to withdraw obsolescent Jupiter missiles from Turkey helped facilitate res-
olution of the crisis. Compellence tends to be much more difficult to achieve, per-
haps since the adversary has already committed substantial resources to achieve a fait 
accompli. 
CONCLUSION
It would be advisable and it is likely that the United States and China will begin to 
engage in deeper bilateral or multi-lateral discussions or negotiations that could 
establish certain codes of conduct in space. Slow but tangible cooperation would con-
tribute to common understandings and thus reduce the likelihood of misunderstand-
ings and surprise. At the same time, both sides are most likely to enhance offensive 
US-China strategic competition in space is a 
struggle between asymmetric powers.
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and defensive capabilities to seek military advantages as part of their overall strate-
gies. The US-China relationship in space, as on the ground and at sea, will be a mix of 
cooperation and competition. Hopefully, as Kissinger reasoned, foolish actions will be 
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U.S.-China Cooperation in Space: 
Constraints, Possibilities, and Options 
By Brian Weeden
Outer space activities played a significant role in the Cold War relationship between 
the United States and Soviet Union, emerging first as a domain for intense political and 
military competition and potential conflict, and then becoming a venue for coopera-
tion. The projected worst-case scenario of space conflict and nuclear warfare between 
the superpowers was avoided. Eventually space activities became an important tool 
for building stability and trust that enabled cooperation and a degree of friendship. 
Will the Cold War pattern and outcome between the nuclear superpowers be repeated 
between the United States and China? Can the space domain help build mutual under-
standing and respect between Washington and Beijing, contributing to peaceful coex-
istence or perhaps even friendship? Or is the historical model of US-Soviet relations 
and space cooperation not applicable between the United States and China? 
There is evidence that senior leaders in both the United States and China realize the 
potential for US-China cooperation in space to foster a positive relationship between 
the two countries. In 2011, US President Barack Obama and then Chinese President 
Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening US-China relations during a visit 
by Hu to the White House.1 As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two 
presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the 
field of space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. The United 
States has also signaled its willingness to open a bilateral dialogue with China on space 
security issues. 
There has been little progress to date beyond the joint statement. China so far has been 
reluctant to engage in a space security-focused dialogue with the United States, and 
some in Congress oppose any form of bilateral space cooperation with China. U.S. 
Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., had led efforts to restrict bilateral cooperation with China: The 
Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing Resolution prevents the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) or the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
from spending any federal funds on participating, collaborating or coordinating in 
The United States and China continue to test 
weapon systems that could be used to damage  
or destroy satellites
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bilateral cooperation with China.2 Meanwhile, both countries continue to engage in 
national security and military space activities, including multiple tests of weapon sys-
tems that could be used to damage or destroy satellites, which have heightened con-
cerns over a military competition in space.
The direction and mix of future US-China space competition and cooperation is far 
from settled. This essay outlines different types of bilateral space cooperation, if con-
gressional restrictions against doing so were lifted, and if Washington and Beijing 
were willing to press forward with a space cooperation agenda. I discuss a bottom-up 
and a top-down approach for space cooperation. I advocate a comprehensive strategy 
for engagement in space with clearly defined goals and steps that mix in both bottom-
up and top-down approaches, rather than the pursuit of a single cooperative space 
activity.
CATEGORIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF  
SPACE COOPERATION
Space cooperation between two countries can take many forms, with varying degrees 
of complexity and involvement. Thus, it is beneficial to begin by laying out broad cat-
egories of cooperation and understanding the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
A useful framework in this regard can be found in a 2008 report published by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) on options for US-China space cooperation. 
The CRS report outlines three categories of cooperation: information and data shar-
ing, space policy dialogue and joint activities.3 Information and data sharing involves 
exchanging data on matters such as the nature of the space environment with the goal 
of establishing a common operating picture and set of facts. Space policy dialogue is 
a more specialized form of data exchange that focuses on enhancing strategic com-
munications between the two countries. The goal of space policy dialogue is to under-
stand more accurately the other’s views, concerns and intentions with the hope that it 
would lead to fewer cases of miscommunication and misunderstanding. Finally, joint 
activities are the most “hands-on” option and involve both countries agreeing to par-
ticipate in a specific activity, usually by contributing money or other resources such 
as hardware or expertise. The goal of joint activities is usually to achieve an objective 
neither could achieve individually, to develop organizational experience in working 
together or to convey a political message regarding the bilateral relationship.
Defined in this way, the term “cooperation” is a bit of a misnomer in that it is not 
limited to just civil space activities between two space agencies. Space cooperation 
can be a much broader undertaking, more accurately defined as space engagement. It 
encompasses a wide range of activities in the civil, scientific and military domains, all 
aimed at building patterns of cooperation between two or more countries. 
In the joint statement issued by Obama and Hu in 2011, the near-term action to 
115
promote dialogue and exchanges in the field of space was to take the form of an invi-
tation for the head of the Chinese Manned Space Engineering Office to visit NASA 
headquarters. This was in reciprocation for a visit by NASA Administrator Charles 
Bolden to China in 2010.4 However, the Chinese trip never materialized because of 
budget injunctions imposed by the Wolf Amendment.5 In the 2011 joint statement, 
the two sides also agreed to continue discussions on opportunities for practical future 
cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency, reciprocity and 
mutual benefit. These three perfectly sensible principles are not easy to implement and 
present additional complications on the prospects for US-China space cooperation.
TRANSPARENCY
The United States has consistently pushed for greater transparency concerning China’s 
decision-making process, budget and space policy. China is deliberately opaque on 
military capabilities in general, and space capabilities in particular. Opacity in deci-
sion making can be an effective way for a weaker state to deal with a stronger state. 
The United States may also be opaque to China, but for different reasons, as the abun-
dance of information and diversity of viewpoints can lead to confusion abroad about 
US policy.
Transparency is even more challenging an issue because neither China nor the United 
States wishes to reveal military space capabilities or vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is 
extraordinarily difficult for Washington and Beijing to distinguish between correlation 
and causation relating to military space decisions. It is often unclear whether national 
actions reflect a rational decision-making process of a government as a whole, orga-
nizational behavior within a government or “court politics” within a government.6 
The US X-37B space plane serves as an example of the difficulty of divining intent, 
the lack of transparency and distinguishing between correlation and causation. The 
X-37B is a miniaturized, fully-automated version of the space shuttle that is able to 
stay on orbit for several months at a time. It could be used for either peaceful or offen-
sive military purposes. The Pentagon will not describe specifically what the X-37B is 
doing on orbit nor provide details of its location while on orbit.7
Some outside observers have concluded that the X-37B is really a space weapons pro-
gram, thus explaining the absence of transparency regarding its test program. This 
China is deliberately opaque on military 
capabilities in general, and space capabilities in 
particular.
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view is supported by writings in military journals on the value of a space plane as a 
tool to “defend and control” space and to enhance US space dominance.8 This con-
clusion is almost certainly not the case, as there are significant technical limitations 
to many of the theorized capabilities of such a vehicle.9 It is more likely the case that 
the secrecy surrounding the orbital location of the X-37B is a function of its use as a 
test bed for classified sensors for the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). 
Existing US policy requires any such spacecraft to have its orbital position classified.10 
The 2007 Chinese antisatellite test serves as another example of the absence of trans-
parency due to perceived national security imperatives. In January 2007, China used 
a ground-launched ballistic missile to destroy one of its own aging weather satel-
lites, resulting in the creation of more than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris. 
The event sparked significant concern and was held up as a sign of China’s insincer-
ity in international discussions on space debris and the prevention of an arms race in 
outer space. Belated and conflicting public statements from Beijing suggested that the 
test was not coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.11 The China National 
Space Administration was due to hold a meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee the following April to discuss the space debris mitigation 
guidelines that had been recently approved by the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). The meeting was canceled at the last 
minute and rescheduled to take place in Toulouse, France, in July 2007 where the 
Chinese delegation faced harsh questions from other international scientists.12 
A study by Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, based on more than 80 interviews from 
individuals across the Chinese government, concluded that the decision to conduct 
the test was carefully vetted, with the full participation of other stakeholders, includ-
ing representatives of the Foreign Ministry.13 The details of internal decision making 
are not fully known, but it is likely that, as with the X-37B, conflicting public state-
ments and the apparent lack of coordination was mainly a result of organizational 
behavior compounded by opacity.
The promotion of transparency in space operations faces considerable, but not insur-
mountable obstacles for the United States and China. Both spacefaring nations are 
already participating in several broader, multilateral discussions related to trans-
parency on space activities. In 2010, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of 
UNCOPUOS created a formal Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of 
Outer Space Activities.14 The working group aims to produce a consensus report out-
lining voluntary best practice guidelines for all space actors to promote the long-
term sustainable use of outer space. In 2011, the United Nations secretary general 
formed a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence 
Building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space Activities.15 The 15 international experts 
who make up the GGE, including experts from the US and China, have produced a 
consensus report outlining specific recommendations for TCBMs on space security 
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issues. The report’s recommendations will be considered by the Fourth Committee of 
the United Nations General Assembly during its annual plenary in October.16 
The European Union (EU) is leading discussions on an International Code of Conduct 
for Outer Space Activities (ICOC). If an ICOC can be agreed upon, it is likely to 
include transparency measures, including notifications, consultations and exchange 
of space policies.17 The EU has briefed spacefaring countries, including China, which 
thus far has not endorsed the EU’s draft text. Beijing has, however, endorsed the report 
of the GGE, which includes support for the concept of an ICOC. The UNCOPUOUS 
and GGE are important initiatives to foster dialogue between the United States and 
China, as well as to help develop positive norms of behavior that can increase trans-
parency of space operations.
 
RECIPROCITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT
The Obama-Hu joint statement outlines reciprocity and mutual benefit as the second 
and third guidelines for future US-China space cooperation. This language strongly 
suggests that joint activities should include equal contributions by and provide tangi-
ble benefits to both parties. These guidelines impose constraints on the types of activi-
ties that might be considered because the United States and China have different levels 
of space capabilities and are currently pursuing different goals in the space arena.
 
The US space program, which received substantial investment during the Cold War, 
has receded to a lower sustained level. US space activities have long consisted of two 
major components – a very public civil space program undertaken by NASA and a 
much more secret program by the national security bureaucracy to conduct satel-
lite reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. The human spaceflight portion of the civil 
space program focused monumental efforts on landing astronauts on the Moon. 
These activities culminated in the Apollo landings in the 1960s and 1970s. Total US 
launches peaked in the 1960s with nearly 80 space launches per year,18 driven largely 
by national security space programs such as the Corona surveillance satellites as well 
as the Apollo program.19 
Although launch rates slowed dramatically in the 1970s, the United States contin-
ued to invest heavily through the early 2000s in both civil and national security space 
capabilities. Human spaceflight focused on trips to low Earth orbit (LEO) and manned 
space stations using the shuttle. The non-human spaceflight portion of the civil space 
United States and China have different levels of 
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program included sustained robotic exploration of the Solar System, remote sensing 
of the Earth from space for climate monitoring and weather and a wide variety of sci-
entific efforts. The national security space sector focused on developing a full spec-
trum of space capabilities to support national security objectives, including global 
satellite communications, remote sensing and precision navigation and timing (PNT). 
Currently, US space activities are at a crossroads , with the number of orbital launches 
standing at approximately 20 per year.20 Both the civil and national security programs 
face significant budget constraints and debate over future goals and levels of activity. 
With the end of the space shuttle program and retirement of the orbiter fleet in 2011, 
a vigorous debate has ensued about the future direction and goals of the human space-
flight program. Robotic exploration continues with recent successes such as the Mars 
rover landings, but faces continued budget cutbacks and schedule slips. The US mili-
tary continues to modernize and upgrade its existing capabilities, but has been unable 
to field significant new capabilities due to budget pressure.
In contrast, China’s activities in space have been building slowly since the 1970s. Only 
recently has China begun to engage in the full spectrum of space activities across 
civil, scientific and national security sectors. China is now building many of the same 
space capabilities to support national security as the United States, including satel-
lite-based PNT services and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capa-
bilities. China is on a clear path to join the United States in possessing full-spectrum 
capabilities. China’s human spaceflight program also largely has followed the same 
development path as those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 2001, 
China has developed the same set of capabilities needed to support human spaceflight 
as the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
All three countries took between 11.5 years and 13.5 years to accomplish these objec-
tives, the only difference being the year they started.21
This difference in phasing of space capabilities is one of the factors complicating efforts 
by the United States and China to engage in reciprocal activities and to derive mutual 
benefit. As difficult as it was for the United States and the Soviet Union jointly to 
pursue the docking of their Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft, these programs were in sim-
ilar phases. The Apollo-Soyuz docking in LEO, with the famous “handshake in space” 
between a cosmonaut and astronaut, is often cited as a model for major spacefaring 
US space activities are at a crossroads,  
facing debate over future goals and activities.
China is on a clear path to join the United States  
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nations to cooperate as well as compete in space. On a political level, the Apollo-Soyuz 
docking reinforced in a symbolic and visible way political intent to pursue détente in 
space as well as on the ground. On a practical level, Apollo-Soyuz allowed both coun-
tries to test and develop rendezvous procedures in space, a capability essential for 
their future manned space station programs.
It is difficult to apply this model to the United States and China, which are out of phase 
in terms of their human spaceflight programs. China is in the midst of a 20-year plan 
to orbit its first continually-habitable space station. The United States is on the tail-
end of its participation in the International Space Station and searching for a suitable 
human spaceflight mission outside of LEO in the wake of the space shuttle program. 
Some in the United States worry that human spaceflight cooperation with China 
would give China access to advanced technology or speed up China’s program. China 
does not possess any compelling capability the United States lacks that could outweigh 
these concerns. There are also those within the United States and China who see any 
international cooperation as a burden, making projects more complicated, costly and 
prone to delays and failures.
BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
A final consideration is whether to pursue potential space cooperation between the 
United States and China in a bilateral or multilateral context. During the Cold War, 
the United States and Soviet Union were far and away the most advanced spacefaring 
nations. It made sense for the superpowers to engage primarily, although not exclu-
sively, in bilateral cooperation. Other countries were involved in cooperative ventures, 
but they participated largely at the behest of Washington or Moscow. The space envi-
ronment is markedly different from the Cold War, with many spacefaring nations 
enjoying the benefits of space technologies and capabilities. Eleven countries have 
demonstrated the ability to place an object in orbit, most recently Iran (2009), North 
Korea (2012) and South Korea (2013). More than 50 countries have operated or are 
currently operating at least one satellite. Three countries – the United States, Russia 
and China – have active human spaceflight programs, with India signaling interest in 
joining them.22 
Many countries view space activities as a significant contributor to their socioeco-
nomic well-being and to the utilization of natural resources, as a key part of their 
communications infrastructure, and as a means of fostering science and technology. A 
smaller, but growing, number of nations view space as a domain for providing critical 
United States and China are out of phase in  
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national security capabilities. An even smaller subset of countries is engaged in or 
considering human spaceflight as a way to build prestige and enhance their regional 
or global power.
This diversity of capabilities and ambitions offers a spectrum of multilateral, coop-
erative space activities and opportunities. On one end of the spectrum are coopera-
tive activities between technological peers or near-peers to accomplish a significant 
objective that none could accomplish individually, perhaps because costs are prohibi-
tive for unilateral endeavors. The eventual shape of the ISS program is an example of 
shared costs.23 On the other end of the spectrum are cooperative activities involving 
one advanced spacefaring country and a number of smaller, less-advanced spacefar-
ing nations. These activities usually involve scientific research and largely are under-
taken to foster diplomatic ties among the countries involved. 
The United States and China already are engaged in a number of cooperative space 
activities, although they are almost entirely multilateral in nature. Both countries are 
part of the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters, a multilateral agree-
ment to provide for the collaboration and dissemination of space-based remote sens-
ing data to help respond to natural disasters. Both the United States and China are 
also part of the aforementioned multilateral UNCOPUOUS, GGE and ICOC deliber-
ations. Washington and Beijing are involved in an international effort to share data on 
space weather to improve warning and prediction of significant geomagnetic storms 
that could disrupt satellites or ground infrastructure. Perhaps most intriguingly, the 
Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS-2), recently installed on the ISS to conduct 
research on dark matter, contains more than 4,800 pounds of Chinese-supplied rare 
earth magnets. This project is backed by a team of scientists from several countries, 
including China.24 In deference to the Wolf Amendment, this space science initiative 
– even though it was multilateral and not bilateral in nature – was pursued under a 
contract with the US Department of Energy and not NASA. 
The United States and China engage in bilateral space cooperation activities, but they 
are fewer in number and limited in scope. The US military currently provides warn-
ings of close approaches that could result in a collision between Chinese satellites and 
other space objects, such as space debris, as part of a service the United States’ offers 
to all satellite operators.25 The United States and China also have held three rounds of 
a Track II technical exchange on space surveillance, modeled on a similar technical 
exchange between US and Soviet researchers that began in the 1990s. Space has also 
featured in recent bilateral security dialogues, although the United States and China 
have yet to agree on a formal dialogue dedicated solely to space security issues.26 
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POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE  
BILATERAL U.S.-CHINA SPACE COOPERATION
The following section discusses three potential areas for future bilateral cooperation 
between the United States and China, evaluating them in the context of the principles 
outlined in the Obama-Hu joint statement. These three examples are not advanced 
as the only possible areas for cooperation. Rather, these examples, drawn from the 
US-Soviet experience and suggested by current events, highlight particular challenges 
and differences between the US-Soviet and the US-China relationships.
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
US-China space cooperation on human spaceflight often is considered because of its 
prominence in both countries and because of its success in bilateral US-Soviet and 
Russian relations. With both the United States and China actively pursuing human 
spaceflight programs, many have suggested this as an area ripe for cooperation, per-
haps leading toward greater understanding and ultimately a less adversarial relation-
ship. This avenue of potential cooperation has both advantages and disadvantages.
Both countries see their human spaceflight programs as important sources of national 
prestige, and leaders have been involved personally to varying degrees in associating 
themselves with their human spaceflight programs. Active involvement by national 
leaders would be required to overcome bureaucratic inertia or political and military 
resistance to cooperative US-Chinese ventures in space. While there may not be many 
space initiatives likely to garner buy-in from the highest political levels; human space-
flight might be one of them.
High economic costs and the potential benefits of a cooperative human spaceflight 
venture might entice US and Chinese leaders into a cooperative venture. Human 
spaceflight is an enormously expensive undertaking and, while both countries have 
strong commitment from policymakers to invest large sums of money, it is increas-
ingly the case that, without collaborative funding, some human spaceflight ventures 
might not be affordable. 
There are also strong disadvantages working against human spaceflight as a feasible 
area of US-China cooperation. The political importance and prestige associated with 
Active involvement by national leaders  
would be required to overcome resistance to 
cooperation in space.
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human spaceflight is accompanied by elements of nationalism and protectionism. 
The Chinese technical community is justifiably proud about its accomplishments in 
human spaceflight, without what might be perceived as “help” from other countries, 
especially the United States. Some US legislators believe that the prestige of human 
spaceflight cooperation should not be offered until China has made tangible progress 
on areas such as human rights and freedom of religious practices. 
Large, collaborative human spaceflight programs are also likely to engender strong 
pushback from powerful constituencies . Some would oppose it on ideological 
grounds, including those who view human spaceflight as wasteful government spend-
ing on something that should be done by the private sector, with government funding 
better spent on tackling social problems such as education or poverty. Political leaders 
may be unwilling or unable to absorb this pressure, especially if it results in obstacles 
being created on other high-priority political initiatives. 
Differences in national goals might also work against US-China cooperation on 
human spaceflight. China plans to place its own manned space station into orbit 
around 2020. It has discussed the possibility of human spaceflight to the Moon, but 
only as a longer-term potential goal. Meanwhile, the United States is debating the 
future goals of its human spaceflight program. At the moment there is disagreement 
between the White House and Congress, as well as within Congress and among com-
mentators over whether to return humans to the Moon, visit near Earth asteroids or 
land humans on Mars. The only apparent area of agreement is that human spaceflight 
in LEO is not meaningful enough to justify its considerable expense. This mismatch 
between goals makes it difficult for China and the United States to cooperate on a 
human spaceflight mission that provides mutual and reciprocal benefits.
Neither the United States nor China would be inclined to pursue a cooperative human 
spaceflight mission that deviates from overall program goals. Such a mission would 
be viewed as a detour and as an unnecessary expense, inviting further political, mili-
tary and bureaucratic resistance. It is also difficult to imagine a cooperative US-China 
human spaceflight mission in LEO that would provide tangible, mutual benefits, leav-
ing “cooperation for the sake of cooperation” as the primary justification for such a 
mission. 
Chinese participation in the current international human spaceflight program, the ISS, 
is feasible but unlikely. On the US side, there are considerable hurdles on export control 
Large, collaborative human spaceflight  
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and technology transfer as a result of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) that would need to be cleared. Virtually everything related to space activi-
ties was placed under ITAR in the 1990s as a result of the Strom Thurmond National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Although ITAR regulations are cur-
rently undergoing dramatic reform, China is one of the few countries that Congress 
has stipulated would still be prohibited from exports of space-related hardware or 
expertise without a license from the US Department of State.27 Even if these domes-
tic US hurdles were resolved, the legal framework of the ISS project poses additional 
obstacles. The ISS partnership is based on a multilateral treaty among the United 
States, Canada, Japan, Russia, and the member states of the European Space Agency.28 
The treaty covers all aspects of ISS operations. Adding China as an official partner to 
the ISS program or just visits to the ISS by Chinese taikonauts would require the con-
sent of all the ISS partners, each of whom would have their own national political hur-
dles to work through. 
There is also the matter of transportation. Either the Chinese taikonauts would need 
to reach an agreement with an existing ISS partner to travel on one of their space-
craft, or they would need to use a Chinese spacecraft. The existing Chinese Shenzhou 
spacecraft would need to have its rendezvous and docking software and procedures 
modified to comply with ISS docking protocols. Although possible, this would take 
considerable time and a set of practice and demonstration dockings, similar to those 
undertaken by SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft as part of its certification process for ISS 
operations. It would also require considerable organizational learning and adaptation 
to integrate China as an ISS partner, as was necessary between the US and Russia. 
None of these political or technological hurdles is insurmountable, given enough time 
and political will. There are indications that several of the ISS partners are interested 
in adding China to the ISS program.29 Whether these suggestions are fully backed by 
government policy is unknown. The most critical constraint may be the factor of time. 
Were this discussion to have taken place earlier in the ISS program, there would have 
been time to work out the political and technical details. As it stands, the ISS is due to 
cease operations in 2020 and be deorbited shortly thereafter. Relative to government 
planning processes, that is a short period of time for making these types of compli-
cated and impactful decisions and reaping their benefits.
Aside from the ISS program, there are other options for Chinese participation in 
future human spaceflight cooperation. Some have suggested that the United States 
might help China build its space station, or have US astronauts visit the Chinese space 
station. Even if this initiative is widely viewed in favorable terms – a questionable 
assumption – orbital mechanics pose a significant obstacle to this idea. The latitude of 
a space launch site determines the orbital inclination into which a rocket can launch 
directly. A rocket could place a payload into an orbital inclination higher than its lati-
tude, but only by using extra fuel and reducing the mass it can place in orbit. It is also 
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possible for a satellite to change its inclination once in orbit, but this requires immense 
amounts of fuel using chemical propulsion or a very long period of time using elec-
tric propulsion.
These practical constraints played a significant role in human spaceflight cooperation 
between the United States and Russia. The main US space launch site used for human 
spaceflight, Cape Canaveral in Florida, is located at 28.5 degrees north latitude. The 
main Russian space launch site used for human spaceflight, the Baikonur Cosmodrome 
in Kazakhstan, is located at 51.6 degrees north latitude. Typically, objects are launched 
into space from the lowest latitude possible, especially very heavy objects like mod-
ules of a space station, in order to take full advantage of the Earth’s rotational velocity. 
That would suggest locating the ISS at 28.5 degrees north. However, if it were located 
at 28.5 degrees inclination to better match the latitude of Cape Canaveral, it would 
be unreachable from Baikonur. Instead, the ISS is orbiting at an inclination of 51.65 
because it can reached by rockets launched from both Baikonur and Cape Canaveral 
as well as French Guiana on the equator, enabling participation in the construction of 
the ISS by the United States, Russia and Europe. 
China currently launches human spaceflight missions from Jiuquan Satellite Launch 
Center in Inner Mongolia at 40.58 degrees north latitude. Its space station will be 
assembled via launches from the new Wenchang Satellite Launch Center on Hainan 
Island at 19.34 degrees north latitude. Unless the future US human spaceflight vehi-
cle has significant excess lift capacity, it will be difficult for the United States to reach 
the Chinese Space Station from US soil. The only options left are either to launch US 
astronauts on a Chinese rocket from Wenchang or to develop a new US human space-
flight capability in a location nearer to the equator. Neither option is feasible politi-
cally or economically in the foreseeable future.
SOLAR MONITORING AND HELIOPHYSICS
Heliophysics and space weather monitoring could be another area of joint space coop-
eration. The energy and particles emitted from the Sun interact with the Earth’s mag-
netic shield to create a number of effects on both satellites and ground infrastructure 
on the Earth. Monitoring of solar activity is critical to developing a better understand-
ing of the Sun, improving the ability to forecast significant space weather events and 
providing timely warning of disruptive events. While monitoring is done from a wide 
variety of sensors located in space and on the Earth, some of the most important mon-
itoring is done from satellites located at the Earth-Sun L1 Lagrangian point. This is an 
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area of space directly between the Earth and the Sun where the gravitational forces of 
the two balance each other out. A spacecraft placed at the Lagrangian Point can stay in 
the region without expending a significant amount of fuel and thus be in a prime loca-
tion to monitor the Sun’s activity and provide early warning of solar storms.
Currently, NASA operates a critical spacecraft for this task at the Earth-Sun L1 called 
the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE). Another critical spacecraft is operated 
jointly with the European Space Agency, the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory 
(SOHO). These two spacecraft are operating far beyond their expected lifespans and 
are likely to fail in the near future, depriving the world of critical data on the Sun and 
warnings of potentially harmful events. NASA has recently revived a spacecraft in 
storage called the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) that will be sent to the 
Earth-Sun L1 point to provide a few of the most critical solar monitoring functions. 
DSCOVR will not, however, be able to replace the full suite of instruments on either 
ACE or SOHO. 
China has developed plans for an Earth-Sun L1 monitoring spacecraft of its own 
called Kuafu as part of a constellation that will include two more satellites in ellipti-
cal orbits around the Earth. KuaFu was planned to contain an instrument that, when 
combined with those on DSCOVR, could replace the most critical capabilities of ACE 
and SOHO. Heliophysics research and space weather monitoring are essential for 
understanding the space environment; sharing of the data from these satellites could 
provide mutual and international benefits. Concerns over technology transfer are not 
prominent in the area of researching space weather , and collaborative building and 
launching satellites for the Earth-Sun L1 point is a relatively low-cost endeavor, com-
pared to ambitious collaborative human spaceflight initiatives.
The most significant downside to this area for future US-China cooperation is that 
it may not garner significant, high-level national interest. While a low profile might 
make it easier to move forward, it might also make it harder to gain the attention of 
national leaders, whose support will be required to provide the impetus to proceed. 
Additionally, the modest collaborative venture on space weather could be suscepti-
ble to budget cuts and scheduling delays. The decision by the United States to with-
draw funding for the joint ExoMars project with the European Space Agency (ESA) 
serves as a recent example of these pressures.30 Cost overruns in other parts of NASA’s 
budget and congressional unwillingness to add additional funds forced NASA to drop 
out of the ExoMars partnership, forcing the ESA to scramble to find new partners.
Concerns over technology transfer are  
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DIALOGUE AND DATA SHARING ON  
HIT-TO-KILL TECHNOLOGY
The United States and China place a high priority on developing space capabilities 
to support national security objectives. These objectives include offensive as well as 
defensive capabilities. Increased reliance on and activity in space for national security 
also increases the potential for misunderstandings, misperceptions, friction and unin-
tended escalation. For example, if a critically important national security spacecraft 
were to be struck by space debris, or subject to a significant space weather event, this 
could be misinterpreted as an aggressive action.
Of particular concern at present is the demonstrated capacity of China and the United 
States of hit-to-kill capabilities that could be used either for ballistic missile defense 
or for anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks. China conducted tests of a ground-based hit-to-
kill ASAT system that could reach targets in LEO in 2005, 2006, 2007 and, likely, in 
2010.31 The 2007 test was most notable as it involved the destruction of a Chinese 
weather satellite and the creation of more than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris 
that will present a collision hazard for decades to come.32 In May 2013, China report-
edly tested ASAT technologies that could reach critical US national security satellites 
in deep space orbits up to and including geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).33
Over the same time period, the United States has also conducted hit-to-kill tests of 
missile defense capabilities, involving both ground-launched and sea-launched inter-
ceptors, employing the same general flight profile as China. In February 2008, the 
United States used its sea-launched SM-3 missile defense interceptor to destroy a 
failed U.S. reconnaissance satellite that was declared to be a risk to people and struc-
tures on the ground if it re-entered the atmosphere intact. The test clearly validated 
the dual-use nature of direct ascent hit-to-kill capability, either as an ASAT weapon 
or for missile defense.
These tests provide ample room for worrying assessments of capability and intent, 
as well as speculation and misinformation. Some analysts and organizations in the 
United States continue to call for a space-based missile defense capability and even a 
resurrection of ideas from the 1980s for large constellations of space-based intercep-
tors.34 Likewise, a number of Chinese military authors have written about the impor-
tance of waging warfare and exerting dominance in space.35 While military planning 
and testing do not infer political consent to authorize the execution of plans and 
the use of offensive counter-space capabilities, concerns naturally have grown about 
whether a military “space race” might be brewing, as well as the role of offensive coun-
ter-space capabilities in a potential conflict between the United States and China over 
Taiwan. 
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China’s development of operational ASAT capabilities could have significantly nega-
tive impacts on the US ability to exert military power in space, while an operational 
US missile defense system and effective prompt global strike capability could under-
mine Chinese confidence significantly in its limited nuclear deterrent. A dialogue 
between the United States and China on their respective policies and plans for space 
warfare-related capabilities, and potentially even a discussion of firebreaks and “red 
lines” on space activities in the event of a conflict, could improve the bilateral security 
relationship. More effort on both sides to communicate information about upcoming 
tests of these systems could also help reduce confusion or misunderstanding that oth-
erwise could lead to heightened tensions or conflict. 
Although the benefits to stability from such cooperation are potentially useful, accom-
plishments will be difficult to achieve. The United States and China view their respec-
tive activities in space as critical to national security and will be reluctant to share 
data. Domestic constituencies in both countries will strongly oppose military space 
dialogue. It is also unlikely that dialogue will result in binding legal agreements or 
arms control treaties – a Chinese diplomatic objective – as was the case for dialogue 
between Washington and Moscow. There are significant verification challenges for a 
legally binding agreement covering ASAT capabilities, unlike agreements on strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles between Washington and Moscow. Dual use hit-to-kill capa-
bilities are much more difficult to limit. The limitations of monitoring capabilities and 
the presence of dual-use capabilities would mean that parties to an agreement would 
not place trust in its limitations. While legally binding agreements do not appear fea-
sible, other reasons for dialogue might well be mutually beneficial.
CONCLUSION
Although there are some similarities between the current US-China relationship in 
space and the US-Soviet relationship, the differences far outweigh them. What worked 
during the Cold War might not work between Washington and Beijing. The incongru-
ity between current space capabilities and long-term goals between the United States 
and China presents a stark contrast to the parallelism of US and Soviet space pro-
grams. These disparities might be resolved over time or set aside by national leaders 
in search of cooperative ventures in space. Otherwise, the range of options for possible 
US-Chinese cooperation in space will be severely restricted.
Two general paths forward for US-China space cooperation lie ahead, if national lead-
ers are willing to proceed. The first is a top-down approach, built around high-pro-
file initiatives such as human spaceflight. The involvement of national leaders will be 
necessary to overcome bureaucratic inertia and resistance to such cooperation. The 
second is a bottom-up approach, involving low-profile areas of cooperation unlikely 
to generate significant opposition and controversy, such as collaborative scientific 
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research and space science missions. This approach is likely to cost less in terms of 
money and political capital but will require institutional champions on both sides. 
Which approach is more likely to succeed depends on a deeper understanding of the 
organizations and interests that might seek to advance or oppose these initiatives, 
which is beyond the scope of this essay. If an area of scientific study or a space appli-
cations concept with sufficient institutional champions can be identified, a bottom-up 
approach is likely to be more successful. If strong institutional champions are absent 
on one side or both, and then high-level national engagement through a top-down 
approach will be required for collaborative spaceflight initiatives. In either case, tan-
gible benefits from cooperation are likely to carry much more weight than mere opti-
mism in pushing a cooperative program forward.
The choice of approach also depends on the main goal of US-China cooperation in 
space activities and the time period for desired results. If the primary goal is to reduce 
misunderstandings and misperceptions and foster strategic stability in the near-term, 
then a top-down approach involving security issues is warranted. Alternatively, if the 
primary goal is to foster institutional cooperation on matters of mutual interest and 
develop long-term understanding and relationships, a bottom-up approach led by sci-
entists is likely preferable. 
Settling on a single initiative for US-China cooperation limits possibilities, and is 
therefore not the best option. A better approach would be to develop a clear strat-
egy for US-China engagement that mixes top-down and bottom-up joint initiatives. 
Bottom-up initiatives might include data sharing, policy dialogues on national secu-
rity topics and joint space science projects. Given the difficulties associated with 
increasing cooperation on space-related issues, interventions and policy impulses 
from national leaders in Washington and Beijing would likely be required, even for 
modest initiatives. The more ambitious the initiative, the greater the effort that will be 
required by national leaders. Whether the United States and China have the political 
will to undertake such an effort to develop and undertake a broad strategy remains to 
be seen.
What worked during the Cold War might  
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Annex: A Comparison of Nuclear and 
Anti-satellite Testing, 1945-2013 
By Michael Krepon and Sonya Schoenberger
To date, the United States, Soviet Union and China have conducted 1,790 tests of 
nuclear devices. In contrast, these three major powers appear to have carried out 61 
anti-satellite (ASAT) tests. The great disparity in these numbers suggests that major 
powers have previously deemed ASAT tests to be strategically unwise, unimportant 
or unnecessary.
Now these calculations may be subject to change – at least by Beijing and Washington. 
While nuclear testing by major powers continues to recede in the rear-view mirror – 
Moscow last carried out a nuclear test in 1990, the United States in 1992 and China 
in 1996 – ASAT testing, or testing ASAT capabilities through other means, is being 
revived by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Pentagon. Moscow has had 
difficulty reconstituting its strategic and military space programs. Its last dedicated 
ASAT test was in 1982, over 30 years ago. Russian officials may well be interested in 
resurrecting these capabilities, but have not, as yet, tested them.
The situation is quite different in China and the United States. Beijing has a very active 
program to advance its ASAT capabilities. Over the past decade – a period that coin-
cides with the withdrawal by President George W. Bush’s administration from the 
Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty – the PLA appears to have attempted six anti-satellite 
tests.1  A January 2007 test successfully demonstrated “hit-to-kill” technology after 
failed attempts in 2005 and 2006.2  Subsequent to the successful intercept in 2007, the 
PLA has conducted two declared missile defense tests in 2010 and 2013,3  and one 
high-altitude rocket launch in May 2013 4  suspected to be related to the advancement 
of Chinese ASAT capabilities.5  
Over the same period, the United States demonstrated agile, sea-based ASAT capa-
bility by shooting down a nonfunctioning satellite in February 2008, ostensibly for 
reasons of public safety. 6  In addition, the United States has carried out 76 attempted 
missile defense tests since 2001.7  Most of these tests have been of theater missile 
defense capabilities. There is a significant technological crossover between missile 
defense and ASAT technologies. The United States and China have other options to 
interfere with or damage satellites. Both have tested close proximity maneuvers in 
space, and both could employ ground-based lasers and jammers to interfere with or 
harm satellites.  
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This annex compares the numbers of nuclear and ASAT tests carried out by the United 
States, the Soviet Union and China. The count for U.S. and Chinese ASAT tests over 
the past decade is debatable for the reasons mentioned above. The U.S. count may be 
low, given the Pentagon’s learning curve with respect to theater missile defense tests. 
The Chinese count may be high, if Chinese claims for ballistic missile defense testing 
are to be believed. Regardless of the number of tests of a predominantly or demonstra-
bly ASAT character over the past decade, these charts clarify that, while the number 
of ASAT tests is but a small percentage of the number of earlier nuclear tests, the pre-
sumed value of ASAT testing, or ASAT testing through other means, is growing.  As 
was the case with ASAT testing by the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War, U.S. and Chinese leaders have important decisions to make about whether 
to ratchet up their ASAT-related testing programs or to reach tacit, informal or execu-
tive agreements to dampen this competition.
ASAT test programs suffer initial failures. According to data compiled by Paul Stares, 
of the 53 U.S. and Soviet ASAT tests through 1984, only 58 percent might be con-
sidered to be successful. The U.S. success rate was 70 percent; the Soviet success rate 
was 45 percent.8  Press reports suggest that the PLA also experienced two failures 
before the successful ASAT intercept in 2007 that produced the largest human-made 
debris cloud of the Space Age.9  Failure rates will become more difficult to assess in the 
absence of intended hit-to-kill tests and the prevalence of tests designed to advance 
ASAT capabilities through indirect means. Absent diplomatic efforts to deal with 
emerging ASAT capabilities, more demonstrations of ASAT capabilities by indirect 
means are likely in the coming years. 
It is not too late to dampen an emerging competition in ASAT capabilities. One espe-
cially useful approach would be to establish a norm against further ASAT tests that 
produce long-lasting debris fields. This norm could be embedded in an International 
Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations. 
This annex relies upon data from several sources. For nuclear testing, this report relies 
upon the National Resource Defense Council’s databases.10  The data in the accom-
panying graphs include tests carried out as “peaceful nuclear explosions” (PNEs), 
because it is difficult to distinguish between tests of PNEs and tests that provide mili-
tary utility. For Cold War ASAT tests though 1984, this report relies on data compiled 
by Paul Stares.11  For tests of a predominantly or demonstrably ASAT character over 
the past decade, this report uses data from the Secure World Foundation’s August 
2013 Fact Sheet on “Anti-Satellite Tests in Space – The Case of China,” 12  government 
press releases and media accounts.    
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